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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis explores the sufficiency and effectiveness of legal guarantees for the 
socioeconomic rights of refugees in Southern Africa. In order to achieve effective 
protection of these rights for refugees, the thesis argues that legal and policy 
responses to refugeehood should distinguish between political and humanitarian 
refugees. This distinction is necessary for principled as well as pragmatic reasons. 
Political refugees are forced to flee from their own countries by reason of wrongful 
rights-violating conduct by the State; or similar conduct by non-state actors but with 
the acquiescence of State authorities; and they seek substitute State protection 
and political community membership in other countries. The thesis argues that 
political refugees ought to be accorded preferential treatment over other foreign 
nationals who are not members of the host State’s political community. These 
include humanitarian refugees who, by contrast, are compelled to flee their country 
of origin due to various factors that threaten to seriously harm their lives; but which 
are neither directly nor indirectly attributable to wrongful State conduct.  Based on 
this distinction, the thesis critiques international and domestic legal instruments, 
exploring the extent to which socioeconomic rights are guaranteed for refugees in 
the region. On the international plane, the thesis observes that international human 
rights law proceeds from the premise that nationals and foreign nationals ought to 
receive equal human rights guarantees, including in the sphere of socioeconomic 
rights, but that limitations on these rights, premised on nationality, are permissible 
based on reasonable and objective criteria. A problem with this position is that it 
makes no special case for the necessary preferential treatment that political 
refugees ought to receive in comparison with other foreign nationals.  On the 
domestic front, the general position in the region is that the socioeconomic rights of 
foreign nationals, including refugees, are only narrowly guaranteed. This is in 
contrast with the general principle of international law that nationals and foreign 
nationals should receive equal treatment with only limited exceptions permitted. 
Further, this domestic position does not comport with the principled case for the 
preferential treatment of political refugees over other foreign nationals that the 
ix 
 
thesis advocates.  In order to achieve a more effective guarantee of socioeconomic 
rights for refugees in the region, the thesis recommends that States in the region 
should comprehensively entrench these rights in applicable Bills of Rights. It also 
argues that courts in the region should be more progressive in their interpretation 
and application of the Bills of Rights. These measures should be blended with legal 
provisions that provide for a split between political refugees and humanitarian 
refugees in terms of the standards of treatment. There is also need for the 
harmonisation of domestic refugee law regimes, as well as a well-defined scheme 
of refugee burden-sharing, in the region. 
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GLOSSARY OF SOME SPECIAL TERMS 
 
Asylum Seeker: The term ‘asylum seeker’ unless the context in the thesis 
otherwise expressly suggests, is used to denote a person who is seeking refugee 
status in a host State, or whose application for such status has not yet been 
determined. 
Culpable conduct: Unless the context otherwise clearly shows, this expression in 
this thesis refers to wrongful or rights-violating conduct in broad terms, rather than 
its usual legal connotation of criminally liable conduct. 
Foreign national: A person who is not a citizen of the host country. 
National: Unless the context in the thesis otherwise expressly suggests, the term 
national in this study is used interchangeably with the term ‘citizen’ 
Non-refoulement: The prohibition of sending or sending back a refugee or other 
person to a State where such person would or is likely to be subjected to 
persecution or other serious harm. 
Permanent Resident: A foreign national who has been granted the right to 
sojourn and to settle in the host country indefinitely. 
Refugee: A person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence 
as a result of such events is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to 
it, or a person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination 
or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country 
of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in 
order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality (AU 
definition). 
State: The term ‘State’, unless the context in the thesis otherwise expressly 
suggests, is used interchangeably with the term ‘country’. 
Travaux preparatoires: Records of discussions or negotiations leading to the 
adoption of an international treaty or other instrument. 
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Ubuntu: A principle of African philosophy that entails treating others with kindness, 
compassion and dignity; and the collective idea that a person is only human 
through other people in the community. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
We lost our home, which means the familiarity of daily life. We lost our 
occupation, which means the confidence that we are of some use in this world. 
We lost our language, which means the naturalness of reactions, the simplicity 
of gestures, the unaffected expression of feelings. We left our lives in the 
ghettos...our best friends have been killed in concentration camps, and that 
means the rapture of our private lives. (Hannah Arendt, 1943). 
 
1.1 Background of the study 
 
Refugees are forced international migrants, ‘forced to leave their homes, 
familiar environment, friends and relations, occupations, established social 
services and all the comforts of their country of origin, however minimal, to 
face an unpredictable future which holds all sorts of dangers.’1 Whilst in the 
host country, whenever there are cutbacks on social services or other 
restrictions on socioeconomic rights, refugees as non-voters, foreigners and 
the uninvited, are among the first to suffer.2 They are often destitute, many of 
them live in difficult psychological and material conditions; and they are open 
to unwarranted negative suspicions that often befall the poor, the 
unprotected, and those ‘without papers.’3 Refugees frequently face egregious 
forms of discrimination, which are often manifested in the form of xenophobic 
attacks or marginalization.4 Thus refugees are a vulnerable group in society 
and their vulnerability is underlined by the circumstances of their 
displacement, the nature of their needs, and their experiences and status as 
                                                 
1
  EQ Blavo, The Problems of Refugees in Africa (1968) 20. 
2
  See Canadian Council for Refugees, Refugee Rights are Human Rights: How 
Canada Lives up, or Fails to Live up to its international human rights obligations 
towards refugees and other non-citizens, <http:// http://ccrweb.ca/refright.htm > 
(accessed on 15 July, 2012). 
3
  P Weis, ‘The international Protection of Refugees’, 48 American Journal of 
International Law 193-194. 
4
  See T Kupe et al (eds.) Go Home or Die Here: Violence, Xenophobia and the 
Reinvention of Difference in South Africa (2009) 
2 
 
foreign nationals in the host country.5 Emma Haddad observes that, 
regrettably, ‘refugees represent a permanent feature of the international 
landscape’ and that they are ‘the human reminder of the failings of modern 
international society.’6 
 
This thesis focuses on this vulnerable group of people. It examines the nature 
and extent of legal protection for refugees in Southern Africa in the area of 
social and economic rights (socioeconomic rights). The thesis also explores 
various measures that can be adopted in constructing a more effective 
scheme of legal guarantees that would be ethically sound, practically 
sustainable and ensure better realisation of these rights for refugees in the 
region.  
 
The focus of the thesis is on the nature and extent of legal guarantees and, in 
the main, the thesis does not seek to address the actual enjoyment of these 
rights on the ground. Where the study touches on the actual enjoyment of 
these rights, it does so in passing and only where the context of the 
discussion makes such exposition essential. 
 
The study proceeds from the assumption that generally, States treat their 
citizens differently from foreign nationals in so far as the guarantee of human 
rights, particularly socioeconomic rights, is concerned. Under this 
differentiated scheme, priority is given to citizens. The priority of citizens 
under this scheme has indeed received, to some extent, the imprimatur of 
international treaty law.  Article 2(3) of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) provides that: 
 
Developing countries, with due regard to human rights and their national 
economy, may determine to what extent they would guarantee the economic 
rights recognized in the present Covenant to non-nationals. 
                                                 
5
  Blavo (note 1 above) 31. 
6
  E Haddad, The Refugee in International Society: Between Sovereigns (2008) 3. 
3 
 
 
This provision makes it clear that the framers of the ICESCR viewed 
differential treatment between citizens and foreign nationals in the guarantee 
of economic rights by developing States as generally legitimate. It is 
noteworthy that none of the 160 States parties to the Covenant have entered 
any reservation on this provision.7 Thus, it is arguable that article 2(3)  of the 
ICESCR shows some discernible consensus among States on the priority to 
be accorded to citizens over foreign nationals, at least insofar as the 
guarantee of economic rights in developing States is concerned. Article 2(3) 
observably reflects, and is an implicit recognition of, the societal tensions that 
arise in respect of the guarantee of socioeconomic rights for foreign nationals 
in various countries. Jonathan Klaaren observes in this respect that: 
 
While the wisdom of allowing developing countries to exercise such an 
exception might be open to question, ICESCR art 2(3)...recognizes the real 
social and political tension that undoubtedly exists between the foreign nationals 
and citizens around perceptions of rights to economic benefits.
8
 
 
Differential treatment between citizens and foreign nationals in the context of 
socioeconomic rights is mainly justified in relation to political and resource 
constraints.9 In terms of the political constraints, it has been argued that a 
democratic State is politically constrained because it derives its authority from 
the consent of the governed and thus, to be legitimate, must, as a general 
rule, promote the claims and interests of its voters.  Generally, these voters 
are citizens.10 Sometimes the interests of the citizens include anti-immigration 
sentiments such as a strong clamour for restrictive admission policies and 
second class treatment of foreign nationals, including refugees. As a result, 
                                                 
7
  OHCHR, ICESCR Status, http: // treaties.un.org / Pages / View Details .aspx ? src = 
TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en (accessed 15 July, 2012).  
8
  J Klaaren, ‘Human Rights Protection of Foreign Nationals’, 2009 30 Industrial 
Law Journal 84  
9
  See VP Nanda   ‘The African Refugee Dilemma: A Challenge for International Law 
and Policy’ (1985) 32(1/2) Africa Today, 61-75. 
10
  See R Dixon, Review of MJ Gibney, ‘The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal 
Democracy and the Response to Refugees’, (2004) in (2005) 17(2) International 
Refugee Law Journal 454. 
4 
 
governments in host States face the difficult and delicate task of having to 
strike a proper balance between ensuring the protection of foreign nationals 
whose lives might be in peril, such as refugees, on the one hand; and being 
electorally accountable to their citizens by being responsive to popular 
sentiment, which might include such anti-immigrant clamour, on the other.  
 
With regard to the resource constraints, difficulties arise from the fact that the 
State, operating within a circumscribed territory, has to act within the 
absorptive capacities of its society.11 These constraints impact very heavily 
on poor countries and communities because of their small or heavily 
burdened pools of resources.12 The UNHCR has acknowledged this resource 
problem in the context of refugee protection, stating that: 
 
There are inevitable tensions between international obligations and national 
responsibilities where countries called upon to host large refugee populations, 
even on a temporary basis, are suffering their own severe economic difficulties, 
high unemployment, declining living standards, shortages in housing and land 
and/or continuing man-made and natural disasters.
13
 
 
These resource constraints are also exacerbated by the prospect that, 
whatever choices the State has to make in admitting and protecting 
immigrants, there is the possibility of ripple socioeconomic effects because, 
                                                 
11
  Ibid. 
12
  As Andrew Shacknove argues, political conflicts, resource scarcity and conceptual 
confusion about the meaning of refugeehood, its causes, and its management 
conspire in contributing to the misery of both the refugee and host country, and to the 
inflammation of international tension – See AE Shacknove, ‘Who Is a Refugee?’ 
(1985) 95(2) Ethics  274-284, 276. 
13
  Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Sub-Committee of the 
Whole on International Protection, ‘Implementation of the 1951 of the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees’, UN doc. 
EC/SPC/54, 7 July 1989, paras.8-22. Cort similarly points out that there is a ‘tension 
existing between international instruments advocating humanitarian assistance to 
refugees and the growing political and economic constraints on assistance placed by 
both developed and less developed nations.’ See Richard AC Cort, ‘Resettlement of 
Refugees: National or International Duty?’ (1997) 32 Texas International Law Journal 
307, 309. 
5 
 
among other things, a generous policy might increase demand for 
resources.14  
 
Further, resource constraints entail that there is always competition for 
access to socioeconomic resources or opportunities between host 
populations and foreign nationals. This causes tensions between these two 
groups. Host populations in many cases fail to appreciate why they should 
compete for these resources or opportunities with foreign nationals. There is 
frequently a general perception that foreign nationals have their own 
countries to look toward; that their welfare should be the concern of the 
governments in their home countries; and that they therefore place an 
unjustifiable burden on the resource pool of the host State. 
 
A peculiar problem arises in the specific case of refugees. Where relief aid is 
provided by or through organizations, it has been noted that, ‘organisations 
that help refugees tend to be more concerned with refugees than hosts.’15 
Michael Nyinnah observes for instance that ‘by virtue of UNHCR assistance, 
many asylum seekers in Southern Africa are materially superior to 
impoverished nationals.’16 Host communities that feel neglected in this way 
often develop animosity towards refugees and become generally hostile 
towards them.17 Betts observes in this regard, that: 
                                                 
14
  See Dixon (note 10 above) 454. 
15
  Robert Chambers, ‘Hidden Losers? The Impact of Rural Refugees and Refugee 
Programs on Poorer Hosts’ in Robert F. Gorman (Ed.), Refugee Aid and 
Development: Theory and Practice (1993), 29-43, 29 
16
  Michael Kingsley-Nyinah, ‘Asylum, Refugee Criteria, and irregular Movements in 
Southern Africa’ (1995) 7 International Journal of Refugee Law 291, 293-294. 
17
  Daniel Barkely points out that during periods of refugee crises ‘time, energy, and 
resources are diverted away from national development and towards aiding refugees. 
This diversion from development threatens the lives of nationals and refugees alike 
as they compete for scarce resources. In some cases, this competition results in 
outright conflict between the nationals and the refugees.’ - DW Barkley, ‘Hope for the 
Hopeless: International Cooperation and the Refugee’ (1989-1990) 21 Columbia 
Human Rights Law Review 319, 328, 332. Volker Türk & Frances Nicholson  observe 
that ‘[x]enophobia and intolerance towards foreigners and asylum seekers 
have…increased in recent years and present a major problem. Certain media and 
politicians appear increasingly ready to exploit the situation for their own ends.’- See 
V Türk & F Nicholson in “Refugee protection in international law: an overall 
6 
 
The problems facing African States that provide asylum for millions of refugees 
have over the…years become part of the common currency of international 
debate. There has been an increasing realisation of the risks of political tensions 
that may  be incurred through special aid programs for tax exempt refugees 
settled among rural, and sometimes urban, populations who are themselves 
almost equally impoverished. There has been a parallel realisation and 
acceptance of the fact that the asylum countries cannot sustain the refugee 
burden without very considerable international assistance for the improvement 
of their infrastructures and services.
18
 
 
In view of these constraints, structural and social challenges, it is imperative 
to devise a carefully constructed legal arrangement with regard to the 
guarantee of socioeconomic rights as they relate to citizens on the one hand, 
and foreign nationals on the other. Such an arrangement should not only be 
tailored to ensure that no person is denuded of his or her human dignity as a 
result of want; but also to ensure that there is harmonious co-existence 
between foreign nationals and host populations.  
 
This thesis attempts to address these general immigration issues. However, 
the general immigration issues are addressed only for purposes of laying an 
appropriate theoretical foundation. The main focus of the study is on the 
rights of refugees as a subset of the broader category of foreign nationals. 
  
It is also noteworthy that some major political and socioeconomic 
developments in the region, most significantly the Zimbabwean political and 
economic crisis over the past decade or so, have had the effect of blurring the 
distinction between those foreign nationals who are genuinely in need of 
international protection, based on a well-founded fear of serious harm; and 
those who are merely looking for better economic prospects in other 
                                                                                                                                           
perspective” in E Feller et al (eds.), Refugee Protection in International Law: 
UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection (2003). 
18
  See TF Betts, ‘Evolution and Promotion of the Integrated Rural Development 
Approach to Refugee Policy in Africa’ in Robert F. Gorman (Ed.), Refugee Aid and 
Development: Theory and Practice (1993) 27. 
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countries.19 The terms ‘refugees’, ‘economic migrants’ and ‘economic 
refugees’ are all often used to describe these foreign nationals, and no 
systematic attempt is made to unpack the meaning of these terms. In 
particular, the terms economic migrants and economic refugees ‘are often 
used interchangeably, apparently under the assumption that their meaning is 
self-evident.’20 This, however, is not the case. For a person to be a refugee, 
as discussed more elaborately below, he or she must flee the country of 
origin involuntarily. If the intolerable circumstances that force him or her to 
flee are economic, he or she can properly be called an economic refugee. An 
economic migrant, by contrast, is a person who ‘is moved exclusively by 
economic considerations’21 and does so voluntarily ‘merely to attain a “better” 
life’.22Illustratively, Foster provides the example of ‘a woman who left her 
country [merely] because she was able to earn a higher salary as a doctor in 
a second country’ as the classic example of an economic migrant.23  
 
Further, in the case of refugees, there seems to be a lack of appreciation 
among policy and law makers, of the need to draw a distinction in standards 
of treatment between refugees who are forced out of their home countries 
due to the culpable conduct of their government or with its acquiescence; and 
those that are forced to flee as a result of a humanitarian crisis that is not 
directly attributable to the State.24 These confusions have led to a rather 
                                                 
19
  Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), South Africa: A long awaited policy 
on economic migrants, 10 April 2009, available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/49e44bd91a.html (accessed 11May 2013); F Khan, 
Patterns and policies of migration in South Africa: Changing patterns and the need 
for a comprehensive approach, http: // www.refugeerights.uct.ac.za / downloads / 
refugeerights.uct.ac.za/patterns_policies_migration_FKhan.doc (acessed 11 May 
2013)                                       
20
  M Foster, International Refugee Law and Socio-Economic Rights: Refuge from 
Deprivation, (2007) 5. 
21
  UHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under 
the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(1992), para.51. 
22
  Foster, (note 20 above) 6. 
23
  Ibid, 7. 
24
  Ibid. 
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amorphous conception of refugeehood in the region that conflates various 
categories of foreign nationals. 
 
This study aims to address the confusion, and seeks to achieve conceptual 
clarity on the separation between refugees on the one hand, and economic 
(voluntary) migrants on the other. Specifically, the study seeks to clarify: (a) 
who exactly a refugee is, (b) what the main categories of refugees are, and 
(c) what entitlements they ought to have in a scheme for the guarantee of 
fundamental human rights generally, and socioeconomic rights in particular. 
In this regard, the study seeks to reconceptualise the nature of the legal 
guarantees for the socioeconomic rights of refugees, by critically evaluating 
the existing guarantees in the light of the normative (theoretical) foundations 
of refugeehood that the study also interrogates. 
 
To that end, the study, for analytical purposes, splits refugees into 
humanitarian refugees and political refugees. This is done for purposes of 
coming up with a more fitting and defensible scheme for the treatment of 
refugees that must take into account various causes of flight and international 
migration. The thesis demonstrates how the broader scheme for the 
treatment of foreign nationals generally relates and should relate to the 
treatment of refugees specifically.  
 
The study proceeds from the premise that the refugee problem is more of an 
international and regional problem than it is (or than it ought to be) a country-
specific one; and that its solutions must reflect this international and regional 
character. As Emma Haddad states: 
 
Since it emerged as a modern ‘problem’ it became clear that the refugee 
issue was beyond the capacity of any one government to deal with 
effectively. As such the discipline sits between domestic and international 
politics and brings to the fore the interdependence between the two. How 
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one country deals with the problem will have consequences for others and 
influence future relations between States.
25
 
 
Haddad argues in this regard that ‘there is a fundamental and mutually 
constitutive link between the refugee concept and international society.’26  
 
The thesis, in this regard, critically engages various refugee protection 
regimes in Southern Africa, exploring whether refugees in the region have 
sufficient socioeconomic rights guarantees; and what frameworks of 
international cooperation exist or ought to exist in order to make the 
socioeconomic rights protection regime in Southern Africa better harmonised 
and more effective. The study proposes that relevant reforms be done under 
the aegis of the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) legal 
framework. 
 
1.2 A synopsis of the study’s argument 
 
The thesis engages ethical and international human rights law standards, in 
order to investigate the extent to which refugees in Southern Africa are 
guaranteed protection of their socioeconomic rights.  The ethical standards 
explored flow from a set of principles of justice that ‘provide a way of 
assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions of society’, and which 
‘define the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social 
cooperation.’ 27 Several alternative political theories are examined in this 
regard as a foundational framework. In general, according to this foundational 
framework, the study accepts that there are plausible grounds for prioritizing 
citizens over foreign nationals in the guarantee of socioeconomic rights. 
 
                                                 
25
  Haddad, (note 6 above) 2. 
26
  Ibid, 1. 
27
   J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1999) 4. 
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The thesis proceeds to identify refugees as occupying a unique space within 
the general spectrum of foreign nationals. It further argues, on principled 
grounds, that it is important that a distinction be drawn between humanitarian 
refugees and political refugees.  Humanitarian refugees ought to be granted 
protection on the basis of humanitarian need. Political refugees on the other 
hand, ought to be granted protection on the basis of the need for substitute 
political community membership, owing to the illegitimate repudiation of their 
membership of their original political community (the country of origin) by (or 
with the acquiescence of) officials of the State.  
 
The normative argument that underlies the investigation is that political 
refugees should enjoy such protection on a heightened footing than 
humanitarian refugees and other foreign nationals generally. It is argued that 
the treatment of political refugees should generally be the same as that 
accorded to permanent residents based on the community membership 
principle. The study also suggests a graduated framework from temporary 
protection to durable protection that should apply in the case of humanitarian 
refugees. 
 
The thesis measures the extent of the guarantee of socioeconomic rights 
under the various international law regimes and domestic legal regimes in the 
countries under study, against this normative argument.  The study concludes 
by advancing an argument that there ought to be a regional legal and policy 
framework on refugee protection that also deals with their socioeconomic 
rights;  and suggests what such a framework should entail. In particular, the 
thesis makes a case for a systematized scheme of burden-sharing and 
harmonization of domestic legal regimes for the guarantee of socioeconomic 
rights for refugees in the SADC region. 
11 
 
1.3 The definition of a refugee 
 
In order to properly conceptualise the refugee problem, it is imperative that 
we clearly delineate the group which is the subject of the study.28  Emma 
Haddad has argued that, without a clear understanding of who broadly, we 
are talking about, however general we choose to keep this ‘who’, we cannot 
expect to further our grasp of how refugees emerge and how we should 
approach the surrounding debate.29 The main purpose of any definition or 
description of the class of refugees is to facilitate, and to justify, aid and 
protection. In practice, satisfying the relevant criteria for refugeehood is a 
necessary condition to trigger entitlement to the pertinent rights or benefits.30 
Thus in this section, the study explores the various definitions of a refugee as 
have been adopted under various legal regimes;  and it then identifies the 
most appropriate definition that would facilitate a more effective scheme for 
the guarantee of the socioeconomic rights of refugees, particularly in 
Southern Africa.  
 
The discussion in this regard starts by briefly exploring the various definitions 
adopted under four international instruments that are either of significant or 
critical relevance to this discussion. These instruments are the 1950 Statute 
of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (the 
UNHCR Statute);31 the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(the 1951 Convention);32 the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees;33 and the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects 
of Refugee Problems in Africa (the 1969 OAU Convention).34 The discussion 
concludes by identifying the 1969 OAU Convention definition as the most 
                                                 
28
  A Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law, (1966) 73. 
29
  Haddad (note 6 above) 3 
30
  GS Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law (1998) 2. 
31
  UNGA Resolution 428 (V) of 14 December, 1950. 
32
  189 UNTS 150. See Annexure I for a full text of the Convention. 
33
  606 UNTS 267. See Annexure II for a full text of the 1967 Protocol. 
34
  1000 UNTS 46. See Annexure III for a full text of the 1969 OAU Convention. 
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appropriate. In Chapter II, the study then proceeds to advance an argument 
in respect of the standards of treatment for refugees that ought to be adopted 
in respect of refugees. As will be observed, that chapter expands on the 
conceptual understanding of refugeehood. 
 
1.3.1 The UNHCR Statute 
 
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
the UN’s refugee agency, was established in 1950 by the UN General 
Assembly (UNGA); and the UNHCR Statute was also adopted by the UNGA 
under the same Resolution.35 The functions of the UNHCR in terms of the 
Statute are to provide international protection and to seek durable solutions 
for refugees through voluntary repatriation or assimilation in new 
communities.36 Thus a primary function of the UNHCR is to explore durable 
solutions for refugee problems. According to Article 6 of the UNHCR Statute, 
a refugee is defined as: 
 
Any person who, as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and 
owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is 
unable or, owing to such fear or for reasons other than personal convenience, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a 
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is 
unable or, owing to such fear or for reasons other than personal convenience, is 
unwilling to return to it.
37
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
  See UNGA Res. 428(V), Annexe 1, No.3, UNGA 5
th
 Sess., Summary Records, 669-
80, 14 Dec. 1950.  See also Goodwin-Gill (note 30 above) 7. 
36
  Ibid, 212. 
37
  See Article 6A(ii) of the Statute. 
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In addition, the competence of the organisation extends to: 
 
Any other person who is outside the country of his nationality, or if he has no 
nationality, the country of his former habitual residence, because he has a well-
founded fear of persecution by reason of his race, religion, nationality or political 
opinion and is unable or, because of such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of the government of the country of his nationality, or if he has no 
nationality, to return to the country of his former habitual residence.
38
 
 
The general significance of the definition of a ‘refugee’ under the UNHCR 
Statute is that the Statute applies to any member State of the UN, irrespective 
of whether or not it has ratified any of the international or regional refugee 
conventions. Coupled with this is the fact that the definition of a refugee under 
the Statute is much wider than the 1951 Convention definition which is 
discussed below. The definition of a refugee under the statute encompasses 
all those persons who, for reasons other than personal convenience, find 
themselves outside the country of their nationality or former habitual 
residence. As the discussion of the 1951 Convention definition below 
demonstrates, this is in sharp contrast with the definition under the latter 
which is highly circumscribed by a closed list of grounds.  
 
The consequence of the wide definition under the UNHCR Statute is that, 
among other things, even those refugees who have been denied status in 
terms of the process of Status determination of the host country based on the 
1951 Convention definition, can still be treated as refugees by the UNHCR if 
they satisfy the UNHCR Statute’s definition. Refugees recognised by the 
UNHCR in terms of the Statute are called ‘mandate refugees’. In such cases, 
the UNHCR might in turn assist mandate refugees in finding durable solutions 
through such measures as international resettlement. The wide definition 
under the Statute includes the category of what are referred to as 
humanitarian refugees under this study. 
                                                 
38
  See Article 6B of the UNHCR Statute. 
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1.3.2 The 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol 
 
The 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the 1951 
Convention) is the framework treaty on the protection of refugees in the 
world. The definition of a refugee under the 1951 Convention is contained in 
Article 1 of the Convention. A refugee is defined as: 
 
Any person who, as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and 
owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and  is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality 
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of 
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
39
 
 
At the time of its adoption, this definition was subject to temporal40 and 
geographical41 limitations. However, in view of new refugee situations that 
had arisen around the world after 1951, it became imperative to remove these 
limitations. Thus the 1967 Protocol to the Convention was adopted, providing 
that: 
 
For the purpose of the present Protocol, the term ‘refugee’ shall…mean any 
person within the definition of Article 1 of the Convention as if the words ‘As a 
result of events occurring before I January 1951…’ and the words ‘…as a 
result of such events’, in Article 1A(2) were omitted.
42
 
 
                                                 
39
  Art. 1(A)(2). 
40
  i.e events occurring before 1 January 1951. 
41
  Article 1B(1)(a) of the Convention, states that the words ‘events occurring before 1 
January 1951’ in article 1, section A, shall be understood to mean… ‘events 
occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951’; and then provided an option for states to 
declare, upon ratification, whether the Convention was to apply only to ‘events 
occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 1951.’Thus it was apparent that 
primarily, the 1951 Convention was adopted with a view to addressing refugee 
problems in Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War. 
42
  Art. I(2) of the Protocol. 
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Further, Article I(3) of the 1967 Protocol provides, in part, that ‘[t]he present 
Protocol shall be applied by all States Parties hereto without any geographic 
limitation…’ It can therefore be said, in this regard, that the treaty protection 
regime for refugees under the UN system only became truly global with the 
coming into force of the 1967 Protocol as a complement of the 1951 
Convention. 
 
The 1951 Convention all the same has still been the subject of criticism. For 
instance, the Convention has been criticised for being ‘a very narrow 
instrument, protecting a very specific group of persons.’43 The Convention is 
said to be narrow owing to its highly circumscribed definition of a refugee, 
premised on the notion of well-founded fear of persecution, that excludes 
from its purview some forced international migrants; who cannot demonstrate 
such well-founded fear, even though they might be considered to have at 
least a morally justifiable claim to international protection and/or assistance 
based on humanitarian need.  It has been counter-argued though, that a 
wider definition, if applied without moderation, might also present both 
practical as well as ethical problems within the social fabric of host States. 
Worster for instance points out in this regard that: 
 
If we were motivated strictly by human-centred interests, we would find a 
broadening of the definition, although perhaps with limited state compliance. If 
we were motivated strictly by state-centred interests, we might find a narrowing 
of the definition, although perhaps abandoning desperate individuals truly in 
need.
44
 
 
One can perhaps state that the conundrum that Worster presents here brings 
into sharp focus the dilemma between pragmatism and idealism when 
adopting measures for the protection of forced international migrants 
generally. It also brings into sharp focus the tension that exists between the 
                                                 
43
  William Thomas Worster, ‘The Evolving Definition of the Refugee In Contemporary 
International Law’, (2012) 30(1) Berkeley Journal of International Law  101 
44
  Ibid. 
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notion of universal human rights as imposing universal obligations on all 
States on the one hand, and the principle of state sovereignty on the other, 
and how these various notions ought to be balanced.  
 
The reason for the narrowness of the definition under the 1951 Convention is 
that the definition is a manifestation of State interests that were prevalent at 
the time the Convention was adopted.45 Whilst it reflects the desire of the 
States to ensure that persons fleeing egregious human rights violations had 
surrogate international protection; the definition also reflects that most States 
were, at the same time, equally focused on retaining their sovereignty over 
immigration control. James Hathaway has observed in this regard that: 
 
Current refugee law can be thought of as a compromise between the sovereign 
prerogative of states to control immigration and the reality of coerced 
movements of persons at risk. Its purpose is not specifically to meet the needs 
of the refugees themselves (as both the humanitarian and human rights 
paradigms would suggest), but rather to govern disruptions of regulated 
international migration in accordance with the interests of states.
46
 
 
However, Hathaway’s argument, it is submitted, is not entirely correct. The 
second preambular citation to the 1951 Convention explicitly states that one 
of the principal motivations for the adoption of the 1951 Convention was the 
desire of the contracting States ‘to assure refugees the widest possible 
exercise of…fundamental rights and freedoms.’ Further, as Hathaway himself 
observed in his subsequent work: 
 
The rights set by the Refugee Convention include several critical protections that 
speak to the most basic aspects of the refugee experience, including the need to 
escape, to be accepted, and to be sheltered. Under the Convention, 
refugees…are entitled to a number of basic survival and dignity rights, as well as 
                                                 
45
  JC Hathaway, Reconceiving International Refugee Law, (1997) xviii-xx.   
46
  James Hathaway, ‘A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law’, 
(1990) 31 Harvard International Law Journal 129, 133. 
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the documentation of their status and access to national courts for the 
enforcement of their rights.’
47
 
 
This position thus seems at odds with the argument that the 1951 Convention 
was adopted primarily as a means for regulating international migration, 
rather than to address the basic aspects of the refugee experience.  The 
latter passage suggests that the Convention was adopted to assure refugees 
their basic survival and dignity rights. The most accurate position therefore 
seems to be that refugee law generally, and the 1951 Convention in 
particular, seek to achieve both ends. It is both state-centric, in seeking to 
ensure that State interests of immigration regulation are assured; and 
anthropocentric in being directly targeted at ensuring the protection of the 
vulnerable refugee, and to restore his or her full recognition as a human being 
with basic survival and dignity rights.  The Convention's attempt at striking a 
proper balance in this regard is manifested by the narrow definition of a 
refugee under the 1951 Convention on the one hand; but also the wide 
catalogue of socioeconomic rights under the Convention on the other.  
 
1.3.3 The 1969 OAU Convention 
 
Among the various treaties on refugee law, the 1969 OAU Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (the 1969 OAU 
Convention) offers probably the most expansive and generous definition of a 
refugee. The Convention was adopted in reaction to the constantly increasing 
numbers of refugees in Africa, with a view to finding ways of alleviating their 
misery and suffering, and to provide them with a better life and future. The 
1951 definition was for instance found to be inapplicable or ineffective to deal 
with mass population displacements, particularly where these were caused by 
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  J Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, (2005) 94. 
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civil war or other disruptive events such as natural disasters.48As events 
turned out, these were incidentally the major causes of forced international 
displacement and migration in Africa.49 Further, the demands and 
consequences of the decolonisation struggle on the continent, and the 
struggle against apartheid in South Africa, created a need to offer refuge to 
people fleeing from oppressive regimes.50  
 
Article I(2) of the 1969 OAU Convention was therefore specially fashioned to 
address these issues. The article, that has attracted significant attention for 
bringing in a new definitional dimension to refugee law discourse, expands on 
the 1951 Convention definition by providing that: 
 
The term “refugee” shall also apply to every person who, owing to external 
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public 
order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is 
compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in 
another place outside his country of origin or nationality. 
 
The expression ‘events seriously disturbing public order’ under the 1969 OAU 
Convention lends itself to expansive interpretation that includes events such 
as natural disasters that lead to massive human displacements or severe lack 
of the basic needs of life; as well as situations of internal armed conflict and 
other forms of internal strife.51 The language of this provision is such as to 
even, under certain circumstances, entail an objective rather than a 
subjective approach to the determination of refugee status. An objective 
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  MB Rankin, ‘Extending the limits or narrowing the scope? Deconstructing the OAU 
refugee definition thirty years on’ (2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights 
406. 
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         M Sharpe, ‘The 1969 African Refugee Convention: Innovations, Misconceptions, and 
Omissions’ 58   McGill Law Journal 95 (2012), 100. 
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  During the OAU Conference on the Legal, Economic and Social Aspects of African 
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  See Rankin (note 48 above).  
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approach entails that a person presenting himself or herself in a country of 
asylum, and who has fled from a country where it is known, objectively, that 
events seriously disturbing public order exist, may be viewed as a prima facie 
refugee for purposes of the Convention, without further examination as to  
individual (subjective) circumstances.52  
 
1.3.4 Preferred definition of a refugee  
 
The definition of a refugee under the 1951 Convention, whilst being generally 
satisfactory in addressing the problem of political refugeehood, has some 
inherent weaknesses. One of them is that it focuses on the subjective 
(individualised) fear of persecution based on a closed set of factors: i.e, race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion. This therefore excludes from its compass, victims of major displacing 
events such as civil wars and natural disasters where the State is unable or 
unwilling to offer them the needed protection, which is a common feature in 
Africa.  Yet another weakness is that it does not create room for group status 
determination and might, therefore, lead into intractable status determination 
complexities in cases of mass influx of refugees. The test under the UNHCR 
Statute on the other hand, which is premised on 'reasons other than personal 
convenience', has the problem that it seems too wide to be practicable. For 
instance, based on the UNHCR Statute test, a person who fails to secure a 
job in one country can claim refugee status in another on the basis that the 
circumstances of his/her departure from his/her country of origin were more 
than mere personal convenience. The concept of refugeehood however is not 
meant to cover such mere economic misfortunes. There must be an element 
of harm, the harm must attain the threshold of seriousness, and there should 
                                                 
52
  See J Hyndman & BV Nyland `UNHCR and the Status of Prima Facie Refugees in 
Kenya' (1998) 10 International Journal of Refugee Law 34. See also E Arboleda 
‘Refugee Definition in Africa and Latin America: The Lessons of Pragmatism’ (1991) 
3 International Journal of Refugee Law 185. 
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be demonstrable evidence of lack of in-country protection alternatives in order 
to ground a claim for refugee status. 
 
In the final analysis, considering the various legal definitions explored above, 
the expanded definition under the 1969 OAU Convention sounds most 
attractive as it, among other things, allows for the protection of refugees who 
flee ‘events seriously disturbing public order’. Such events could include 
serious disruptive economic crises that threaten livelihood to the degree that 
the only avenue for survival is for the people affected to seek international 
protection. In addition, it offers an avenue for group status determination that 
is unavailable under the 1951 Convention, but remains an important legal 
device considering the cases of mass influx that are a common feature of the 
African refugee landscape. This definition is therefore both usefully broader 
than the 1951 Convention definition, and pragmatically narrower than the 
UNHCR Statute definition. In the premises, the 1969 OAU Convention’s 
definition is the preferred definition under this study.  
 
However, it has to be acknowledged here that the 1969 Convention definition 
itself is not unproblematic. For instance, the definition seems to conflate flight 
for safety that is culpably triggered by State agents on the one hand (political 
refugeehood); and other forms of forced migration arising either from non-
human agency or not culpably triggered or acquiesced in by State agents on 
the other (humanitarian refugeehood). Walker suggests that these different 
causes of need for surrogate State protection demand differing responses 
that may be allocated by the international community.53The 1969 OAU 
Convention does not allocate such differing responses. 
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  K Walker, ‘Defending the 1951 Convention Definition of Refugee’, (2003) 17 
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A fuller exposition of the critique of the existing framework under the 1969 
OAU Convention, and a justification for the argument advanced by Walker, as 
introduced here, is made in Chapter II.   
 
1.4 Overview of the refugee problem in Southern Africa 
 
1.4.1 The nature of the problem 
 
International migration is one of the most pressing social phenomena in the 
world today. The United Nations Food and Population Agency (UNFPA) 
states that there are over 214 million international migrants worldwide,54 and 
out of these, nearly 16 million are in African countries south of the Sahara.55 
In the context of Southern Africa, international migration has been described 
as a perennial and indelible part of the regional political economy.56 There are 
an estimated 4.7 million international migrants in Southern Africa.57  
 
The problem of refugees is part of this wider phenomenon of international 
migration. It is estimated that, out of the total international migrant population 
globally,58 11.8 million are refugees.59  
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At the time of writing, the latest information from the UNHCR shows that as ‘at 
the beginning of 2012, there were some 449,000 people of concern to 
UNHCR in Southern Africa, including 145,000 refugees, 245,000 asylum-
seekers, 55,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 4,000 returnees’.60 
The UNHCR figures however exclude Tanzania, which is classified as an 
East African State by the UNHCR. However, Tanzania is also sometimes 
politically categorized as a Southern African country; it is a member of SADC, 
and forms part of this study in that context. According to the UNHCR, the 
organisation’s total population of concern in Tanzania as at the beginning of 
2012 was 294,204, of whom 131,243 were recognised refugees, 705 asylum 
seekers, and various groups (not disaggregated and explained in specific 
groups by the UNHCR) comprising 162,256.61 Thus the total population of 
concern in the countries under study, as at the beginning of 2012,62 was 
743,204; of whom 521,948 were recognised refugees and asylum seekers 
(the refugee population). It is this refugee population that this study focuses 
on. 
 
The UNHCR has observed that mixed migratory movements pose the biggest 
challenge to refugee protection in Southern Africa generally and South Africa 
in particular, as it is not always easy to isolate real refugees who are in need 
of international protection; and mere economic migrants who are solely 
migrating in search for better economic opportunities elsewhere.63 These 
mixed migratory movements have put a severe strain on scarce humanitarian 
resources in the region, and in countries such as Malawi, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe, this has in turn caused tensions not only between the real 
refugees and mere economic migrants within government established 
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refugee camps, but also between the migrant populations generally and the 
surrounding host populations.64 The UNHCR states that this problem:  
 
has led many governments in the region to restrict access to the asylum 
system by requiring travel documents at entry points and applying the ‘first 
safe country’ principle, whereby entry is refused to asylum-seekers who have 
travelled through a safe country prior to their arrival
65
 
 
This trend is problematic as it puts refugees at significant risk of being 
exposed to the possibility of return to a country where they could face serious 
violations of their fundamental human rights (the risk of refoulement). 
 
1.4.2 The magnitude of the problem in Southern Africa 
 
1.4.2.1 South Africa 
 
Regionally, in the context of immigration generally, South Africa features 
prominently in Southern Africa because, being Africa’s biggest and most 
advanced economy, it acts as a magnet for various types of migrants 
including general migrant workers and refugees.66 Indeed, South Africa, a 
developing country with a medium sized economy by global standards, has 
the largest number of asylum applications in the world.67 As at the beginning 
of 2012, the country had a total population of 277,299 of concern to the 
UNHCR, including 57,899 recognised refugees and a backlog of over 
219,400 asylum applications that were either awaiting decision or on 
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appeal.68 Most of the Applications were from Nationals of Burundi, Ethiopia, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Somalia and Zimbabwe; 
as well as some Asian countries such as China and India.69 Most of the 
recognised refugees originated largely from Angola, DRC, Burundi, Rwanda 
and Somalia.70  
 
An analysis of these source countries shows that refugees or asylum seekers 
in South Africa largely come from countries in which there is, or has recently 
been, civil strife or armed conflict. These include the DRC, Somalia and 
Burundi. Source countries also include those where the refugees are likely to 
suffer persecution ‘for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion.’71These include India, on grounds 
of religion or membership of a particular social group such as members of 
lower castes,72 and Zimbabwe, on grounds of political opinion.73 
 
Unlike most other SADC States, South Africa does not have a policy of 
camping refugees. Instead, it promotes their integration into local 
communities so that they can pursue an independent livelihood. Refugees in 
South Africa are formally guaranteed a wide spectrum of socioeconomic 
rights, including the rights to health, work and social security. However, in 
practice, it has been difficult for them to access these rights.74 The UNHCR 
states that generally, ‘competition between refugees and South African 
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nationals for jobs, housing, business opportunities and social services has 
raised tensions’ between refugees and the local population.’75  
 
The government of South Africa therefore finds itself in a quagmire. On the 
one hand, if it fully implements the wide-ranging guarantees of socioeconomic 
rights for refugees, it risks being seen by its citizens as failing to accord them 
priority over the refugees that are viewed as outsiders and therefore as less 
deserving of accessing socioeconomic goods and services from the State.76 
On the other hand, if it provides only minimal protection, it risks being viewed 
by refugees and the international community as failing to ensure that 
refugees enjoy the rights that are guaranteed for them under the law.77 Faced 
with this conundrum, it has been observed that for obvious political reasons, 
the government’s focus has ultimately fallen squarely on addressing the 
needs of its citizens first, and deferring those of other groups that might be 
just as vulnerable.78 The result has been that most poor foreign nationals, and 
particularly political refugees (who are politically choiceless by reason of 
lacking effective political membership of their States of nationality), have 
become even more vulnerable. 
 
The UNHCR observes that the vulnerability of refugees in South Africa is 
further exacerbated by the fact that they are often targeted by criminals within 
an environment already afflicted by high levels of crime, including violent 
crime, ‘as well as sexual and gender-based violence, exploitation in the 
workplace and detention due to lack of proper documentation’.79 Further, the 
UNHCR observes that ‘poor socio-economic conditions among host 
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communities provide a breeding ground for xenophobia.’80 In addition, the 
documentation that refugees receive from the Department of Home Affairs is 
of limited duration and this in turn, restricts and compromises their efforts to 
find secure jobs and/or generally to become self-reliant.81 
 
Generally, it is apparent that notwithstanding an apparently generous 
constitutional and legislative framework in the guarantee of socioeconomic 
rights for refugees, South Africa is faced with numerous problems in the 
implementation of these rights due to a matrix of socioeconomic challenges.82 
Thus it is apposite to re-examine the existing framework and assess whether 
it could be improved or reconceptualised for better implementation.  
  
1.4.2.2 Tanzania 
 
Tanzania, as demonstrated by the statistics above, comes second after South 
Africa within the SADC region, in terms of the magnitude of the refugee and 
asylum seeker population. Tanzania is situated in Africa’s Great Lakes 
Region. Whilst over the decades virtually all of its Great Lakes neighbours 
(Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda) have been afflicted to different 
degrees by either general civil strife or intra-State and Inter-State conflicts, or 
both, Tanzania has remained peaceful and stable.83 The result is that 
Tanzania has naturally been the first country of asylum for millions of 
refugees fleeing various forms of harm within that region.  
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The UNHCR reports that ‘Tanzania has been an asylum country for more 
than four decades during which it has hosted one of the largest refugee 
populations in Africa.’84 The country, unlike South Africa, adopts an 
encampment policy whereby refugees are ‘warehoused’ in designated 
camps. Whilst Tanzania has historically been renowned for its generous 
reception and treatment of refugees, the country has shown signs of fatigue 
in hosting refugees in recent years, and the government has become 
increasingly reluctant to process asylum applications.85 The cause for this 
growing reluctance is largely premised on the heavy resource burden that 
refugees place on the host State.  
 
Thus for instance, whilst Tanzania has previously been renowned for its 
generosity towards refugees, including offering good prospects of local 
integration and subsequent naturalization upon durable residence, it is now 
closing down on the refugees’ prospects for local integration and 
naturalization.86 To illustrate Tanzania’s retrogression in its standards for the 
treatment of refugees, the UNHCR reports that unlike previously when 
refugees could be permitted to locally integrate and to work, now the ‘vast 
majority of the refugees, most of them Congolese in Nyarugusu which is 
Tanzania's only remaining refugee camp, can neither work nor move outside 
the camp.’87 This obviously has significant negative implications on their 
enjoyment of socioeconomic rights, as work is a means towards attaining 
other socioeconomic capabilities. 
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1.4.2.3 Zambia 
 
Zambia is third within the SADC region in terms of the numbers of refugees 
and asylum seekers hosted. The total population of concern for the UNHCR 
in Zambia, as at the beginning of 2012, was 46,653. Of these, 46632 were 
recognised refugees whilst 1,021were asylum seekers.88 Just like Tanzania, 
Zambia borders the DRC that is the biggest country in the Great Lakes 
Region and the largest source country for refugees in the region. Again, like 
Tanzania, Zambia has ‘a long tradition of hosting refugees that predates its 
independence’.89 Zambia similarly adopts an encampment policy in hosting 
refugees. A major critique levelled against Zambia is that, unlike South Africa 
and Tanzania, its laws make the possibility of local integration of refugees by 
way of naturalisation next to impossible.90 This policy results in prolonged 
dependence by the refugees on humanitarian assistance and diminishes their 
capacity to achieve self reliance and hence actualise their human dignity.  
 
The UNHCR reports that ‘of the 34000 refugees registered in the settlements 
or urban areas, 47 percent were born in Zambia while 12 per cent entered 
Zambia more than 15 years ago.’91 This highlights the problem of the 
assumption that refugeehood should, in all cases, be considered as a 
temporary State of affairs, and proceeding on that assumption to develop 
policies that restrict the refugees’ access to socioeconomic rights, among 
other things. As the UNHCR observes, restrictive practices adopted in 
Zambia, as well as many other Southern African countries, make it difficult 
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even for third generation refugees to envision a better future, and they are 
often frustrated by a lack of economic and educational prospects.92  
 
Zambia also presents a stark case of the problem faced by under-resourced 
governments to meet minimum international standards for refugee treatment. 
The UNHCR reports that in Zambia, whilst the quality of assistance accorded 
to refugees is generally below standard, ‘due both to lack of capacity of the 
different actors involved, and the general environment in which the refugees 
are accommodated, [t]he assistance provided nevertheless often exceeds the 
standards enjoyed by nationals in similar settings.’93This scenario presents 
another problem. The socioeconomically worse-off surrounding populations 
become thoroughly disaffected and resentful towards the refugees.  
 
1.4.2.4 Malawi 
 
Malawi follows after Zambia in terms of refugee and asylum seeker numbers 
in the region. As at the beginning of 2012, Malawi had a total population of 
16,853 of concern to the UNHCR.94  Of the 16,853 there were 6,308 
recognised refugees whilst 10,545 were asylum seekers. During the late 
1980s to early 1990s, Malawi played host to over 1 million refugees from 
Mozambique who were fleeing civil war in that country. Most of the 
Mozambican refugees were repatriated after the end of the war; but a 
significant number also integrated into the local population, mostly informally 
(i.e de facto rather than de jure) due to the homogenous languages and 
ethnicities of the local and refugee populations.95 Currently, the refugees and 
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asylum seekers in Malawi are largely from Burundi and Rwanda, and to a 
significantly lesser extent, Somalia.96  
 
The country adopts an encampment policy, and generally faces the same 
socioeconomic quagmire that Zambia faces due to lack of resource capacity 
by the State.97 As further demonstrated in Chapter IV below, there are 
significant restrictions on socioeconomic rights for refugees. For instance, the 
right to work for refugees is highly constrained.98 In addition, the legislation 
does not provide for any procedure through which a refugee can be 
naturalised. The net effect is that refugees, including political refugees, are 
perennially treated as community strangers of the State. A more progressive 
approach to the treatment of refugees in Malawi, along the pattern introduced 
in Chapter II and further discussed in subsequent chapters, is called for. 
 
1.4.2.5 Other SADC States 
 
Other countries in the region, such as Botswana,99 Lesotho,100 Namibia,101 
Swaziland102 and Zimbwabwe103have significantly lower numbers of refugees.  
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i. Botswana 
 
Botswana is host to about 3,500 refugees and asylum-seekers.104 Most of 
these are from Angola, Namibia, Somalia, Zimbabwe and the Great Lakes 
Region.105 Botswana's implements a strict encampment policy for refugees. 
As a result of this strictness, the numbers of refugees living at the Dukwi 
Refugee Camp have been on a steady increase, and this has put a strain on 
the services made available to them by the State and the UNHCR.106  
 
One of the consequences of Botswana’s approach, similar to the situation in 
other countries in the region that adopt an encampment policy, is that 
refugees are generally denied the enjoyment of some critical socioeconomic 
rights such as the right to work. In this regard, the UNHCR has indicated its 
resolve to continue ‘advocating for the lifting of the restrictions on refugees' 
freedom of movement and reform of the national asylum law.’107  
 
ii. Lesotho 
 
There are about 28 refugees and asylum-seekers officially reported by the 
UNHCR to be in Lesotho. They are reported to be largely self-reliant.108 
Mpedi et al report that: 
 
[m]ost refugees in Lesotho are employed and as a result, are able to support 
themselves and their dependants. However, there are some refugees who have 
no means of income and as a result, the Government of Lesotho has put in 
place a social assistance benefit package for indigent refugees in the form of 
free health services obtainable from public health centres and public hospitals; 
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access to free primary and secondary education from public and faith-based 
organization schools; and a monthly grant of M400 [the equivalent of R400]
109
 
 
There is also evidence that the Lesotho Government goes as far as providing 
houses for homeless refugees in urban areas.110 UNHCR continues to 
advocate for the Kingdom of Lesotho to grant unconditional citizenship to 
those refugees who have been in the country for five years or more, in 
accordance with national legislation.111 
 
iii. Namibia 
 
There are about 4,300 refugees and asylum-seekers formally reported to be 
in Namibia.112 Most of these refugees originate from the Great Lakes 
region.113 There are also some 1,600 Angolans whose refugee status ceased 
on 30 June 2012. UNHCR is promoting the local integration of these former 
refugees, given their long residence in and close ties to the country.114   
 
Like most countries in the region, Namibia also adopts an encampment policy 
for refugees. Refugees are encamped at the Osire Camp.115 The UNHCR 
observes that there has been a significant decrease in the number of 
refugees in Namibia, mostly because of the end of the civil war in Angola 
almost a decade ago.116 Refugees at the camp are provided with basic social 
assistance including food, water and basic sanitation.117 
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iv. Swaziland 
 
Not much information is available in respect of the situation of refugees in 
Swaziland. With the assistance of the UNHCR, the Government of Swaziland 
‘provides education, health and other services to the 800 refugees in the 
country, originating from Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda, Somalia and 
Zimbabwe.’118Like several other countries in the region, Swaziland adopts the 
refugee encampment policy, and refugees are camped at the Malindza 
Refugee Camp.  
 
Gumedze states that the Refugee Section of the Swaziland Home Affairs 
Department reports that ‘The Kingdom of Swaziland upholds a generous 
policy towards refugees.’119 Gumedze seems to support this position, as he 
argues that the country has adopted such a generous policy ‘despite the fact 
that the Refugees Control Order of 1978 is outdated.’120 However, neither 
Gumedze’s paper, nor any other available literature, provides any concrete 
evidence of the extent of such a generous policy.121 What is evident is that 
Swaziland, along with Zambia and Botswana, has very out-of-date refugee 
legislation, as is more elaborately argued in Chapter IV.  
 
v. Zimbabwe 
 
There are about 5,800 refugees and asylum-seekers formally reported to be 
in Zimbabwe.122 Like most of the countries in the region, these refugees and 
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asylum seekers largely come from the Great Lakes region and the Horn of 
Africa.123 The country is said to be significantly affected by mixed-migration 
movements along the north-south migratory route, which includes Tanzania, 
Malawi, Mozambique Zimbabwe and South Africa.124 Zimbabwe similarly has 
an encampment policy for refugees; but it allows those refugees with money 
to invest, or who have special skills or education to reside in urban areas.125  
 
Not much has been written about the treatment that refugees receive in 
Zimbabwe. Recently however, there have been conflicting signals on the 
policy of the Zambiabwean Government in treating refugees. The UNHCR 
Resident Representative to Zimbabwe is reported to have recently 
commended the Zimbabwean Government; stating that: 
 
UNHCR wishes to record its special thanks because despite the tremendous 
developmental and other challenges facing the country, both the government 
and people of Zimbabwe have remained committed to preserving the 
institution of asylum and tolerating the presence of refugees and other 
persons of concern on Zimbabwean territory, and most importantly, sharing 
the meager resources such as health and medical facilities as well as 
ensuring the personal security for refugees and other persons of concern.
126 
 
However, this statement has been criticised. It has been argued that this 
statement flies in the face of the lived experiences of refugees at places such 
as the Tongogara Refugee Camp, where the conditions have been described 
as ‘absolutely deplorable.’127 However, neither of these positions is supported 
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by concrete facts; and just like in most of the countries reviewed, literature on 
the refugees’ practical experiences is sparse. Such dearth of literature calls 
for further research in this area, which is outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
1.5 The basic nature of socioeconomic rights 
 
Socioeconomic rights are empowerment rights. They allow socially vulnerable 
and marginalised individuals and groups to use the legal process in order to 
actually obtain the satisfaction of their essential socioeconomic needs.128 
These rights empower the inhabitants of a particular State to demand of the 
State that it acts reasonably and progressively to ensure that all enjoy the 
basic necessities of life. In so doing, socioeconomic rights enable the 
subjects of the jurisdiction to hold government to account for the manner in 
which it seeks to pursue the achievement of social and economic welfare and 
development.129 Sandra Liebenberg states that these rights are central in 
ensuring that significant sections of the population, especially the socially and 
economically vulnerable, are able to develop to their full potential, realise their 
life plans and participate as equals in the political, economic, social and 
cultural spheres in a constitutional democracy.130 Such rights include access 
to adequate housing, health, education, work and social security among 
others. 
 
Socioeconomic rights impose both negative and substantial positive State 
obligations131to ensure the realisation of individual rights of access to material 
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goods and services, which enable both human survival and the individual 
pursuit of the good life.132 As Mbazira argues, the realisation of these rights 
serves to ameliorate the conditions of the poor and heralds the beginning of a 
generation that is free from socioeconomic need.133 Such realisation 
guarantees people entitlements that enable them to attain a series of 
interrelated capabilities which enable the pursuit of individual value-choices 
and which are often impeded or restricted by material deprivation.134Given the 
vulnerability of refugees, it is clear that socioeconomic rights are central to 
their protection concerns. 
 
1.5.1 Progressive Realization and Availability of 
Resources  
 
Socioeconomic rights are generally highly demanding on State resources135 
and, as such, their implementation and/or enforcement usually demands 
substantial allocation or redistribution of State resources. Rights such as 
those to have access to social security, education, housing and health, 
among others; require the State to engage in an exercise of weighing 
complex polycentric considerations in order to determine the appropriate 
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prioritization and attendant trade-offs to be made among these different but 
often mutually reinforcing and inter-connected interests.136 The situation is 
ever more vexing for developing countries that cannot be expected to 
immediately guarantee the full range of the socioeconomic rights recognized 
and/or guaranteed by international human rights law.137   
 
 Frequently, governments, especially in developing countries, have to 
combine the adoption of fiscal austerity measures and the re-allocation and/or 
re-distribution of resources in order to ensure the optimal use of State 
resources. In view of this recognition of the scarcity of resources; and 
especially the difficulties faced by developing States, the concept of 
progressive realization of socioeconomic rights is generally recognized and 
accepted around the world.138 The UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (the CESCR) has stated that the concept of progressive 
realization represents a recognition of the fact that the full realization of all 
socioeconomic rights can generally not be achieved in a short period of 
time.139Progressive realisation entails the realisation of socioeconomic rights 
‘over time’ rather than immediately. The concept is a necessary flexibility 
device that reflects the realities of the real world and the difficulties involved 
for any country to ensure full realization of socioeconomic rights.140  
 
Coupled with the idea of progressive realization is the recognition that 
socioeconomic rights are to be realized within the confines of the availability 
of resources.141 This obligation requires however, that the State should make 
maximum and optimal use of such resources.142 The concept of availability of 
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resources is equally meant to be a flexibility device that reflects the realities of 
the real world where economic resources are generally scarce. It is one of the 
central factors that must be considered when determining the obligations of a 
government in the context of socioeconomic rights.143  
 
A significant issue in the context of this concept relates to the question: what 
is the pool of resources that should be considered as available for purposes 
of realizing socioeconomic rights claims?144 The term ‘available resources’ is 
interpreted broadly and objectively to include all resources available and not 
just the resources allocated to a particular domain by the State.145  
 
Further, the CESCR has stated that ‘the phrase “to the maximum of its 
available resources” was intended by the drafters of the Covenant to refer to 
both the resources existing within a State and those available from the 
international community through international cooperation and assistance.’146 
For purposes of this thesis, this issue is particularly essential in the context of 
Chapter V, which explores collective approaches that States in Southern 
Africa can take in order to enhance the guarantee and realisation of 
socioeconomic rights for refugees. 
 
The CESCR has further emphasized that the obligation to ensure progressive 
realization applies even in times of severe resource constraints. The 
obligation focuses in particular on vulnerable groups in society.147 In this 
regard, the CESCR has stated that the obligation to ensure progressive 
realisation enjoins the State to take positive action to reduce structural 
inequality and to give appropriate preferential treatment to vulnerable and 
                                                 
143
  Bilchitz (note 135 above) 225. 
144
  Ibid, 227. 
145
  K McLean, ‘Housing’ in S Woolman et al (eds.) Constitutional Law of South Africa: 
Student Edition (2007) 55-33. See also MCR Craven, The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its Development (1995) 137. 
146
  See CESCR (note 139 above) Para. 13. This requirement arises from the provisions 
of Art. 2(1) of the ICESCR that makes international assistance and cooperation in the 
realisation of socioeconomic rights an international legal obligation. 
147
  Ibid, Para.12. 
39 
 
marginalised groups in society; and that such positive action includes 
specially tailored measures or additional resource allocation for these 
groups.148 Thus the CESCR has stressed that even in times of severe 
resource constraints such as economic recession, vulnerable members of 
society can and indeed must be protected by the adoption of relatively low-
cost targeted programmes.149Thus the needs of refugees, as a vulnerable 
group in society, should not be pushed to the margins of the State’s agenda 
during difficult economic times.  
 
1.5.2 Minimum core obligations 
 
The concept of the ‘minimum core content’ of socioeconomic rights imposes 
an obligation on the State ‘to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, 
minimum essential levels of each of the rights.’150The concept of the minimum 
core content, as a term of art, was first used by the CESCR in the context of 
its interpretation of the obligations of States parties to the ICESCR under 
Article 2(1) of the Covenant in its General Comment No. 3, and further 
developed, modified, and concretized in subsequent General Comments in 
relation to particular rights in the Covenant.151 The concept has been 
developed as a check in order to ensure that States do not interpret the 
concept of progressive realization in such a way as to completely denude the 
rights guaranteed under the ICESCR of all meaningful content. The CESCR, 
in justifying the concept of the minimum core, has stated that ‘if the Covenant 
were to be read in such a way as not to establish such a minimum core 
obligation, it would be largely deprived of its raison d’être.’152Foster describes 
the minimum core as constituting an ‘unrelinquishable nucleus’153 of each 
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socioeconomic right, and argues that in the context of the ICESCR, it has 
proved highly influential in defining the obligations of States; and that, in this 
regard, it has been engaged as the most effective method of developing the 
normative content of the rights therein.154Bilchitz adopts a similar approach, 
arguing that the minimum core approach is key to providing clear content to 
socioeconomic rights, and in ensuring that they have enforceable practical 
implications for government policy that benefit the worst-off in society.155 
 
The concept of the minimum core content is essential for ensuring that no 
person in society, including refugees, is allowed to fall below the minimum 
essential levels of enjoyment of socioeconomic rights. Bilchitz argues that this 
involves ‘guaranteeing the general conditions to be free from threats to 
survival.’156 According to Bilchitz, a society that is committed to the principle 
of equality and ensuring the dignity of every person will in this regard 
‘prioritise the meeting of interests that are of the greatest urgency to 
beings.’157 He contends that ‘the most urgent interest is being free from 
general threats to one’s survival’, and that ‘this interest is of the greatest 
urgency as the inability to survive wipes out all possibility for realizing the 
sources of value in the life of a being.’158 It is this urgent survival interest that 
in his view, justifies the idea of maintaining a minimum core content of each 
of the socioeconomic rights. He argues that the minimum core concept is 
‘justified as a result of the greater impact that the failure to realize such a 
threshold has on the ability of individuals to have positive experiences and 
realize their purposes.’159  
 
Bilchitz’ justification of the minimum core content concept, to which this study 
subscribes, entails that the minimum core content of socioeconomic rights 
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must, of necessity, apply to all human beings in society, irrespective of any 
social status, including their nationality status. 
 
Thus legal frameworks on the guarantee of socioeconomic rights in Southern 
Africa must take into account the minimum core content concept. Observably, 
no Southern African State under study has thus far demonstrated its 
acceptance or adoption and application of the minimum core concept at the 
domestic level. Further, as the thesis will demonstrate in Chapter IV, the 
various countries under study have adopted different approaches to the 
recognition and enforcement of socioeconomic rights . The study argues for 
regional harmonization of approaches in this regard. 
 
1.6 Significance, objectives and scope of study 
 
This thesis provides the first in-depth study of its kind on the socioeconomic 
rights of refugees at the African regional level, and more specifically at the 
Southern African sub-regional level. The Southern Africa sub-region provides 
a good comparative fulcrum in this area as it comprises countries that are at 
very different levels of development, such as South Africa that is an emerging 
and sizeably significant economy on the global plane on the one hand;160 and 
Malawi that is a very small and fragile economy, falling in the category of 
least developed countries, on the other. The challenges and prospects in 
ensuring the realisation of socioeconomic rights of refugees in such a diverse 
region are therefore deserving of critical interrogation. 
 
The study examines the refugee legal frameworks of Botswana, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
These are all SADC member States. Other SADC member States, such as 
Angola, Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are 
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excluded for linguistic reasons as most of the primary legal material available 
in those countries is not in the English language. Yet other member States, 
such as Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles are excluded because they 
are off-shore the mainland continent and they are not largely affected by the 
refugee movements in the sub-region. It is crucial to observe however that in 
respect of the refugee burden-sharing framework proposed in Chapter V, 
these States would have to be included as part of the sub-region’s collective 
responsibility.   
 
Whilst the study explores the refugee protection regimes in the listed 
countries, it is important to point out that in some instances; there is a slight 
degree of asymmetry, with more focus being placed on South Africa.  South 
Africa is the largest economy in the region, but it also has the largest number 
of asylum seekers, not only in Southern Africa, but globally as well.161  Thus 
the challenges and prospects it faces are in that regard be markedly different 
from those faced by other countries in the sub-region. Further, South Africa 
has been a pacesetter in developing jurisprudence on socioeconomic rights in 
the region, including the socioeconomic rights of refugees specifically, and 
therefore provides a very good basis for more extensive exploration. 
 
With the above background, the study proceeds to firstly explore, in Chapter 
II, the question of whether refugees are entitled to enjoy socioeconomic rights 
on a different and heightened footing than other foreign nationals. The 
Chapter also explores the level of protection that refugees, both humanitarian 
and political, ought to be entitled to in comparison with citizens; and in 
comparison with other foreign nationals. The study in this respect critically 
discusses ethical and moral theories of justice and political authority. In this 
respect, it makes a case, first, for the general justification of differential 
treatment in the guarantee of rights between citizens and foreign nationals. 
The study then explores the special position of refugees. It provides an 
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incisive distinction between refugees who simply have an urgent and pressing 
humanitarian need for international protection on the one hand; and those 
that have a political need for international protection which requires 
immediate substitute political community membership in the host State on the 
other. The study makes an argument for preferential treatment of refugees 
that have a political need for international protection over other foreign 
nationals generally, and indeed, in the first instance, preferential treatment of 
political refugees over those refugees who only have an urgent and pressing 
humanitarian need for international protection, especially in the context of 
socioeconomic rights. This discussion is germane in laying a theoretical 
foundation for the critique of the standards of treatment for refugees that have 
been adopted both on the international law plane and in the context of 
domestic laws in Southern Africa, and the ultimate recommendations made in 
this thesis. 
 
The study acknowledges that this is a highly complex subject, and the author 
is therefore not presumptuous to argue that the approach suggested is 
morally or normatively unassailable in every respect. What the thesis 
suggests, though, is that the approach proposed in Chapter II is plausible, 
normatively defensible, and appropriate in framing a better scheme for the 
guarantee of socioeconomic rights of refugees in the region.  
 
The study proceeds, in Chapter III, to provide a general overview of the 
international guarantee of socioeconomic rights of refugees under 
international law. Chapter III explores the question of whether the specialised 
international and regional protection regimes for refugees (the 1951 
Convention, the 1967 Protocol and the 1969 OAU Convention) offer sufficient 
guarantees necessary to ensure the enjoyment of socioeconomic rights for 
refugees. It identifies gaps in the protection scheme in this regard and makes 
some proposals for reform. 
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In Chapter IV, the study further explores the relevant constitutional and 
legislative guarantees in the southern African sub-region, auditing in the 
process the extent to which they meet international standards in the area of 
refugee law, particularly in the area of the socioeconomic rights of refugees.  
 
Chapter V generally proposes collective sub-regional legal and policy burden-
sharing initiatives in addressing the issue of the guarantee of socioeconomic 
rights for refugees in Southern Africa. It further argues for the harmonisation 
of domestic laws on refugees in Southern Africa, and proposes that the 
adoption of a SADC Model Law on refugee protection would be germane.  
 
Chapter VI provides the overall conclusion of the Thesis, summarises its 
major findings and recommendations and identifies some areas for further 
research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
CHAPTER  II 
 
EQUALITY AND PREFERENCE: THE TREATMENT OF 
FOREIGN NATIONALS AND REFUGEES IN A DEMOCRATIC 
POLITY 
Within an international system made up of dichotomies and grey areas 
between the internal and the external, the refugee brings to the fore the clash 
between pluralism and solidarism, communitarianism and cosmopolitanism, 
sovereign rights and human rights. (Emma Haddad, 2008) 
 
2.1   Introduction 
 
Virtually all States in the world host foreign nationals who are either voluntary 
or forced migrants. As discussed in the previous Chapter, this thesis focuses 
on the treatment of refugees as a sub-category of forced international 
migrants.  
 
The study seeks to locate the place that refugees, as a special group of 
foreign nationals, should occupy in a social arrangement for the guarantee of 
socioeconomic rights within the State. To do this, this chapter first looks into 
the scheme of how the guarantee of rights for foreign nationals in any 
particular State ought to be constructed generally. From that premise, the 
chapter proceeds to explore the case for the special treatment of different 
categories of refugees.  
 
2.2   The case for equal treatment of citizens and foreign    
nationals 
 
One conception of justice in international migration theory urges for the 
absolute equality of treatment between citizens and foreign nationals in the 
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guarantee of fundamental human rights. Proponents of this conception, such 
as Joseph Carens,162 often adopt, as a starting point, John Rawls’s typology 
of the ‘original position’ as expressed in his seminal work: A Theory of 
Justice,163contextually adapted to the immigration discourse.164  
 
According to Rawls, if free and rational people, being oblivious of their own 
personal situation, such as their class, race, ability or their conception of the 
good – a position he calls the ‘original position’– were to choose the kind of 
society in which they wanted to live, they would follow self-interest to choose 
to live in a society in which institutions were constructed and ordered so as to 
benefit those who were the least advantaged.165 He argues that since the 
person envisaged in the concept of justice from the original position is 
assumed to be unaware of the socio-economic environment around him or 
her, he or she is envisaged as being blinded – in the sense that he or she is 
free of and from any prejudices that might otherwise cloud his or her world 
view.  
 
In other words, Rawls argues that such a person operates from behind a ‘veil 
of ignorance’. This veil of ignorance, according to his thought experiment, 
‘ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in their choice of 
principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social 
circumstances.’166 In the premises, the veil of ignorance enables the person 
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in the original position to conceptualise principles of justice as fairness in their 
ideal form. Among other things, justice as fairness, as conceived by Rawls, 
advocates egalitarianism within a given polity. Rawls argues that his 
principles of justice are those which rational persons, concerned about 
advancing their interests, would consent to as equals.167 
 
Adapting and extending Rawls’ original position to the realm of immigration, 
Joseph Carens argues that when one considers possible restrictions on 
freedom from behind the ‘veil of ignorance’, he or she will adopt the 
perspective of the one who would be most disadvantaged by the restrictions. 
He classifies, in this regard, the immigrant as being among those most 
disadvantaged by the restrictions. He argues that from the original position, 
one would therefore insist that the right to immigrate, including the attendant 
rights enjoyed by citizens of the host State, be included in the system of basic 
rights and liberties.168  
 
Premised from this conception, a school of thought referred to as global 
egalitarianism (globalism) has emerged in immigration discourse.  Michael 
Dummet describes the notion of egalitarianism in this respect as ‘the belief 
that within a just society, every individual must be accorded absolutely equal 
treatment [and that] it goes far beyond equality of opportunity.’169 Thus his 
argument is that by moving, the worse-off can thereby improve their position. 
He contends therefore that from an egalitarian perspective, justice requires 
that the worse-off be allowed to freely move so as to improve their condition 
as of right. Notwithstanding that equal treatment between foreign nationals 
and citizens in such absolutist terms, particularly in respect of socioeconomic 
rights, might conceivably overstretch the available resources within the State 
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to the disadvantage of existing citizens, Carens argues that  consideration of 
the well-being of current citizens in this regard is irrelevant in the bigger 
scheme of things. He further argues that it is also irrelevant if open borders 
and the concomitant equal treatment of foreign nationals and citizens may 
lead to an influx of immigrants (including refugees) from other cultures or 
indeed if the numbers of immigrants become so large as to undermine the 
dominance of the existing culture in a particular society.170 He argues that 
there is no logical or moral basis for according existing citizens priority over 
the claims of others by virtue of their citizenship.171 In Carens’ view 
‘Citizenship in western liberal democracies is the modern equivalent of feudal 
privilege – an inherited status that greatly enhances one’s life chances. Like 
feudal birthright privileges, restrictive citizenship is hard to justify when one 
thinks about it closely.’172 
 
Myron Weiner augments Carens’ argument, stating that since it is a purely 
fortuitous occurrence whether we are born in a country that is peaceful, 
democratic, and prosperous, or a country that is poor, authoritarian, and torn 
by civil conflict; from the premises of the original position, we would all clearly 
prefer to be born in the peaceful, democratic, and prosperous society. Thus 
he contends that from a liberal egalitarian perspective, there are no grounds 
for limiting membership in any society to those who happen to be born there. 
He states that ‘birthplace and parentage are…“arbitrary from a moral point of 
view.”’ Thus Weiner supports the idea of what one might call the 
'universalisation of egalitarianism' in the context of the enjoyment of 
fundamental human rights.  He argues that, for globalists, the highest moral 
value is distributive justice, and that the preservation of a nation’s existence, 
its political order, political institutions, and cultural identity, as well as the well-
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being and interests of its citizens are subordinate to the goal of distributive 
justice.  
 
In conclusion, globalist egalitarians arguethat in so far as all human beings 
are born equal in rights and dignity, and in so far as the duty to act towards 
one another in a spirit of brotherhood is recognised,173 an ethical imperative 
of global redistribution of opportunities and resources exists that calls for 
open borders and absolute equal treatment of citizens and foreign nationals 
in as far as the enjoyment of fundamental rights, including socioeconomic 
rights, is concerned. In their view, the distinction in treatment between 
citizens and foreign nationals in respect of rights is arbitrary and unjustifiable. 
 
2.3   The justification for differential treatment between    
citizens and foreign nationals 
 
Having explored the philosophical arguments advanced in favour of equality 
of treatment in the guarantee of fundamental human rights between nationals 
and foreign-nationals, it is important to acknowledge that the principle of 
equality is self-evidently good.174 It represents a virtue deeply rooted in the 
idea that all humans have inherent equal worth and dignity. The principle of 
equality therefore ‘imposes upon those who wish to treat individuals 
differently the duty of showing cause for such differential treatment’.175   
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To this end, in this section, the study shows the justification for differential 
treatment between citizens and foreign nationals based on a number of what I 
consider to be plausible and defensible premises. Thus, in this respect, the 
study generally identifies with the differential model, as opposed to the 
globalist egalitarian approach. However, it proceeds to argue that even 
though there is a case for treating nationals and foreign nationals differently, it 
should be recognised that refugees form a special category of foreign 
nationals that should generally be treated as a special case. The study, in this 
regard, splits refugees into two categories: ‘humanitarian refugees’ and 
‘political refugees’. The study argues, in particular, for the preferential 
treatment of political refugees who, it is submitted, should be accorded 
treatment that is as close as possible to parity with nationals in respect of the 
guarantee of socioeconomic rights. It further argues that humanitarian 
refugees on the other hand, should at first instance receive temporary 
protection which may or may not be upgraded to protection on preferential 
basis, on parity with political refugees, depending on objective factors such as 
the likelihood of permanence of stay and the possibility of their return to their 
States of nationality in safety and security. 
 
This section begins by setting out the idea of communitarianism as an 
overarching basis for differential treatment between citizens and foreign 
nationals.  It explores three arguments all premised on communitarianism. 
Firstly, the section explores the concept (and frequently controversial idea) of 
nationalism. Whilst acknowledging that there are various notions of 
nationalism that are pernicious, the study concludes that nationalism is not 
inherently and self-evidently bad; and indeed that it offers a plausible 
justification for differential treatment between citizens and foreign nationals. 
Next, the section explores the social contract theory as a theory that is also 
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grounded in communitarianism, and demonstrates that it offers another 
plausible basis for immigration control and differential treatment between 
citizens and foreign nationals. The section then examines the concept of state 
sovereignty, noting that it is basically the legal expression of the recognition 
by the international community of the essence of the political community, in 
this case the community of the State, under communitarianism. In this 
respect, state sovereignty is therefore projected as the legal basis for 
immigration control and differential treatment between nationals and foreign 
nationals. Finally, the section explores the pragmatic justification for 
differential treatment, arguing that some idealistic egalitarian theories, such 
as globalism, might be utopian but practically unworkable in the real world. In 
this respect, in order to have an effective scheme of guarantees of 
socioeconomic rights, it is necessary to be realistic and balance ideal 
egalitarian principles (that have worthy moral capital) on the one hand, with 
what might practically work, considering the configuration of the notion of the 
State in contemporary international law on the other. 
 
2.3.1 Community membership and nationalism 
 
In order to answer the question as to whether States are entitled to treat 
foreign migrants differently from their citizens, a number of scholars have 
premised their responses on the idea of community membership in the 
political polity (the State). Citizenship has been defined as ‘both a set of 
practices (cultural, symbolic and economic) and a bundle of rights and duties 
(civil, political and social) that define an individual's membership in a polity.’176 
Put differently, ‘citizenship is a legal concept conferring nationality upon a 
people who have fulfilled the legal requirements of belonging to a particular 
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community and the rights consequent to this, including the [right] to hold a 
passport.’177 
 
Michael Walzer, one of the most prominent scholars on the subject, argues 
that there is something self-evidently good about preserving stable and well-
organised communities; and that the State can be regarded as a form of a 
community with citizens as its members.178 He states that restricting entry into 
the territory of such a community, and the resultant differential treatment 
between members and non-members thereof, can be justified on the basis of 
the need ‘to defend the liberty and welfare, the politics and culture of a group 
of people [citizens] committed to one another and to their common life’.179In 
other words, communities have a legitimate interest in preserving their 
communal identity and the special relationship with, and responsibility 
towards one another as part of the community’s unique norms and mores. 
 
It is thus necessary to briefly explore the significance of national membership. 
Day and Thompson observe that central to the argument advanced by 
communitarians is ‘the view that membership of a nation provides an 
important source of personal identity.’180 The connection between community 
membership and the interests of nationals (as citizens) has been the main 
anchor of discourse on nationalism. Lea Brilmayer defines nationalism as the 
idea ‘that one identifies with the claims of one's nation and one's co-nationals, 
and takes them as one's own.’181 
 
Yael Tamir in her work Liberal Nationalism recognises that the idea of 
attaching significance to community membership in the context of nationalist 
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sentiment has previously been abused, leading to terrible human tragedies 
such as genocide.182This view is shared by Lea Brilmayer who observes that 
‘[n]ationalism now tends to be associated with barbarism: with genocide, 
ethnic cleansing, rape and wanton murder.’183 Some well known tragic 
examples of ill-conceived nationalist sentiment in modern history are the 
atrocities committed in Nazi Germany, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and 
Chechnya among others.184 This has led to high levels of skepticism about 
nationalism among some notable political theorists. Jürgen Habermas for 
instance claims that the ties of nationalism with universal democratic ideals 
have been shattered. He states that the nationalism of Hitler and Mussolini 
destroyed the precarious balance between the universalist value orientations 
of democracy and constitutional State on the one hand, and the particularism 
of a nation distinguishing itself from what is outside on the other.  The Nazi 
nationalism, according to Habermas, released 'national egoism' altogether 
from its ties to the universalistic norms of the constitutional democratic State. 
 
Thus Habermas is arguing here that nationalism has been abused so much, 
as exemplified by the Nazi nationalism, so that it can no longer be justified as 
an incident of the democratic State. Further, it is also well documented that 
nationalism has been used to ground claims of autochthony (which literally 
means ‘born from the soil’ or ‘indigenous to the land’) in an attempt to 
‘establish an irrefutable, primordial right to belong and to exclude 
outsiders’.185 A good example can be found in the recent indigenization 
policies and laws adopted by the government of Zimbabwe.186 The question 
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however is: Is it indeed the case, as Habermas suggests, that nationalism’s 
ties with the norms of the constitutional democratic State have been utterly 
destroyed?  
 
Tamir argues that whilst nationalism has been previously abused leading to 
barbaric and catastrophic results, this should not be taken to suggest that the 
idea of nationalism itself is inherently bad.187 She contends that nationalism 
does offer a sense of community that has value for humanity. By belonging to 
a nation and having a sense of community membership, community members 
(citizens or nationals) share mutual obligations and a sense of 
togetherness.188 Tamir argues that if people view their community 
membership to the State to be a constitutive factor of who they are, then ‘their 
self-esteem and well-being’ will be ‘affected by the successes and failures of 
their individual fellow members and the group as a whole.’189 They will 
therefore have a legitimate interest to have a say regarding the admission of 
strangers to join their community.  
 
Kymlicka, another leading political thinker in this area, takes Tamir’s 
argument further, urging that in seeking to mediate the frequently conflicting 
interests between majority and minority populations in liberal democratic 
States, one has to recognise the idea that people attach importance to self 
and community identity which is defined by their ‘cultural [community] 
memberships’.190 He argues that the modern liberal democratic State is not 
culturally neutral as it has a vested interest in promoting a common culture.  
He states that this could be, for example: 
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[a] culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the 
full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, 
recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres. 
These cultures tend to be territorially concentrated.
191
 
 
It is important, however, to clarify that the concepts of nationhood and 
Statehood are traditionally not the same. The former concept has been 
traditionally linked to a politically organised, largely homogenous and self-
determined, community whose members share a number of common 
attributes such as cultural values, race, ethnicity and/or language.192 The 
latter concept, by contrast, has been understood as an international law 
construct constituted by an internationally defined and recognised territory, 
defined population and effective government.193 However, there is a great 
deal of symmetry and overlap between these two concepts in the 
contemporary world, and the dividing line between them has become very 
thin. The nationalist concept of nationhood in the contemporary metropolitan 
and globalised world has evolved and assumed new meaning in 
heterogeneous metropolitan communities.   
 
Ben-Ami states, in this respect, that nationalism has many ‘faces and should 
not be dismissed even in the age of total media and the global village.’194He 
argues that among the various forms that nationalism takes are what he 
terms ‘the ethnic concept of nationalism’ and ‘the pluralistic, multi-ethnic and 
multi-cultural concept presumably more adaptable to the nature of immigrant 
societies such as the USA, Argentina, Canada [and] Australia’195 Indeed, it is 
common for citizens of highly diverse societies such as the USA to talk about 
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their common national values and the deep sense of pride and self-identity 
that they attach to their citizenship.  Buckley for instance states that ‘[t]he 
core nationalist symbol for Americans is the idea of constitutionally protected 
liberties that I call liberal nationalism.’196 This can therefore be viewed as an 
example of what Ben-Ami refers to as ‘pluralistic’ nationalism. 
Metropolitanism in an age of globalisation does not therefore necessarily 
conflict with the notion of nationalism when nationalism is understood in this 
multi-faceted way. 197 
 
Similar sentiments of nationalism are to be found in most modern societies 
including African States where, notwithstanding the highly heterogeneous and 
multi-ethnic forms that the modern State takes, citizens still retain a sense of 
self-identity and self-definition by reason of the fact of citizenship, as well as a 
deep sense of community membership in their State of nationality.  This is so 
although most existing boundaries on the continent were colonially imposed 
and thus disrupted the boundaries, composition and/or political status of the 
original ethnic nation States. What currently obtains in these States is the 
pluralistic rather than ethnic nationalism. 
 
A good example of an African polity with pluralistic nationalism is South 
Africa, a country in which the majority of the population suffered at the hands 
of a minority through a pernicious form of nationalist policy – Apartheid. That 
notwithstanding, the country now prides itself for being the ‘Rainbow Nation’. 
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As imperfect as the notion of the ‘Rainbow Nation’ might presently be, there is 
no doubt that a significant number of South Africans are proud to be 
associated with the multiracial and multicultural texture of the country and 
have a deep sense of self-identity and self-definition as South Africans by 
reason thereof.198  
 
There are thus certain common unique and state-centric values, interests and 
goals that citizens in the modern African State, as elsewhere, develop with 
the passage of time, the preservation of which is a shared interest among all. 
In the result, the pluralistic view of nationalism remains relevant to the African 
context and is indeed appropriate in the modern democratic State. 
 
It is therefore submitted that States do have a legitimate basis for taking into 
account the communitarian interests of their citizens, based on the need to 
maintain certain shared community values, interests and goals that they 
deeply cherish, as they address issues of immigration. In other words, in 
order for a particular community to be viable as an orderly and sustainable 
State; some form of control of the entry of outsiders should be permitted 
because without such control, society would lack stability and a common 
sense of identity and definition that are an essential feature of human life.199  
This is the essence of nationalism as a communitarian concept, particularly 
pluralistic nationalism under which most of the States under study fall.200 
Walzer astitutely summarises the essence of the connection between 
immigration control and communitarianism thus: 
 
Admission and exclusion are at the core of communal independence. They 
suggest the deepest meaning of self-determination. Without them, there could 
not be communities of character, historically stable, ongoing associations of men 
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and women with some special commitment to one another and some special 
sense of their common life.
201
 
 
Walzer argues that such type of closure against strangers should not be 
viewed as an attempt to have an exclusive community that does not 
accommodate strangers, but rather that it is the only way to accord value to 
the idea of the sovereign State; and that the stability of the sovereign State in 
turn provides for greater inclusiveness than would be possible if the State did 
not exist.202In the specific context of immigration law and policy, Walzer 
states that: 
 
The right to choose an admissions policy …is not merely a matter of acting in 
the world…and pursuing national interests. At stake here is the shape of the 
community that acts in the world, exercises sovereignty, and so on..
203
 
 
 Kristen Walker takes this line of argument further, stating that: 
 
It is legitimate for States to impose restrictions on immigration. States owe 
duties to their citizens - such as protection from violence, an adequate standard 
of living, the opportunity to participate in community decision-making and so on. 
States cannot fulfill these functions unless they can control who may enter and 
become members of the community - if the number of members becomes too 
great, a State may cease to be able to provide such services to all its citizens. 
Thus, the concern the States have with controlling immigration is a legitimate 
concern.
204
 
 
Myron Weiner, building upon Walzer’s argument, argues that if one attaches 
value to the ‘community’, then one must necessarily adopt a conception of 
justice that holds that members of a community have rights and obligations 
toward one another that go beyond those toward individuals who do not 
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belong to the community.205 He argues that in the real world of States, 
governments are morally responsible for their own citizens and to those who 
legally reside within their territory on the basis of community membership.206  
 
He argues that the stance adopted by global egalitarians presumes a world 
without borders, without States, without repressive regimes, without vast 
differences in health, education and welfare services offered by governing 
authorities, and without vast differences in incomes and employment. Since 
this presumption is unsupportable and clearly rebutted by the real state of 
affairs in the world, Weiner compellingly argues that the globalists’ noble 
vision [of absolute equality of treatment] becomes a nightmare, because the 
consequences of an open door approach to entry into the jurisdiction, and full 
entitlement to citizenship rights can, in extreme situations, be the erosion of 
the institutions and values that liberal democratic societies have created for 
themselves and which make them attractive to outsiders in the first place.207 
 
2.3.2 Social contract theory and immigration control 
 
Social contract theory offers another communitarian justification for 
differential treatment between citizens and foreign nationals. This is so as the 
theory is also based on the interests of community membership within 
bounded communities.  
 
One of the leading proponents of social contract theory was Thomas Hobbes. 
Hobbes took the view that when people are left to their own devices without 
the control of a common power, they live in continual fear, and danger of 
violent death; and that in those circumstances, the life of man is ‘solitary, 
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poor, nasty, brutish, and short.’208 Thus they collectively cede their 
autonomous powers to a common power, the State, in order to receive 
security and maintain social order.209 Succeeding social contract theorists 
such as John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant expanded 
Hobbes’ theory, urging more rights to the individual citizen.210  Locke’s 
analysis is particularly relevant for the purposes of this study. Locke defined 
the social contract as an agreement among people ‘to join and unite into a 
community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst 
another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties and a greater security 
against any that are not of it.’211 
 
Thus, the social contract in this sense envisages a bounded community with 
defined membership and whose members have a collective right of self-
determination to fashion their political and socioeconomic destiny. Under this 
theory, in its contemporary conception, the electorate delegates the power to 
govern its interests to an elected government, thereby giving rise to a duty on 
the part of the government to administer according to the interests and 
legitimate expectations of the electorate.212 Thus, an understanding of the 
social contract is fundamental to the concept of representative democracy 
within the national polity.  
 
Foreign nationals are, in this regard, considered to be non-members of the 
community of the national polity.213Their exclusion from basic governmental 
processes, according to this school of thought is, therefore, viewed not as a 
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deficiency in the democratic system, but as a necessary consequence of the 
community’s process of self-definition. According to this theory, self-
government, whether direct or indirect, begins by defining the scope of the 
community of the governed and of the governors; and non-citizens are, by 
definition, those outside this community.214 
 
Henry Shue states in this respect that ‘the proper role of every national 
government is primarily or exclusively to represent and advance the interests 
of its own nationals’.  He argues that a decision by the State to sacrifice the 
interests of the constituents of the community (the citizens), ‘or anyhow the 
basic interests of the nation of which the constituency is a part, would…quite 
literally be a betrayal of trust.’215 
 
It is submitted therefore, that in terms of social contract theory, in the context 
of immigration, democratic governments are under a responsibility to take into 
account the general will of the electorate with regard to immigration issues in 
the design and implementation of their immigration policies and laws.  
 
Social contract theory has however also been the subject of criticism. Martha 
Nussbaum, for instance, argues that ‘the classic theory of the social contract 
[…] does not suffice to ground an inclusive form of social cooperation that 
treats all human beings with equal respect.’216 This is so, she argues, in light 
of the fact that social contract theory is based on the self-interest of the 
participants.217 Nussbaum argues that giving all human beings the basic 
opportunities necessary to ensure a minimally just and decent world would 
require sacrifice from richer countries and individuals for the benefit of poorer 
nations and individuals. She states that, on the basis of self-interest, such 
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sacrifice cannot be said to be to the former’s advantage. She argues that it is 
therefore simply not true, as Rawls argues, that cooperating with others on 
fair terms will be advantageous to all.218 Thus the classical social contract 
theory would, in this respect, fail as a basis for ensuring both global as well as 
individual justice within a State based on fairness and equity.  In other words, 
Nussbaum argues that the social contract, in its classical form, is a recipe for 
the marginalisation of the rights of minority and other vulnerable groups such 
as people with disabilities, foreign nationals, and non-human animals.  
 
Michel Foucault also takes the view that the social contract, invoked strictly, 
can be the source for the marginalisation of vulnerable groups in society. He 
states that for this reason: 
 
Women, prisoners, conscripted soldiers, hospital patients, and homosexuals 
have now begun a specific struggle against the particularised power, the 
constraints and controls, that are exerted over them…They fight against the 
controls and constraints which serve the…system of power.
219
  
 
Majoritarian forces invoke the social contract theory, at least in part, to 
legitimise such controls and constraints to the political system of power.  
 
Notwithstanding these critiques, it is submitted that social contract theory 
offers a plausible basis for differential treatment between citizens, as 
members of the bounded political community, and foreign nationals as 
strangers (or outsiders as it were). It has been argued, for example, that 
unless responsible policy makers take heed of deeply felt public sentiments, a 
number of social evils might unravel.220 For instance, others have suggested 
that populist extreme right-wing parties might grow by taking advantage of 
unaddressed anti-immigrant public sentiment; and threaten the democratic 
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system by advocating intolerant laws that take no account of universal human 
rights norms.221 
 
In the premises, it is essential that at the very least, popular sentiment of 
citizens as members of the political community must be engaged and 
accorded serious consideration. To be clear, giving serious consideration to 
the popular sentiment of the citizenry does not entail subjecting the 
enjoyment of fundamental human rights, including rights of minority groups, to 
the unfettered whims of majoritarian public opinion. Rather, the process of 
democratic engagement entails clearly demonstrating that such majoritarian 
sentiment has given due consideration, and that upon such consideration, it is 
clear that it militates against basic fundamental and inalienable human rights 
and that, if such rights are to be taken seriously,  such popular sentiment 
must necessarily give way to fundamental rights. In this sense therefore, 
fundamental human rights may trump public opinion.222 
 
2.3.3 State sovereignty and immigration control 
 
The principle of State sovereignty entails that there is a province of state 
conduct that should remain within the exclusive decisional domain of the 
State, interference with which is prohibited by international law. Catherine 
Dauvergne explains that ‘[a] traditional account of sovereignty emphasises 
control over territory223and includes an internal dimension - capacity to govern 
a particular space - and an external dimension - immunity from interference 
by others.’224  
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Under international law, this principle has been significantly watered down 
since World War II, largely by the steady development of universal human 
rights norms that have unquestionably made the human rights question one 
of international concern.225 An understanding has emerged of ‘sovereignty as 
responsibility’, which means that a State is not allowed to hide under the 
cloak of sovereignty in order to shirk its human rights responsibilities. 
However, state sovereignty still remains central in international law 
discourse.226 The centrality of the principle in international law was stressed 
by the International Court of Justice (the ICJ) in the case of Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of 
America) (The Nicaragua Case) where the court held that ‘the whole of 
international law rests [on] the fundamental principle of state sovereignty’.227 
The centrality of state sovereignty has since then been emphasised in the 
jurisprudence of the ICJ.  
 
One of the last bastions of State sovereignty that is jealously guarded by 
States is in the area of immigration control.228 The dominant position in this 
regard was first laid down in the seminal case of Nishimura Ekiu v. United 
States,229where the Federal Supreme Court of the USA held that: 
 
It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the 
power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to its self- preservation, to forbid 
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the entrance of foreigners within its dominion, or to admit them only in such 
cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.
230
 
 
This principle has been reaffirmed in numerous national decisions around the 
world and can properly be classified in international law discourse as a 
general principle of law recognized by civilized States.231 
 
In the context of community membership, State sovereignty and immigration 
control, the principle of State sovereignty can be viewed as a legal attribute or 
manifestation of the normative communitarian basis for immigration control 
and differential treatment between citizens and foreign nationals. As Roth 
states: 
 
Sovereignty is a legal attribute of a territorially bounded political community 
enjoying full membership in the international system. Recognized exercises of 
sovereignty are acts legally attributed to the will of the designated territory’s 
permanent population as a whole. From international law’s external standpoint, 
sovereignty itself lies not in a given constitutional order (pouvoir constitué), but in 
the underlying constituency (pouvoir constituant) whose will to accept or 
repudiate that order must somehow be discerned.
232
 
 
Roth suggests here that the concept of state sovereignty is rooted in the 
power of the members of the political community (the underlying 
constituency) of the State. His argument therefore resonates with the 
communitarian basis for the principle that this study espouses. 
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2.3.4 Communitarian justification: summary 
 
The communitarian argument for community and immigration control offers a 
plausible and persuasive justification for differential treatment between 
citizens and foreign nationals.  Whilst it is conceded that some brand of 
communitarian nationalistic sentiment  has previously been the source of 
some major human tragedies such as the Jewish holocaust or apartheid; 
failure to recognise the fact that some communitarian concerns of citizens 
(nationals) are legitimate; and failure in this connection to ensure, in a 
principled way, the priority of citizens in the guarantee of human rights, and 
socioeconomic rights in particular; would also be potentially destabilising in 
an otherwise well-ordered liberal democratic State.   
 
The result would be that instead of building the desired modern, harmonious, 
multicultural, and metropolitan society; such failure (to recognise and give 
principled effect to communitarian concerns) might end up being the source 
of pent-up resentment against foreign nationals, and disturb society’s stable 
political foundations that are in turn necessary to ensure the protection of the 
rights of foreign nationals in the first place. As Singer and Singer argue, 
States might be so open in their approach to immigration to a stage where 
tolerance in a multicultural society breaks down because of resentment 
among the resident community, and this loss of tolerance becomes a serious 
danger to the peace and security of all, including previously accepted foreign 
migrants.233 
 
Therefore, the sovereignty of the State must be given due recognition, and 
the State must be allowed a proper margin of appreciation on decisions 
related to the admission of foreign migrants and the standards of treatment to 
be accorded to them once admitted. Further, the globalist argument, that 
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essentially urges global citizenship, is pragmatically untenable as it 
essentially envisages a world without borders and a global government. In a 
world that has for centuries been, and continues to be, characterised by 
communities governed within bounded sovereign territories, the prospect of a 
world government that is essential to effectuate the globalist ideal, is rather 
too remote.  
 
2.3.5 Differential treatment: a pragmatic justification 
 
As is apparent from the foregoing, this thesis rejects the globalist approach of 
absolute equal treatment of citizens and foreign nationals in all 
circumstances. This approach is rejected because it ignores morally 
legitimate and justifiable communitarian concerns discussed in the preceding 
Section.  There are also more pragmatic justifications for differential 
treatment. Such justifications seek to strike a balance between the more 
ideological concepts of globalist egalitarianism on the one hand; and 
communitarianism on the other.  
 
Max Weber has developed an ethical premise upon which to ground this 
pragmatic approach in a principled manner.234 In his conceptual scheme, 
Weber draws a difference between two kinds of ethics: ‘the ethic of principled 
conviction’, which pursues an absolute ideal; and ‘the ethic of responsibility’, 
which requires that political leaders choose courses that are often less ideal 
based on pragmatic considerations. Weber argues that policymakers should 
not only consider whether policies are in some abstract sense moral, but also 
whether there is a reasonable likelihood that morally desirable objectives can 
be ‘practically’ achieved.235 Weber states, in this regard, that in terms of the 
ethic of responsibility, a decision maker goes beyond ideal principles, and 
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factors in the actual or reasonably foreseeable consequences that such 
decisions may practically engender. He clarifies further that: 
 
[w]e have to understand that ethically oriented activity can follow two 
fundamentally different, irreconcilably opposed maxims.  It can follow the ‘ethic 
of principled conviction’ (Gesinnung) or the ‘ethic of responsibility’. It is not that 
the ethic of conviction is identical with irresponsibility, nor that the ethic of 
responsibility means the absence of a principled conviction – there is of course 
no question about that. But there is a profound opposition between acting by the 
maxim of the ethic of conviction…and acting by the maxim of the ethic of 
responsibility, which means that one must answer for the (foreseeable) 
consequences of one’s actions.
236
 
 
He argues that an extremist committed to the ethic of conviction might be fully 
aware of the adverse consequences of his actions, but ‘none of this will make 
the slightest impression on him.’237 Where adverse consequences flow from 
actions or decisions taken out of his pure conviction, he will hold the world, or 
the stupidity of others, or the will of God responsible and not attribute 
responsibility to his own actions. On the other hand, argues Weber, ‘[a 
person] who subscribes to the ethic of responsibility…will make allowances 
for precisely these everyday shortcomings in people…He has no right to 
presuppose goodness and perfection in human beings.’238 In other words, 
whilst appreciating what the ideal scenario can be, Weber’s ethic of 
responsibility calls upon the decision maker to take account of the actual 
realities of the world. In the context of immigration, Myron Weiner states that 
the difficult choices that have to be mediated as between the ideal and the 
pragmatic: 
 
arise because resources are always limited and because one person’s gain 
often entails someone else’s loss…we cannot resolve debates over migration 
with reference to principles of absolute justice…If immigration is not a basic 
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human right- and it cannot be as long as there are States – then each country 
must weigh conflicting claims and consider the consequences of alternative 
policies for their own citizens. It is important that we not conflate issues of public 
interest, public values, and fundamental human rights. Migration and refugee 
issues cannot simply be reduced to moral questions, but neither… are they 
solely questions of national sovereignty in which moral judgments play no 
role.
239
 
 
Joseph Carens similarly comments that it is proper to take practical realities 
into account when formulating policies and laws in the area of immigration. 
With reference to the specific case of refugees, Carens states that ‘in ideal 
theory, refugees simply disappear. Whatever the virtues of ideal theory 
[however], it is a mistake to rely on that form of thinking to make 
recommendations about policies and existing institutions.’240 This is because, 
according to Carens, decision making in the field of immigration must not 
ignore the practical realities of the world.241  
 
The practical reality in the world is that there are actual States with defined 
territories and populations which, whilst being interdependent, are disparate 
and sovereign. Indeed, recorded history of the human species over 
thousands of years shows that human communities have always lived within 
bounded sovereign territories. It would therefore be merely utopian, and 
arguably a fruitless exercise in thought experiment, to conceptualise a 
borderless world in the near or indeed foreseeable future. Thus Max Weber, 
in advancing the ‘ethic of responsibility’ argument, should be looked at as 
advocating an approach that, guided by considerations of principle and 
pragmatism, carefully mediates between the ideals of global egalitarianism on 
the one hand and actual particularistic State interests that are premised on 
communitarianism and closed membership of the political community of the 
State on the other.  
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The approach of blending principle and pragmatism, as argued by Weber, 
would also provide justification in the particular context of socioeconomic 
rights, which are dependent on the availability of resources. For practical 
reasons, beyond its obligation to ensure the minimum core content of such 
rights for everyone, the State would be justified to limit the extent to which it 
otherwise guarantees socioeconomic rights for foreign nationals. Such 
limitation would be well-founded if the State can demonstrate that it lacks 
sufficient resources to ensure the full realisation of these rights for both its 
nationals and foreign nationals on equal footing, immediately. 
 
2.4   Differential treatment: which rights and why? 
 
Having established that there are plausible premises for treating citizens and 
foreign nationals differently in the guarantee of fundamental human rights, the 
study proceeds to examine the issue at another level. Is there greater 
justification for the host State to adopt a differentiated model in respect of 
some rights as compared to others?  As observed earlier, democratic States 
generally limit rights for foreign nationals who are geographically connected 
to the State’s territory in two areas: Access to material resources (thus access 
to socioeconomic rights); and participation in the political processes that 
determine the functioning of the State (the enjoyment and/or exercise of 
political and some civil rights).242The question here is thus: Is there 
justification for this approach? Whilst the specific concerns of this thesis lie in 
the area of socioeconomic rights; it is relevant that we examine both these 
cases (access to socioeconomic rights and enjoyment of civil and political 
rights) in order to better appreciate what principles ought to guide a 
differentiated model for guaranteeing rights between the two groups of people 
under study. 
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It would appear that States tend to restrict those rights that have a more 
visible and direct impact on how the host State’s core social arrangements 
are constructed, and how resources controlled by the State are distributed. 
For instance, in the political rights sphere, Tushnet states that a survey of 
liberal democracies around the world shows that ‘few liberal States impose 
significant restrictions on the rights resident aliens have to free speech, while 
many do restrict access to the right to vote. This might suggest that voting is 
connected to membership in a liberal political community in a way that free 
expression is [generally] not.’243 In other words, voting in a democratic State 
is a right and an act that would directly (at least more visibly so) affect the 
way social arrangements are constituted in the host State, much more than 
the mere guarantee of free speech would.  
 
According to communitarian discourse, voting may in this regard be viewed 
as lying at the core of sovereignty and, as Roth puts it, the exercise of 
sovereignty in a liberal democratic State’s political order lies ‘in the underlying 
constituency…[the membership] whose will to accept or repudiate that order 
must somehow be discerned.’244 The exercise of suffrage through voting 
seems to be the best way of discerning such community will. 
 
Thus the restriction of voting rights to non-members can be viewed, from a 
communitarian perspective, as a legitimate way of ensuring that such core 
changes (to the social arrangements of the host State) should only be 
effected by members of the political community rather than strangers (as 
community outsiders). The same argument is extended to other rights of 
political participation, such as the right to stand for political office. 
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In terms of socioeconomic rights on the other hand; as much as they impose 
negative obligations, they are also highly demanding on State resources. As 
such, their implementation and/or enforcement usually demands substantial 
allocation or redistribution of resources. Rights such as social security, 
education, housing and health require the State to engage in complex and 
polycentric considerations in order to determine the appropriate prioritization 
and attendant trade-offs to be made among these different but often mutually 
reinforcing and inter-connected interests.245 
 
Thus, the guarantee of socioeconomic rights also tends to have a more 
visibly direct impact on the configuration of the socioeconomic arrangements 
of the host State than the guarantee of civil rights with generally negative 
obligations, such as freedom of expression, freedom of religion or freedom of 
association. Undifferentiated guarantee of access to socioeconomic rights 
can, therefore, also engender core changes to the social arrangements of the 
host State. In other words, the fact that the available socioeconomic 
resources for ensuring that the rights of the existing community members are 
guaranteed are directly affected when non-members are admitted, also 
suggests that the members have a legitimate concern in terms of how the 
available resources are to be distributed and/or redistributed; and more so 
how these are to be made available and accessible to foreign nationals as 
community outsiders.  
 
As observed above, globalists suggest that we should ignore the 
consequences of immigration on the availability, distribution, and/or 
redistribution of socioeconomic resources in the State.246 However, the 
globalist approach ignores the ‘ethic of responsibility’ that this study 
espouses, by failing to take into account the possible practical adverse 
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consequences of giving effect to absolutist egalitarian ideals in an 
unmitigated fashion.  It is submitted that a pragmatic approach that restricts 
the guarantee of some rights by taking into account the possible adverse 
consequences of according absolute equal treatment between citizens and 
foreign nationals (which might result in the destabilisation and ultimate 
collapse of the existing scheme of socioeconomic rights guarantees) is, 
therefore, justified. 
 
However, whilst differential treatment between citizens and foreign nationals 
generally might be justified, it will also be recalled that all socioeconomic 
rights have minimum core content.247 The minimum core content is an 
‘unrelinquishable nucleus’248 of each socioeconomic right, ensuring that no 
person in society, including foreign nationals, is allowed to fall below the 
minimum essential levels of enjoyment for each right. The minimum core 
approach has been described as the most effective method of developing the 
normative content of these rights.249 This is so as the approach is key to 
providing clear content to socioeconomic rights, ensuring that they have 
enforceable practical implications for government policy that benefit the worst 
off, marginalised and vulnerable in society.250  
 
Nussbaum, justifying the minimum core approach, argues that notions such 
as state sovereignty, though morally important, should not be used as an 
instrument for insulating the State from criticism for neglecting the plight of 
disadvantaged groups within each nation such as foreign nationals.251 She 
argues that ‘[t]he situation of people (whoever they are, at any given time)’ 
whose quality of life falls below the minimum threshold of what she terms a 
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‘capabilities list’,252 should therefore be a persistent focus of attention of the 
State and the world community as a whole.253 
 
Thus, whilst this study takes the view that host States are justified in imposing 
restrictions on the enjoyment of socioeconomic rights by foreign nationals, it 
also takes the view that every State must ensure that every person within its 
jurisdiction, including foreign nationals, is, by reason of his/her inherent 
human dignity,254 guaranteed at least the minimum core content of 
socioeconomic rights.  
 
2.5    The case of permanent residents 
 
A permanent resident is defined as a foreign national ‘who has been granted 
permission to reside in the [host] country indefinitely.’255 Upon a survey of 
various  Southern African immigration regimes, and similar regimes in other 
parts of the  world, Mpedi et al point out that foreign nationals who have been 
granted permanent residence status ‘are on the whole afforded the same 
treatment accorded to nationals of that State.’256Some political theorists have 
grappled with the justification for affording permanent residents such 
preferential treatment in comparison with other foreign nationals. As the issue 
of permanent residents in this study is generally on the sidelines of the core 
argument, the study only explores one major theorist on this issue – Joseph 
Carens, whose views are representative of the justification commonly 
provided by most political theorists. Carens begins by asking; 
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What can we say about what justice requires and permits with regard to 
people who live in a State but are not citizens? In what way (if any) may 
the legal rights and obligations of permanent residents legitimately differ 
from those of citizens? 
257 
 
He then answers himself thus: 
 
In broad outline my answer is this: Liberal democratic justice, properly 
understood, greatly constrains the distinctions that can be made 
between citizens and non-citizen residents. The longer people stay in a 
society, the stronger the moral claims become, and, after a while, they 
pass a threshold that entitles them to virtually the same legal status as 
citizens. Once people have been settled for an extended period, say five 
years or so, they are morally entitled to the same legal rights (and ought 
to be subject to the same legal obligations) as citizens, except for the 
right to vote and the right to hold public office
258
…So in my view, it is 
unjust to exclude permanent residents from any social programs, means 
tested or not.
259 
 
Carens further argues that ‘during the early stages of settlement, it is 
permissible (though not required) to limit some other rights (e.g redistributive 
benefits and protection against deportation).’260 
 
It is evident from Carens’ argument that his justification for according 
permanent residents heightened treatment in comparison with other foreign 
nationals generally, and on a footing almost on parity with citizens, is 
premised on the notion of community membership that has been explored in 
this Chapter. The significance of looking at the position of permanent 
residents is that, as will become evident in the next section, the treatment of 
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political refugees in the host State is linked to the treatment that permanent 
residents receive. 
 
2.6     The special case of refugees 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, this study adopts the definition of a 
refugee under the 1969 OAU Convention, extrapolated to the global sphere. 
That definition recognises a refugee as a person who is compelled to leave 
his or her place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place 
outside his or her country of origin or nationality; by reason of either a well 
founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion; or for reasons of 
external aggression, foreign occupation or domination, or events seriously 
disturbing public order in either a part or the whole of his or her country of 
origin or nationality.  
 
Refugeehood is based on the principle of asylum. This principle accords 
every person who suffers serious human rights violation(s) or deprivation in 
his or her State, the right to flee to another (safe) State when circumstances 
become unbearable.261 The question that arises however is: Are all refugees 
to be accorded the same treatment regardless of the actual cause of their 
flight? This question is posed in light of the fact that there are numerous 
factors that might render circumstances in one’s State of nationality 
unbearable, and thereby grounding a legitimate basis for seeking 
international protection. Price observes for instance, that: 
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Today, refugees are just as likely to be fleeing the chaotic violence that 
accompanies state breakdown as they are to be seeking refuge from 
persecution. They include not only political ‘activists’ or ‘targets’ of genocide or 
ethnic cleansing by state agents, but also ‘victims’ caught in the crossfire of 
generalized violence or crushed in the vise of hunger and economic distress as 
their state collapses around them due to disorder, corruption, or incompetent 
governance. 
 
One therefore needs to enquire whether the different causes of flight and 
need demand different responses from the international community,262or 
whether the moral obligations to assist remain the same as long as there is a 
threat to life or safety since such a threat is, after all, a threat to life or safety 
regardless of its cause.263In this regard, it is necessary to disaggregate 
refugeehood on the basis of causal factors. To that end, a distinction between 
what are termed ‘humanitarian refugees’ and ‘political refugees’ is essential.  
2.6.1 Humanitarian refugees 
 
The humanitarian conception of refugeehood suggests that the refugee 
definition should not only be restricted to persecuted people, as is the case 
under the 1951 Convention, but should also encompass those people who 
need protection from serious harm more generally, regardless of the source 
of the harm.264 Proponents of this conception argue that people who have 
been forced to flee their home because they lack protection from generalized 
violence, natural disasters, or severe economic hardship have as strong a 
moral claim to refugeehood as people targeted for violence by their State 
(persecuted by or with the acquiescence of the State). They argue therefore 
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that there is no moral justification for excluding the former category and 
limiting entitlement to refugeehood to the latter.265 
 
Price states that some scholars who have engaged with the normative 
framework for the persecution-based conception of refugeehood have 
identified what they consider to be two deep flaws; a historical one and a 
normative one. He states that: 
 
The historical claim is that the persecution criterion was ‘specifically devised for 
a particular geographic problem at a particular time’— namely, the post–World 
War II European refugee problem—and ‘was not a model for general 
application.’
266
 Furthermore, its adoption was politically and ideologically driven: 
it was designed to call attention to Soviet mistreatment of political dissidents 
while deflecting attention away from the West’s failure to satisfy its citizens’ 
‘socio-economic human rights.’
267
 
 
He proceeds to state that: 
 
The normative claim is that the framers of the Convention were so focused on 
the post-war European refugee problem that their solution had a moral blind 
spot: although ‘persecution’ aptly described the plight of the population with 
which they were concerned, the phrase has since led to the confusion of a 
symptom for the disease. Persecution is simply a manifestation of a more basic 
problem: individuals whose basic needs—including physical security and 
economic subsistence
 
—are unmet. By remaining wedded to the persecution 
criterion, however, the refugee regime [has become] increasingly detached from 
consideration of human rights problems generally as well as . . . those of justice, 
peace, or development . . .
268
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Thus proponents of the humanitarian conception of refugeehood advocate for 
the widening of the scope of the refugee definition to cover all cases where 
people have an urgent need for international protection, which need is morally 
justifiable.  Supporters of this conception raise issues such as: ‘Why should 
our duty to assist someone depend on the reason that [he]/she is in distress? 
Isn’t it the fact of distress that should matter?’269 They argue that these are 
certainly the issues that matter to the victim as, for instance, it makes no 
difference to someone starving to death as to why there is no food.  Whether 
there is no food because of persecutory deprivation or simply because there 
is famine in the land that cannot be attributed to human fault. What matters to 
a person is that he or she has no food and should, through one way or the 
other, get access to food or else face death.270Thus ‘need’ rather than ‘cause’ 
should be the basis for refugeehood. 
 
Viewed in this light, the humanitarian conception of refugeehood suggests 
that the grant of refugee status is merely palliative in its intent. It has no 
expressive and politically condemnatory connotations towards the refugee’s 
source country.  Thus it has been emphasized that the granting of refugee 
status should not be viewed as an unfriendly act against the source 
country.271 Hathaway adopts this view, arguing that the refugee definition 
should adopt a conception that is ‘consonant with modern political realities, 
and which genuinely enables governments to conceive of refugee protection 
as a humanitarian act which ought not to be a cause of tension between 
states.’272 
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All in all, the humanitarian conception does not, therefore, concern itself with 
the cause behind the circumstances that have forced a person to flee from his 
or her country, in order to ascribe refugee status and to determine what 
standards of treatment ought to be guaranteed in the host State. It merely 
focuses on whether a pressing, urgent and morally justifiable need for 
international protection exists. As observed in the previous Chapter, the 1969 
OAU Convention seems to embrace this conception. 
 
2.6.2  Political refugees 
 
The political conception of refugeehood is, in contrast with the humanitarian 
one, a narrow conception. It limits the guarantee of the right of asylum to 
persons who have a well-founded fear of persecution, or who are actually 
persecuted by the State or with the acquiescence of the State.  
 
Thus whether the persecution is based on deprivation of civil and political 
rights or deprivation of socioeconomic rights; in both instances the deprivation 
must be the direct result of culpable official (State) conduct, or similar conduct 
by non-State actors to which the State aids and abets, or acquiesces in. This 
approach is in tandem with the thesis advanced by Michelle Foster who, in 
her book International Refugee Law and Socio-Economic Rights: Refuge 
from Deprivation, argues that the deprivation of socioeconomic rights should, 
in appropriate cases, be construed as constituting ‘persecution’ for purposes 
of refugee status determination.273  She argues for instance – and correctly 
so, that a child who is born ‘outside the parameters of China’s one-child 
policy, and thus subject to deprivations of economic and social rights such as 
education and healthcare’, and thereby flees from the country, is not merely 
an economic migrant but a political refugee by reason of socioeconomic 
persecution.274 Thus the narrow conception that only situates persecution in 
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the context of the violation of civil and political rights is no longer acceptable, 
as it flies directly in the face of actual realities of socioeconomic persecution 
that people face on a daily basis in many parts of the world. 
 
Unlike the humanitarian conception of refugeehood, the political conception is 
not merely palliative, but also focuses on the cause of the problem and is 
intended to send an expressive politically condemnatory message against the 
source country. As Price explains, the political conception: 
 
lends asylum an expressive dimension by capturing the opprobrium that 
attaches to a state’s mistreatment of its citizens. To say that State A has 
persecuted Person B is to say that A has wrongfully inflicted harm on B, and it is 
also to express condemnation of A’s action.
275
 
 
The political conception has its basis in the concept of community 
membership.  It flows from the idea that the basis for granting asylum is 
primarily to provide substitute community membership to a person whose 
membership of his or her own community (the State) has effectively been 
repudiated by State authorities either directly or indirectly with their 
acquiescence.  This idea is in turn founded on the notion that the State of 
nationality has the primary duty to protect the rights of its citizens, and that 
‘international human rights law is appropriately invoked only when a State will 
or cannot comply with its classical duty to defend the interests of its 
citizenry.’276  
 
Price emphasises the requirement of the persecution element in political 
refugeehood. He states that its ‘main thrust is that “persecution” should be 
interpreted in light of the membership principle.’ He describes persecution, in 
this regard, as ‘the infliction of serious harm by agents acting under the colour 
of state authority for reasons that deny the victim’s standing as a member.’  
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He states that ‘central to the inquiry whether conduct constitutes persecution, 
then, is the legitimacy of the State’s reasons for inflicting harm on the victim, 
or acquiescing in the infliction of harm by others’.277 
 
Where a person becomes the subject of persecution in this sense, and 
therefore denied community membership of the persecutory State, substitute 
international protection becomes in turn necessary to avoid a denial of what 
Hannah Arendt has described as ‘the right to have rights’.278 Arendt describes 
this right as ‘the right of every individual to belong to humanity [which] should 
be guaranteed by humanity itself.’ She states that the loss of the right to have 
rights is ‘not the loss of specific rights, but the loss of a community willing and 
able to guarantee any rights whatsoever.’279 Andrew Schaap argues that the 
‘right to have rights’ as expressed by Arendt, is a primordial human right, a 
right more fundamental than the rights of justice and freedom.’280In other 
words, the primacy of the right to have rights flows from the fact that all the 
other human rights can only be guaranteed when a person is part of a 
political community that recognizes his or her humanity in the first place; and 
the fact that he or she has inherent human rights. 
 
The right to have rights is particularly germane in grounding refugeehood. 
Arendt has suggested that we become aware of the existence and 
importance of the primordial right to have rights when we see many people, 
sometimes millions of people, involuntarily lose their membership to a political 
community because of a new political situation.281Thus political refugeehood 
can be viewed as substitute international protection granted in order to 
restore an individual’s loss of the right to have rights through the guarantee of 
rights constitutive of surrogate community membership in the host State. 
                                                 
277
  Ibid, 457. 
278
  H Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, (1973) 296. 
279
  Ibid, 298. 
280
  A Schaap, ‘Enacting the right to have rights: Jacques Rancière’s critique of Hannah 
Arendt’, European Journal of Political Theory (2011) 10(1) 22-45, 23 
281
  Arendt, (note 278 above). 
83 
 
 
When the political conception is compared with the humanitarian conception 
of refugeehood, it is evident that under the latter conception, the loss of the 
Arendtian right to have rights is not a necessary feature. 
 
In sub-Saharan indigenous African philosophy, the political conception of 
refugeehood also finds resonance. Of importance is the fundamental principle 
among the Bantu people of Central, Eastern and Southern Africa – the 
principle of ubuntu (or umunthu).282 The principle of ubuntu is commonly 
encapsulated in the expression ‘a person is a person through other 
persons.’283 Cornell states that according to ubuntu ‘human beings are 
intertwined in a world of ethical relations and obligations with other people 
from the time they are born’ and that ‘[w]e come into the world obligated to 
others, and in turn these others are obligated to us’. She argues that ‘the 
ethical, political and moral inscription of each one of us into a web of relations 
is fundamentally drawn from the fact that we are born into a community with 
others’. She concludes, therefore, that it is only through ‘engagement and 
support of others that a person is able to realise true individuality.’284 Thus 
central to the ubuntu principle (or philosophy) is the idea of community 
membership as well.  
 
Munyaka and Motlhabi state that ubuntu, as conceived in the expression 
above, is made concrete by its constitutive elements that include ‘respect for 
persons and the importance of community, personhood and morality.’285 They 
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also state that ‘ubuntu is inclusive: Because it is manifested in living in 
community, it is best realised in deeds of kindness, compassion, caring, 
sharing, solidarity and sacrifice’.286 These deeds have historically 
characterised the way African societies have dealt with foreigners or 
strangers. Nelson Mandela for instance has observed that in historic times ‘A 
traveller through the country would stop at a village, and he didn’t have to ask 
for food or for water. Once he stopped, the people gave him food, entertained 
him. That is one aspect of Ubuntu.’287However, this type of visitor was a 
temporary and friendly visitor. Munyaka & Motlhabi state that such visitors 
(referred to as iindwendwe or abahambi in Southern African Nguni 
languages), whilst being treated with respect and shown hospitality, were ‘not 
part of the family, tribe or group’ and therefore did not enjoy general rights of 
community membership.288  
 
By contrast, the position of political refugees (referred to as Iimbacu in Nguni 
languages) who had been forced to leave their own societies (typically for 
political reasons such as banishment from their society) were also treated 
with compassion and kindness, just like the iindwendwe or abahambi. 
However, they received preferential rights in comparison with the latter. This 
is because they were regarded as abantu abahlelelekileyo (people who are 
forcibly deprived…);’289 and that ‘[b]ecause of their deprived position, they 
were given special treatment, such as being allocated land. Some merged 
with the local people.’290 
 
Thus it appears that even in traditional African societies, guided by the 
principle of ubuntu, the deprivation of community membership in one society 
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provided the basis of being provided with rights constitutive of surrogate 
membership to another political community. It was not the idea of need per 
se, such as facing general life-threatening circumstances at home that would 
qualify them to receive immediate surrogate community membership, with its 
attendant rights and obligations; but rather the fact that such persons had 
effectively been ejected from membership by one political community and 
needed another community within which their humanity would be recognised 
and rights respected.  
 
In other words, the principle that a person is a person through other persons 
necessarily required that if one community had banished a person, frequently 
as a result of the decrees of persecutory monarchic regimes then, he or she 
needed another community of persons in order to realise his or her humanity. 
Banishment in pre-colonial Africa could be viewed as one form of deprivation 
of the right to have rights in the Arendtian sense as discussed above.  
 
Thus both under the Arendtian conception of the right to have rights as well 
as under ubuntu philosophy, political refugeehood merits special treatment on 
account of the necessity of providing substitute membership to a political 
community. As Stefan Heuser states: 
 
the right of asylum aims at reinstating…rights on individuals or smaller social 
groups of persons who have lost citizenship in their countries of origin. It can 
thus be understood as a legal institution that serves to integrate persons who 
have lost their rights as citizens into political communities: a specific human 
right to have civil rights, not just anywhere, but in the given political body that 
grants this right for political refugees.
291
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Whilst Heuser seems to limit his idea of substitute community membership to 
‘civil rights’, it is clear that the argument is equally applicable to an expansive 
conception that includes socioeconomic rights.  
 
From this analysis, it is evident that in the case of humanitarian refugeehood, 
a person can be classified as a refugee even though his/her State of origin is 
willing to render protection; as long as it can be shown that such State is 
unable to fulfil his/her humanitarian needs. In sharp contrast, under the 
political conception, there must be an element either of outright persecution 
or the threat of persecution by the State; or of a failure of protection that 
arises out of unwillingness on the part of the State. Hence it is in the case of 
political refugeehood that the bond of protection gets repudiated and the 
refugee loses his/her rights of community membership. This is what provides 
a ground for international protection on the basis of substitute community 
membership. 
 
2.6.3 Refugeehood: burdened States and outlaw States 
 
Another analytical foundation for the differing international responses in cases 
of humanitarian refugeehood and political refugehood is expounded by John 
Rawls in his work, The Law of Peoples.292 In that work, Rawls distinguishes 
between humanitarian refugees and political refugees.  Rawls uses the 
typology of ‘burdened societies’ and ‘outlaw states’ to highlight this 
distinction.’293  Burdened societies, he argues, recognise that their citizens 
are entitled to protection from harm, but due to exigencies beyond their 
control, are unable to provide it.294 He argues that leaders in burdened 
societies are motivated by a desire to secure decent treatment for their 
nationals.295 However, these societies are often too weak to possess a 
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monopoly on violence and consequently they may be wracked by civil 
conflict, or they may lack the infrastructure to offset food shortages, or they 
may lack the resources to redress severe poverty.296   Price argues in this 
regard, that: 
 
The appropriate stance of outsiders to burdened societies is to lend assistance, 
not to condemn their failures. Asylum is an inappropriate tool for addressing the 
needs of those fleeing burdened societies. The label ‘persecution’ is inapposite 
to describe their situation; and to grant asylum would be to issue a 
condemnation where none is warranted. 
297
 
 
Thus because governments in burdened States take the rights of their 
citizens and subjects seriously, and the leaders in such societies are 
motivated by a desire to secure decent treatment for their citizens and 
subjects; although citizens of such societies might lack provision of or access 
to their basic rights, they still retain standing as members of their societies. 
The bond of protection with their State is not ruptured by a denial of the right 
to have rights. 
 
On the other hand, an ‘outlaw state’ is described as a regime that flouts the 
requirements for international legitimacy by violating basic human rights, such 
as the peremptory human rights norms recognised by international law.298 
These include ‘the prohibitions on slavery, torture, genocide, prolonged 
arbitrary detention, and the murder or disappearance of persons – or by 
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harming citizens for illegitimate reasons.’299 As argued earlier, the harm could 
include persecutory deprivation of socioeconomic rights.   
 
The victims of the illegitimate conduct of an outlaw State are political 
refugees. Asylum responds to harms perpetrated by outlaw states by 
providing shelter to their victims in a manner that also expresses 
condemnation to their State of nationality. As Guglielmo Verdirame observes: 
 
Implicit in any grant of [political] asylum is a censure of the country of origin of 
the refugee. Refugee law tries to exorcise the potential for political conflict by 
characterizing the grant of asylum as a ‘humanitarian act.’ It is a useful trick 
when it comes to inter-state political conflict. By obliging states not to regard 
foreign asylum practice as unfriendly, it limits the use they can make of this 
practice in open exchanges with other States…[However] the recognition of a 
political refugee may expose the wrongdoing of a government.
300
 
 
Thus the Rawlsian distinction between the implications of flight from a 
burdened State and an outlaw State render further credence to the argument 
that it is important to pay attention to the various causes of forced migration 
when considering appropriate protection responses. 
 
Matthew Price eruditely summarises the major differences between the 
political and humanitarian conceptions of refugeehood. He states that: 
 
The political conception differs from the humanitarian conception in at least 
three significant ways. First, the humanitarian conception is fact-oriented while 
the political conception is norm-oriented. A humanitarian looks no further than 
the fact that a foreigner’s basic needs are unfulfilled; the reasons for this state of 
affairs are entirely irrelevant to the foreigner’s claim to asylum. The political 
conception, by contrast, looks not only at the fact of need, but also evaluates its 
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cause, and grants asylum only to those who fear harm illegitimately inflicted by 
agents acting under colour of state authority...This is a predominantly normative, 
not factual, inquiry (though of course normative judgments are often highly fact-
dependent).
301
  
 
Secondly, Price states that: 
 
the two conceptions differ with respect to the importance of agency. For 
humanitarians, the cause of a refugee’s need is irrelevant. Whether a refugee’s 
basic needs are unmet because of “market forces,” an “act of God,” or simply 
bad luck is irrelevant to her claim for asylum. For the political conception, 
agency is critical. Asylum protects only those whose problems are caused by the 
wrongdoing of someone acting in an official capacity, or with official sanction or 
acquiescence.
302
  
 
He then argues that the foregoing features of the two theories 
collectively present a third major difference, which is that:  
 
the humanitarian conception is non-political and welfarist, while the political 
conception endows asylum with a potent, and highly political, expressive 
dimension. The humanitarian project is to identify those people whose welfare 
fails to reach the most minimal level, and provide the goods necessary to 
increase their welfare above that level. Because the humanitarian conception is 
oriented toward facts rather than normative judgments, agnostic as to the cause 
of an asylum seeker’s need, and exclusively focused on improving the asylum 
seeker’s welfare, granting asylum communicates nothing other than that the 
recipient’s basic needs were unmet. By contrast, because the political 
conception requires states to make critical judgments about the practices of 
other states and directs attention at official misconduct, granting asylum 
communicates condemnation. Asylum is a story of victims and perpetrators, not 
beggars and benefactors.
303
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2.6.4 The standards of treatment for foreign nationals 
and refugees: Synthesis and conclusion 
 
States are generally entitled to prioritise their own citizens over foreign 
nationals in the guarantee of human rights, including socioeconomic rights; 
principally based on the legitimacy and morality of some communitarian 
interests. States have legitimate (community-based) interests to preserve the 
stability of their social configuration. Without such stability, there is a danger 
that existing institutions and important social arrangements in a democracy, 
including the scheme for the guarantee of socioeconomic rights, might 
collapse to the detriment of all, including foreign migrants themselves. 
Communitarianism also forms the basis for the international law principle of 
State sovereignty that legally entitles States to assume general monopoly of 
control over political and other socioeconomic affairs within their territories, 
including the admission and nature of treatment of foreign nationals. 
 
It is also submitted that differential treatment between citizens and foreign 
nationals is necessary on pragmatic grounds. This is so because we live in a 
world comprised of States bounded by real borders and without a global 
government. The reality of statehood is a millennia-old phenomenon and it 
makes sense to recognise it as a pragmatic premise upon which to predicate 
policy and laws.  Max Weber has expressed this pragmatic justification in 
terms of what he refers to as the ‘ethics of responsibility’. The pragmatic basis 
for differential treatment is particularly relevant in the context of the guarantee 
of socioeconomic rights since these rights are highly dependent on the 
availability of resources, and resources are scarce, especially in developing 
States. 
 
However, it is also significant to note that all human beings have inherent 
worth and dignity which form a lowest and universal common denominator of 
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our common humanity.304The notion of human dignity requires that there 
should be a minimal level of treatment that one receives in any State as a 
human being, irrespective of his/her immigration or indeed any other 
status.305 This is the notion of minimum core content obligations that each 
State has towards people within its jurisdiction.  
 
A question arises though: How should refugees be treated in a socio-legal 
arrangement of rights? Should their rights be guaranteed on the same footing 
and with the same emphasis as those of other foreign migrants, or should 
they receive priority over other foreign migrants in this regard? The foregoing 
discussion demonstrates that there is a plausible basis for according priority 
to political refugees over other foreign migrants. The study argues in this 
respect, that political refugees ought to be entitled to treatment that is as 
close as possible to that accorded to citizens. In the specific area of 
socioeconomic rights, such guarantee should be on par with citizens, save for 
exceptional cases. In other words, the study argues that political refugees 
should be treated like permanent residents in the guarantee of their 
socioeconomic rights. This is so on the grounds that both are categories of 
people who have assumed membership of the host State as a political 
community; in the case of permanent residents on the basis of the degree of 
their attachment to the host State through prolonged stay; whilst in the case 
of political refugees on the basis that the host State has accorded them 
substitute community membership owing to the rapture of their membership 
to the political community of their country of origin. As Hathaway has stated, 
political refugeehood ‘is fundamentally a form of surrogate or substitute 
protection’ and excludes ‘those who enjoy the basic entitlements of 
membership in a national community, and who ought reasonably to vindicate 
their basic human rights against their own State.’306 He adds that the position 
of political refugees within their home State community ‘is not just precarious; 
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there is also an element of marginalisation which distinguishes them from 
other persons at risk of serious harm.’307 Okoth-Obbo is therefore right when 
he states that the appropriate response in cases of political refugeehood 
should be to ensure that refugees receive legal protection and the opportunity 
to realise the most fulsome life possible in the host country; and to put the 
refugee in a situation as close as possible to that of the national of the host 
country.308  
 
With regard to humanitarian refugees, the study argues that they can, at first 
instance, be treated on the same footing as other temporary foreign migrants, 
lawfully present or lawfully staying in the host country. It will be recalled that 
in the case of humanitarian refugees, the sending State is merely burdened 
but remains very willing to protect its own citizens. State officials in burdened 
States recognise the rights of their citizens; have the best intentions to ensure 
the protection and advancement of those rights, but lack the necessary 
resources to provide effective protection. This triggers the need for 
international protection. Since the sending State is willing, although unable, to 
provide protection to its citizens; the options for response from the 
international community are wider. They include in situ (in-country) assistance 
(since there is no bar for international assistance to be made available to the 
affected persons within the borders of the host State); temporary protection 
pending repatriation as soon as the situation in the sending State improves; 
and even, where appropriate, military intervention at the invitation of the host 
State to protect civilians in cases of civil strife. 309 
 
Temporary protection in refugee law is particularly vital as it is also a form of 
providing international refuge for humanitarian refugees in flight of serious 
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harm or threats of serious harm. Joan Fitzpatrick states that temporary 
protection ‘expands the protection of forced migrants who cannot satisfy the 
criteria under the 1951 Convention.’310 This concept is said to have 
emerged:311 
 
in the discourse of reaction to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia,
312
 where, as 
part of a “comprehensive response”, it was considered a “flexible and pragmatic 
means of affording needed protection to large numbers of people fleeing human 
rights abuses and armed conflict…who might otherwise have overwhelmed 
asylum procedures”.
313
 
 
Goodwin-Gill states that beneficiaries of temporary protection include those 
who could come within the 1969 OAU Convention definition.314 Although he 
observes that States have been ‘less enthusiastic about committing 
themselves to basic standards of treatment after admission’, he states that 
temporary protection ‘allows a pragmatic, flexible, yet principled approach to 
the idiosyncrasies of each situation’, and that ‘it does not rule out eventual 
local integration or third country resettlement of all or a proportion of a mass 
influx in the State of first refuge, acting in concert with others and pursuant to 
principles of international solidarity and equitable burden-sharing.’315  
 
Although States have not reached consensus on a uniform standard of 
treatment for refugees under temporary protection; the standard, viewed 
generally, is observably lower than the treatment accorded to political 
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refugees whose treatment is as close as possible to that accorded to full 
members of the community of the State. The basis for such lower standard of 
protection is that there are alternative ways of providing humanitarian 
refugees with protection which is effective for the purpose, meeting minimally 
accepted levels of dignity, but short of surrogate community membership in 
another State. Their situation is presumptively more likely to change within a 
relatively short period of time than is presumptively the case with political 
refugees. 
 
It has to be mentioned however that the differences drawn here are based on 
rebuttable presumptions. Such presumptions, it is submitted, are justified on 
account of the explanations proffered above. However, it is acknowledged 
that it is possible that the situation of a humanitarian refugee might eventually 
assume an observable degree of permanency. Based on objective 
considerations relating to the permanency or the possibility of permanence of 
stay, the standard of treatment for the humanitarian refugee can 
subsequently be upgraded to parity with that accorded to permanent 
residents. The justification here is that owing to the permanency criterion; 
although the humanitarian refugee’s membership to his or her State of 
nationality has not been repudiated; he or she qualifies for admission to rights 
reserved for members of the host State’s political community, due to a 
heightened degree of formal attachment constitutive of community 
membership.  
 
The split between humanitarian refugees and political refugees, with the 
attendant differing approaches in standards of treatment, is also pragmatic in 
another way: It narrows the scope of asylum, on a justifiable and principled 
basis (Max Weber’s ethic of responsibility), and such narrowing down is 
essential to ensure that the principle of asylum does not completely lose its 
essence or political legitimacy in international law. In practice, most States 
would most likely frown upon an international law scheme that imposes on 
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them the obligation to accord the full spectrum of socioeconomic rights to 
each and every foreign national who has a social or economic need which 
cannot be immediately satisfied in or by his or her own State of nationality. 
International law, it will be recalled, remains a body of law premised on the 
consent of sovereign States.  
 
In the sphere of international law, almost invariably, the legal remains 
political. As John Dugard observes, 'international law - like municipal law - 
has no autonomy as a discipline and must be seen as an integral, and 
important, part of the international political process. Traditionalists ignore this 
truth at their peril.'316 It is therefore essential, in order to achieve an effective 
scheme for the guarantee of socioeconomic rights at international law, that 
such a scheme should garner at least the support of the majority States. 
Thus, whilst such a scheme ought to be based on principle as found in the 
internationally agreed norms of human rights and plausible ethical, moral and 
fair principles of justice; it also ought to be pragmatic and politically legitimate 
by assuming standards that would achieve a good measure of consensus in 
the community of States, and which would be practically implementable given 
the scarcity of resources.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
GUARANTEE OF SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS FOR REFUGEES 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 This Chapter provides a critical discussion of the various international 
instruments that guarantee socioeconomic rights for refugees. The discussion 
starts with an exposition of the applicability of general human rights 
instruments, namely; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the African 
Charter on Human and People's Rights (ACHPR) to refugee issues. In 
particular, it examines how these instruments relate to or address 
socioeconomic rights issues in respect of refugees.  The discussion then 
proceeds to critically examine refugee specific instruments, with particular 
emphasis on the 1951 Convention regime; assessing the extent to which 
socioeconomic rights are guaranteed under these instruments; and 
interrogating the standard of treatment of refugees that is adopted.  Focus is 
placed on the 1951 Convention because it is the framework legal instrument 
for international refugee protection.  
 
3.2    Socioeconomic rights of refugees under the UDHR 
 
The UDHR was adopted on 10 December 1948.317 It contains a 
comprehensive catalogue of civil, political and socioeconomic rights.318 
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Although its general character is non-binding, the UDHR is unquestionably 
the most influential human rights instrument in the world. 319 
 
Particularly significant to refugee studies is the fact that the UDHR contains 
an express provision on the issue of refugeehood. Article 14 provides that 
‘everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from 
persecution.’ This Article has been described as the springboard of modern 
refugee law and of the 1951 Convention in particular. It is therefore central to 
the articulation of refugee rights in international human rights law. Alice 
Edwards emphasises the importance of Article 14(1) of the UDHR, stating 
that ‘[a]t a minimum, Article 14 places the right to seek and to enjoy asylum 
within the human rights paradigm and represents unanimous acceptance by 
States of its fundamental importance.’320  
 
It is evident from the language of Article 14 that the UDHR adopts the political 
conception of refugeehood. This is so because it confines itself to 
guaranteeing the protection of persecuted refugees (this includes those with a 
well-founded fear of persecution), and it therefore has, at best, only limited 
application for humanitarian refugees. 
 
3.3    Socioeconomic rights of refugees and the ICCPR 
 
Although the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), as 
its name suggests, focuses on civil and political rights, it is also relevant to 
the protection of socioeconomic rights. Perhaps a good starting point in this 
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regard is Article 2 as it provides for the nature of the obligations of States 
parties under the Covenant. The Article provides that every State party has 
the obligation to respect and ensure ‘to all individuals within its territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction’ the rights recognised in the Covenant in a non-
discriminatory manner. It states that these obligations include the adoption of 
legislative and other measures to give effect to the rights.  
 
The special relevance of the ICCPR in the context of the advancement of 
socioeconomic rights lies in the fact that some of the provisions under the 
Covenant can be invoked to advance socioeconomic rights. Most significant 
in this regard is the equality clause under Article 26 that has been invoked to 
ensure the equal guarantee of all rights, including socioeconomic rights, for 
all.321 Hathaway observes that the uniqueness of Article 26 of the ICCPR as a 
non-discrimination clause lies in the fact that ‘its ambit is not limited to the 
allocation of simply the rights found in any one instrument. Article 26 rather 
governs the allocation of all public goods, including rights not stipulated by 
the Covenant itself.’322 The Human Rights Committee (HRC), a body 
established under the ICCPR to monitor the effective implementation of the 
Covenant,323 has stated that ‘Article 26 …prohibits discrimination in law or in 
fact in any field regulated by public authorities.’324 Further, the HRC, through 
its decisions under the individual communications procedure,325has 
demonstrated the interplay between the equality clause under the ICCPR and 
socioeconomic rights guaranteed in other instruments.326  
                                                 
321
  Article 26 of the ICCPR.   
322
  Hathaway(note 47 above) 125. 
323
  The HRC is established under Art. 28 of the ICCPR. 
324
  HRC, General Comment No. 18: Non-discrimination (1989) UN. Doc. 
HRI/GEN1/Rev.7, May 12, 2004, at 146, para. 12. 
325
  The Individual Communications procedure is provided for in the 1
st
 Optional Protocol 
to the ICCPR that was also adopted in 1966 (See UNGA Res. 2200 A (XXI) of 16 
December 1966; UN, Treaty Series, Vols. No. I-14668, and also 1059, No. A-14668 
(corrigendum). The 1
st
 Optional Protocol to the ICCPR entered into force on 23 
March 1976. 
326
  See for instance Zwaan-de Vries v The Netherlands Communication 182/1984, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 at 209 (1990), where the Human Rights Committee held that the 
Netherlands had violated art. 26 of the ICCPR by denying Mrs. Zwaan-de Vries, and 
99 
 
 
The HRC has evidently not yet dealt with the specific issue of refugee rights 
under this Article.  However, from an analysis of its jurisprudence, it would 
appear that in appropriate cases, the Committee would be prepared to make 
decisions on socioeconomic rights claims of refugees, premised on Article 26 
of the ICCPR, from an equal protection of the law perspective. Indeed, the 
principle of equal treatment of the law, as it regards non-nationals generally, 
has been emphasised by the HRC through its General Comments. The HRC 
has stated that the general requirement of non-discrimination under the 
ICCPR ‘applies to aliens and citizens alike’;327 and that in particular, it 
extends to such vulnerable groups as asylum seekers and refugees.328 
 
However, it is also noteworthy that through its more decisive individual 
communications procedure, the HRC has demonstrated that the application 
of the principle of equal treatment between nationals and non-nationals is 
limitable based on reasonable and objective grounds. 329It has stated though, 
that these limitations are not to be too easily read into the non-discrimination 
principle in respect of nationals and non-nationals pursuant to Article 26 of 
the ICCPR, and that each case must be examined and determined upon its 
own facts.  
 
Thus in Karakurt v Austria,330 the State party had granted the applicant, a 
non-Austrian national, the right to work in its territory for an open-ended 
period. The question that arose for determination was whether there were 
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reasonable and objective grounds justifying exclusion of the applicant from a 
core incident of his status as an employee in the State party, which incident 
was otherwise available to nationals, namely the right to stand for election to 
the relevant work-council, on the basis of his citizenship alone.  The HRC 
stated that no general rule could be drawn on whether differential treatment 
between nationals and non-nationals was justifiable in the employment 
sphere under Article 26 of the ICCPR. Rather, the HRC observed that it was 
necessary to judge every case individually and on its own facts. On the 
specific facts of this case, the Committee held that ‘it is not reasonable to 
base a distinction between aliens concerning their capacity to stand for 
election for a work council solely on their different nationality.’331 
   
It is submitted that the point made in the Karakurt case, that each case is to 
be decided on its own facts, is particularly relevant for refugees and more so 
in respect of the guarantee of socioeconomic rights. The approach would 
provide the HRC with greater flexibility to treat the case of refugees, 
particularly political refugees, as a special one that merits preferential 
treatment over and above the general position of other non-nationals.  
 
Thus whilst in some instances differential treatment between nationals and 
foreign nationals might generally be justified on the basis that the 
differentiating criteria are objective and reasonable, such differentiation might 
as well fail to meet the test in the special case of political refugees. For 
instance, it might be permissible and reasonable to limit the right to wage 
earning employment in respect of foreign nationals generally, by for instance 
placing rigorous work permit requirements to be satisfied. It might similarly be 
permissible and reasonable to limit the right to self-employment (including 
commercial activity) by imposing onerous business permit requirements in 
order to protect the interests of local (national) entrepreneurs. However, such 
restrictions would not constitute reasonable and justifiable criteria in terms of 
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Article 26 of the ICCPR if applied to political refugees. This is because such 
onerous requirements would militate against the essence of surrogate 
community membership and protection that grounds political refugeehood 
and affords such refugees legal protection and the opportunity to realise the 
most fulsome life possible in the host State.332 
 
The relevance of the ICCPR in the context of the guarantee of socioeconomic 
rights for refugees also lies in the fact that, as demonstrated in the previous 
Chapter, political refugeehood can be engendered by the deprivation of both 
civil and political rights, and socioeconomic rights. Thus, where a refugee is 
persecuted through the deprivation of socioeconomic rights, not only is the 
violation founded on denial of socioeconomic rights, it also entails denial of 
some civil and political rights such as human dignity and life, among others, 
hence triggering the applicability of the ICCPR to the circumstance(s). 
 
3.4 The ICESCR and Refugees 
 
3.4.1 The nature of obligations under the ICESCR 
 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) guarantees a wide range of socioeconomic rights including the 
rights to self-determination, work, fair and just conditions of employment, 
joining and forming trade unions, social security,housing,food,clothing, health, 
education, and culture.  Article 2(1) of the ICESCR addresses the twin 
concepts of progressive realization and the availability of resources discussed 
earlier in Chapter I. It provides that: 
 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually 
and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and 
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technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised in the present Covenant 
by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures. 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter I, a body of scholarly literature and jurisprudence 
has been generated particularly around the concepts of availability of 
resources, ‘progressive realisation’ and ‘minimum core obligations’ in respect 
of this article.333 The notion of progressive realization in particular stands out 
prominently in distinguishing the nature of State obligations in respect of the 
rights guaranteed under the ICCPR and those guaranteed under the 
ICESCR. It suggests that, unlike the duty imposed under Article 2(1) of the 
ICCPR that generally imposes immediate obligations, Article 2(1) of the 
Covenant generally requires gradual realization over time, albeit based on 
deliberate and targeted measures.334  
 
3.4.2 Application to refugees and standards of treatment 
 
Just like the UDHR and the ICCPR, the ICESCR has a non-discrimination 
clause. Article 2(2) of the Covenant provides that: 
 
States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights 
enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of 
any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has stated 
that non-discrimination is an immediate and cross-cutting obligation in the 
Covenant.335 It has stressed that Article 2(2) requires States parties to 
guarantee non-discrimination in the exercise of each of the socioeconomic 
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rights enshrined in the Covenant. It has further clarified that discrimination in 
this regard constitutes any distinction, exclusion, restriction, preference or 
other differential treatment that is directly or indirectly based on the prohibited 
grounds of discrimination and which has the intention or effect of nullifying or 
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of 
Covenant rights.336 
 
The CESCR has specifically addressed the issue of nationality in relation to 
the principle of non-discrimination in its General Comment No. 20, stating 
that: 
 
The ground of nationality should not bar access to Covenant rights…The 
Covenant rights apply to everyone including non-nationals, such as refugees, 
asylum-seekers, stateless persons, migrant workers and victims of international 
trafficking, regardless of legal status and documentation.
337
 
 
From this authoritative interpretation, it is clear that refugees, along with other 
foreign nationals, are protected from discrimination under the ICESCR. 
However, it is pertinent here to note that this proposition is subject to the 
provisions of Article 2(3) of the ICESCR. The Article states that ‘[d]eveloping 
countries, with due regard to human rights and their national economy, may 
determine to what extent they would guarantee the economic rights 
recognized in the present Covenant to non-nationals.’  As stated in Chapter I, 
Article 2(3) appears to have been a compromise provision in the negotiation 
process of the Covenant. It exemplifies the political tension between the 
interests of foreign nationals and citizens around perceptions of rights to 
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economic benefits. Unfortunately, the CESCR has not yet provided any 
concrete guidance through its General Comments on the precise contours of 
this provision, including the extent of the margin of discretion that it entails.  
The Committee needs to provide guidance on the meaning of the term 
‘developing country’ in the context of the ICESCR  as there does not seem to 
be any universally agreed criteria that qualifies a country as a developed or 
developing one. However, whichever way one reads it, the Article provides at 
least some justification for the differential treatment of nationals and non-
nationals in developing countries in terms of the economic rights guaranteed 
under the Covenant.  
 
In conclusion, a reading of the ICESCR together with the interpretive General 
Comments of the CESCR, suggests that the covenant guarantees social 
rights to foreign nationals, including refugees of both categories 
(humanitarian and political), on the same footing as citizens.  It is in respect of 
economic rights only that the covenant allows developing countries, which 
includes virtually all the countries in Southern Africa under study, to accord 
preferential treatment towards their citizens. 
 
The remaining question is: How should refugees be treated under this 
scheme?  Based on the analysis and conclusions drawn in Chapter II, it is 
submitted that political refugees ought to be guaranteed economic rights on 
the basis of substitute protection as members of the political community of the 
State. In other words, they ought to be accorded treatment as close as 
possible to the manner in which nationals are treated. In many cases, this 
standard could be equated to the position of permanently resident non-
nationals who have assumed the domicile of the host State.338  
 
                                                 
338
   Union of Refugee Women & Others v The Director: The Private Security Industry 
Regulatory Authority & Others, 2007 (4) BCLR 339 (CC) para. 109, per Mokgoro & 
O’Regan, JJ. 
105 
 
The normative basis for this similarity of position between political refugees 
and permanent residents is that both categories of foreign nationals must 
necessarily be treated as members of the political community. In the case of 
political refugees, it is surrogate membership whereas in the case of 
permanent residents, it is based on their degree of attachment to the host 
State. Thus political refugees should be understood in this context as an 
exception to the general rule of differential treatment laid down in Article 2(3) 
of the ICESCR. 
 
On the other hand, humanitarian refugees, as Chapter II demonstrates, can 
be treated differently. They could be accorded temporary protection through 
the provision of basic resources that ensure that they have the minimal 
capabilities of life that ensure their dignity, without necessarily according them  
treatment on the same basis as that which is afforded to permanent 
residents. However, should their stay assume a character of permanence, 
humanitarian refugees can similarly be accorded rights reflective of their 
community membership of the host State. In this case, economic rights for 
humanitarian refugees should initially be caught by the provisions of Article 
2(3) of the Covenant, but depending on the degree of permanence of their 
stay, the application of that provision can be terminated. It is suggested that 
the appropriate test to gauge the longevity of stay would be to look at how 
long a foreign national generally has to stay in the host State in order to 
qualify for permanent residence.  
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3.5 The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights and 
Refugees 
 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the ACHPR)339 
expressly affirms the indivisibility and interconnectedness of all human rights. 
It states that ‘civil and political rights cannot be dissociated from economic, 
social and cultural rights in their conception as well as universality and that 
the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the 
enjoyment of civil and political rights.’340 The Charter’s express affirmation of 
this indivisibility, interconnectedness, interdependence and universality is 
evidently unique among human rights treaties.  
 
The ACHPR guarantees a wide range of socioeconomic rights, including 
rights to work, access to healthcare services, education, and family life 
among others. Significantly, the ACHPR also guarantees the rights to 
property and development that have been excluded from some major 
international human rights treaties such as the ICESCR and the ICCPR.  
 
Another interesting feature of the African Charter is the absence of a 
derogation clause. In this regard, the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights has made its position clear, holding that limitations on the 
rights and freedoms in the Charter cannot be justified by emergencies or 
special circumstances.341This point has special significance in relation to 
refugees and asylum seekers.  For instance, even where the host State is 
involved in hostilities against the refugees’ source State, the African Charter 
                                                 
339
  See UN, Treaty Series, Vol. 1520, No. I-26363. The African Charter was adopted by 
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) in Nairobi on 27 June 1981 and it came into force on 21 October 1986.  
340
  See Preambular para 7 of the African Charter. 
341
  See Media Rights Agenda and Others v Nigeria Communications 105/93, 128/94, 
130/94 and 152/96, Twelfth Activity Report 1998-1999, Annex V (Documents of the 
African Commission,), 18, paras 67-70. 
107 
 
would still require that the host State should protect the rights of the 
concerned refugees.   
 
A further unique attribute of the Charter is that, unlike the ICESCR which 
clearly and explicitly subjects the obligations of States parties to the 
availability of resources and progressive realisation,342 the African Charter 
does not have a similar provision. This has led others to argue that the 
obligations of States with respect to these rights under the Charter  must be 
understood as immediate.343 This is, however, not necessarily the case.344 In 
Purohit and Moore v The Gambia,345the African Commission held that there 
should be read into Article 16 (that guarantees the right to physical and 
mental health) the obligation on the part of States party to the African Charter 
to take concrete and targeted steps, while taking full advantage of their 
available resources, to ensure that the right to health is fully realised in all 
aspects without discrimination of any kind.346  
 
Whilst the Purohit case related to the right to health, the reasoning of the 
Commission is equally applicable to all other socioeconomic rights under the 
Charter. It can therefore be safely stated that the concept of ‘progressive 
realisation’ with regard to socioeconomic rights is implicit under the African 
Charter. This is more so considering that, in terms of article 60 of the Charter, 
the African Commission is required to ‘draw inspiration from international law 
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on human and peoples' rights’ when interpreting the obligations of States 
parties under the Charter.347  
 
The ACHPR, just like the UDHR, makes specific provision for asylum. Article 
12(3) of the ACHPR provides that ‘[e]very individual shall have the right, 
when persecuted, to seek and to obtain asylum in other countries in 
accordance with the laws of those countries and international conventions’.  It 
can therefore be concluded that, in terms of this specific treaty provision on 
asylum, the concomitant rights under the ACHPR equally apply to refugees 
who have obtained asylum. It is significant to note that the ACHPR, just like 
the UDHR, focuses more on political refugees in comparison to humanitarian 
ones as it requires the presence of the persecution element in order for a 
person to be recognised as a refugee. 
 
3.6 The 1951 Refugee Convention and Socioeconomic rights 
 
3.6.1 Introduction 
 
The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the 1951 Convention)348 
is the framework international instrument for the protection of refugees under 
the UN human rights system. The principal objective of the 1951 Convention 
is to ‘assure refugees the widest possible exercise of …fundamental human 
rights and freedoms’.349In order to achieve this goal, the Convention sets out 
a number of safeguards including the principle of non-refoulement, described 
as a core duty of States under international law,350 as well as the guarantee 
of a range of civil, political, and socioeconomic rights. The Convention thus 
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entitles refugees to several basic survival and dignity rights, documentation of 
their status and access to courts for the enforcement of their rights.351  
 
There is, however, one glaring omission under the Convention: It does not 
have a clause that expressly addresses the right of asylum per se. Whilst the 
raison d’être of the Convention centres around the question of asylum, it is 
curious that the 1951 Convention has no express provision that guarantees 
every persecuted person the right to seek and to enjoy (or obtain) asylum in 
other countries as is the case under Articles 14(1) of the UDHR and 12(3) of 
the ACHPR respectively.  This is unfortunate. The right of asylum, it is 
submitted, is an attribute of what Arendt has referred to as the right to have 
rights, and it correlatively forms the basis for the obligations of countries to 
provide surrogate protection in terms of the Convention. By including a 
provision that guarantees the right of asylum, for instance as provided for 
under Article 12(3) of the ACHPR, the 1951 Convention could have 
expressed in a very direct way, the right of the refugee to escape, to be 
accepted, and to be sheltered. Such a right constitutes one of the critical 
protections that speak to the most basic aspects of the refugee experience.352  
 
3.6.2 Socioeconomic rights guaranteed 
 
In the context of the 1951 Convention, socioeconomic rights are ‘of particular 
importance’353as they ‘integrate refugees in the economic system of the 
country of asylum or settlement, enabling them to provide for their own 
needs.’354 As earlier discussed, the 1951 Convention adopts the political 
conception of refugeehood. As such, the following discussion on specific 
rights under that Convention, and particularly the recommendations that 
follow, are premised on the understanding that it applies to political refugees. 
                                                 
351
  Hathaway (note 47 above) 94. 
352
  Ibid. 
353
  Ibid, 95. 
354
  Ibid. 
110 
 
3.6.2.1 The Right to Property 
 
The right to property under the 1951 Convention is provided for in Article 13. 
The right extends to the acquisition of movable and immovable property and 
other rights pertaining thereto, as well as to leases and other contracts 
relating to movable and immovable property.  On the international plane, it is 
especially significant that the right to property is provided for under the 1951 
Convention. This is so because although the right is provided for under Article 
17 of the UDHR, an instrument which is merely hortatory in character, 
provision of the right was omitted under the legally binding ICESCR and 
ICCPR. Thus whilst the existence of an internationally recognised right to 
property remains tenuous and highly contested,355 and more so in respect of 
foreign nationals, the right is clearly guaranteed for refugees under the 1951 
Convention.  
 
The right to property is of special significance to refugees. Firstly, the right 
protects refugees against arbitrary deprivation of property that they brought 
along into the host State during their flight. Secondly, the right also protects 
refugees from arbitrary deprivation of property acquired during their period of 
refuge in the host State. Thus where a refugee has to be repatriated, whether 
voluntarily or otherwise in terms of the cessation clauses under he 1951 
Convention, such a refugee should have his or her property security of tenure 
thereof should be assured.356 Where possible, in the case of movable assets 
or other easily transferable property, the refugee should be permitted to 
transfer these to his or her country of origin.357 If that is not possible, or where 
the refugee so elects, he or she should be allowed to either properly 
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economically dispose of such property; or should otherwise be afforded 
adequate compensation by the State.  
 
The standard of treatment that States parties under the Convention are 
enjoined to adopt in terms of Article 13 is that contracting States should 
accord a refugee treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, no 
less favourable than that accorded to other foreign nationals358 generally in 
the same circumstances. This standard provides host States with the 
discretion to decide whether to guarantee this right to refugees on the same 
footing as other foreign nationals generally, or to provide better treatment. In 
other words, there is no legal obligation imposed by the Convention to 
provide better treatment under this standard.359A generalised critique of the 
various standards of treatment adopted under the Convention is provided 
later in this Chapter. 
 
3.6.2.2 The Right to work 
 
The right to work under the 1951 Convention is guaranteed under three 
related articles that deal with the economic livelihood of refugees.360 These 
are Articles 17, 18 and 19 that deal with the right to wage-earning 
employment, self-employment and the practice of liberal professions 
respectively.  
 
The ability of a person to engage in activities in pursuit of a livelihood is an 
essential attribute of human dignity.361 Among other things, in addition to 
enabling him or her to provide for life’s amenities, he or she derives from such 
activities a special meaning for life. The right ensures that the refugee 
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becomes ‘a whole person again, one who earns his own living and the 
respect of those around him.’362The right also helps refugees to establish 
themselves as fully functional members of their new communities. 
 
The Michigan Guidelines on the Right to Work provide a lucid description of 
what the right to work entails. They state that: 
 
The right to work enshrined in international instruments is not the guarantee of a 
job, although some treaties, particularly the ICESCR and ILO Convention No. 
122 (Employment Policy Convention, 1964), oblige states to move towards full 
and productive employment. At the core of the right to work is freedom to gain a 
living by work freely chosen or accepted. This right entails access to the labor 
market, as well as the ability to participate in self-employment and the liberal 
professions. In most human rights instruments, this freedom is expressed as a 
universal entitlement, and is protected on a non-discriminatory basis.
363
 
 
However, notwithstanding the general international law principle of non-
discrimination, most States treat citizens and foreign nationals differently 
when it comes to guaranteeing the right to work. Kent Källström and Asbjørn 
Eide state that: 
 
the State is entitled to set [as] a condition for temporary entry into the country 
that the person shall not have a right to work under that temporary stay. This will 
apply, for instance, to persons who arrive as tourists or for purposes of 
temporary study in the country concerned. Persons who have obtained a non-
temporary right of residence [permanent residence], however, have the same 
right of access to work as citizens have.
364
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The general practice around the world is that foreign nationals are required to 
obtain work permits in order to be allowed to engage in any form of gainful 
work.365 In many jurisdictions, the situation of refugees with regard to the right 
to work is largely the same, and sometimes worse than, that of other foreign 
nationals generally. The situation becomes worse in some countries as 
refugees are confined to refugee camps indefinitely, thus severely limiting 
their work prospects. Indeed, Hathaway has observed that in most developing 
countries, this right ‘is either denied altogether or extremely limited for 
refugees.’366  He argues that ‘[h]ost States are often concerned that allowing 
refugees to work will drive down wages for their own citizens, thereby 
creating tensions between the refugees and their hosts.’367 This leads to the 
tragic consequence that ‘refugees who are unable to work may be compelled 
by sheer economic desperation to return to a place of persecution, resulting 
in violation of the obligation of non-refoulement.’368 Thus, in the context of 
these practical refugee problems, it is significant that the 1951 Convention 
specifically guarantees the right of refugees to work.  
 
Before concluding on this right, it is essential that we identify some of the 
differences in relation to the three aspects of work addressed under the 1951 
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Convention: wage-earning employment, self-employment and liberal 
professional practice. 
 
First, the right of wage-earning employment entails the right of the refugee to 
provide his or her labour services to an employer for pay. The right to practice 
in liberal professions under Article 19 is basically the same as wage-earning 
employment, with the only difference lying in the fact that the former is limited 
to professional refugees that practice in the liberal professions, whilst the 
latter applies to all refugees. Self-employment, by contrast, as the term 
suggests, entails the right of the refugee to independently engage in 
economic activity in the host State. This right is also applicable to all refugees 
under the 1951 Convention. 
 
Secondly, there are differences in terms of the standards of treatment 
accorded to these different aspects of work under the Convention. In terms of 
the right to wage earning employment under Article 17(1) of the Convention, 
the standard of treatment required of States is that they should accord to 
refugees lawfully staying in their territory the most favourable treatment 
accorded to nationals of a foreign country in the same circumstances. By 
according the most favourable treatment standard, the implication is that 
refugees are entitled to the same treatment as permanently resident foreign 
nationals in the host State who, as pointed out in the previous Chapter, 
generally have the same right of access to work as citizens.369  
 
The standard of treatment however is lower with regard to the rights to self-
employment and professional practice. In both of these latter cases,370 the 
Convention states that ‘[c]ontracting States shall accord to a refugee lawfully 
in their territory treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not 
less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same 
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circumstances.’  This accords the host State a wider margin of discretion. 
Whilst the host State is encouraged to provide more favourable treatment to 
convention refugees, it remains at liberty to afford refugees the same 
treatment as that accorded to other foreign nationals generally. 
 
3.6.2.3 Housing 
 
When a refugee takes refuge in another country, one of the major problems 
that he or she usually confronts in the new host community is to find decent 
housing or shelter. The UNHCR has observed that ‘housing’ in this regard 
has to be distinguished from mere ‘accommodation’. It states that the right to 
housing has wider implications as ‘it implies not only the obtaining of a 
dwelling place, but also participation in schemes for financing of the 
construction of dwelling places’.371 It is also submitted that the right to 
housing should be understood to be more that mere shelter or space in a 
refugee camp. Whilst refugees can perhaps be ‘accommodated’ in a refugee 
camp as a preliminary protection measure immediately on arrival in the host 
State, they should be guaranteed the right to access housing of their own 
choice that meets the requirements of durability, habitability and stability.372 
Where refugee camps are established by Governments, these must not 
function as places of detention but only as a place of safety. Thus, the 
accommodation of refugees therein should not in any way prejudice their 
fundamental right of access to housing. 
 
Article 21 of the Convention guarantees the right to housing. However, the 
scope of Article 21 is rather narrow. It provides that: 
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As regards housing, the contracting States, in so far as the matter is regulated 
by laws or regulations or is subject to the control of public authorities, shall 
accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory treatment as favourable as 
possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens 
generally in the same circumstances. 
 
Hathaway argues that the real value of this Article is limited in two 
fundamental ways: First, he argues, its benefit may only be claimed by 
refugees ‘lawfully staying’ and not those merely ‘lawfully in’ the country.373 
The difference between these two terms is that refugees ‘lawfully staying’ are 
those that have been granted some form of Status, either as recognised 
refugees or somehow granted temporary protection. On the other hand, 
refugees ‘lawfully present’ are those whose claims to refugeehood have been 
officially noted and/or registered by the State, but their status has not yet 
been determined such as asylum seekers. Hathaway observes that the 
decision to limit the enjoyment of this right only to those ‘lawfully staying’ 
might have been prompted by concern not to exacerbate housing shortages 
for the host State’s housing shortages for their own citizens, which would 
likely be the result of a wider application of the right.374 Therefore, in terms of 
Article 21, mere asylum seekers awaiting status determination may be 
disqualified from enjoying the right to housing. This position however ignores 
the fact that in any event, such asylum seekers would still be entitled to the 
minimum core of the right to housing. 
 
Secondly, Hathaway argues that another problem is that Article 21 provides 
no firm qualitative guarantee of any rights over and above those which inhere 
in ‘aliens generally in the same circumstances.’375 This standard is vague. 
The right guaranteed for ‘aliens generally’ may in practice entail that only a 
very narrow and unsatisfactory catalogue of rights is guaranteed. Further, 
Hathaway argues that Article 21 contains no affirmative and substantive 
                                                 
373
  Hathaway (note 47 above) 825. 
374
  Ibid. 
375
  Ibid, 826.  
117 
 
content in respect of the right to housing.376 In the result, Hathaway 
concludes that the guarantee of housing rights under Article 21 might, in 
practice, amount to a guarantee of very little, if any protection at all, in 
substantive terms.377   
 
Whilst Hathaway’s critique of Article 21 seems highly persuasive, it is still 
significant that an attempt at specifying the importance of the right to housing 
for refugees, through the explicit provision of housing under the Convention, 
was made. At the very least, the express provision of housing issues under 
the Convention provides a springboard from which matters relating to the 
scope of the right to housing under the Convention might be further 
interrogated. 
 
3.6.2.4 Education 
 
The right to education is an empowering right, in that it enhances a person’s 
capabilities within society. The CESCR has stated in this regard that: 
 
Education is both a human right in itself and an indispensable means of realizing 
other human rights. As an empowerment right, education is the primary vehicle 
by which economically and socially marginalized adults and children can lift 
themselves out of poverty and obtain the means to participate fully in their 
communities.
378
 
 
The right to education is also essential for the realization of human dignity. In 
the Watchenuka case, Nugent JA stated that the freedom to study is inherent 
in human dignity because, without such freedom, a person is deprived of the 
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potential for human fulfilment.379 For people who have been involuntarily 
uprooted from their homes such as refugees, access to study and to pursue 
other forms of education is critical for them to have a sense of human 
fulfillment, socioeconomic upliftment and dignity. The special significance that 
refugees place on education is astutely articulated by James Hathaway who 
states that: 
 
anxious for their children’s studies to resume before knowledge is lost, or simply 
to restore a sense of purpose in a situation otherwise without hope, refugees 
frequently establish classes for their children immediately upon reaching safety, 
using whatever resources are available to them.
380
 
 
The right to education under the 1951 Convention is provided for in Article 22 
under the heading ‘Public Education’. The Article provides as follows: 
 
1. The Contracting States shall accord to refugees the same treatment as is 
accorded to nationals with respect to elementary education. 
2. The Contracting States shall accord to refugees treatment as favourable as 
possible, and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens 
generally in the same circumstances, with respect to education other than 
elementary education and, in particular, as regards access to studies, the 
recognition of foreign school certificates, diplomas, and degrees, the 
remission of fees and charges and the award of scholarships. 
 
One observes from these provisions that Article 22 does not explicitly state 
that every refugee has the right to education, as is the case for instance 
under Article 13 of the ICESCR. Instead, it simply refers to the standard of 
treatment to be accorded to refugees in relation to education. It provides that 
refugees will be accorded the same rights as nationals in respect of 
elementary education, but that with regard to other forms of education, the 
standard of treatment is ‘treatment as favourable as possible, and, in any 
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event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same 
circumstances.’ 
 
The clear priority on elementary education in Article 22(1) that obliges host 
states to treat refugees and their own citizens on an equal footing, is 
significant. It ensures that the education of refugee children should not be 
prejudiced based on their vulnerable status.  
 
In respect of education other than elementary education, the standard 
adopted under the 1951 Convention is also problematic in so far as the 
Convention does not accord political refugees the most favourable treatment 
accorded to a foreign national generally in the host State. As argued in 
Chapter II, there is an ethical imperative that demands that political refugees 
should receive such treatment in the host country, which equals that of 
permanent residents, particularly in the area of socioeconomic rights.  
 
3.6.2.5 Labour and Social security 
 
Article 24 of the 1951 Convention addresses the issue of ‘Labour Legislation 
and Social Security’ rights for refugees.381For the purposes of this discussion, 
Article 24(1) that is especially significant. This provision has two separate but 
related parts. The first part provides for general equality of treatment in the 
workplace between nationals and refugees. The UNHCR has observed that 
this provision is derived from standards earlier adopted by the ILO in respect 
of the treatment of nationals and foreign nationals in the workplace, stating 
that ‘the placing of foreigners and national workers on the same footing not 
only meets the demands of equity but is in the interests of national wage-
earners who might have been afraid that foreign labour, being cheaper than 
their own, would have been preferred.’382 
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The second part of Article 24(1) addresses social security entitlements. It 
accords refugees lawfully staying in the host State the same treatment as 
nationals in respect of legal provisions relating to employment injury, 
occupational diseases, maternity, sickness, disability, old age, death, 
unemployment, family responsibilities and any other contingency covered by 
a social security scheme.  
 
A deficiency with regard to Article 24 is that it limits the scope of social 
security to the employment sphere. Social security measures are important to 
a wider spectrum of people in any State, including refugees, beyond the 
context of labour relations. Mpedi et al provide us with this broad conception 
of social security, stating that: 
 
Social security refers to public and private, or mixed public and private 
measures designed to protect individuals and families against income security 
caused by contingencies such as employment injury, maternity sickness, 
invalidity, old age and death. Conceptually, social security includes social 
insurance, social assistance and social allowances.
383
 
 
This entails therefore, that in the case of refugees, issues such as social 
allowances, such as child support or old age grants, among others, that ought 
not necessarily be tied to the labour market context, must be encompassed in 
a comprehensive social security guarantee scheme. This is particularly so in 
the case of political refugees who ought to be treated as members of the 
political community. 
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3.7 Key socioeconomic rights unaddressed 
 
Even though the 1951 Convention is the framework instrument for the 
protection of the rights of refugees, and whose overarching objective is to 
ensure the widest possible exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms for 
refugees, it still falls short in certain material respects due to its failure to 
guarantee some key socioeconomic rights. These rights include the right of 
access to healthcare, the right of access to food, and the right of access to 
clean and potable water.  
 
All these rights are highly significant for refugees. The right of access to 
healthcare, for instance, is important for refugees as in many cases; they are 
highly traumatised and might have been exposed to multiple health hazards 
during flight. In terms of the right to food, the Jesuit Refugee Service correctly 
observes that Refugees are frequently forced to flee without the basics of life, 
and that even where they are provided with a degree of protection in a 
country of asylum, they are frequently not permitted to cultivate their own food 
and are denied access to markets.384  
 
Within such an environment, refugees must necessarily depend on the host 
country and the international community to provide the necessities of life 
which include, most fundamentally, food.385 Without food, all the other 
aspects of refugee protection become almost meaningless.386 This is why it is 
quite surprising, and indeed regrettable, that although the right to food is 
quintessential and primordial, it does not find explicit expression in the 1951 
Convention. 
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In terms of the right of access to clean and potable water, this is a right that is 
an essential determinant for the enjoyment of other rights such as health, 
food and housing.387 The CESCR has emphasised that ‘[t]he right to water 
clearly falls within the category of guarantees essential for securing an 
adequate standard of living, particularly since it is one of the most 
fundamental conditions for survival.’388 
 
The omission of these rights under the 1951 Convention means that we need 
to look to broader international and regional human rights law in order to 
gauge the extent to which these rights are guaranteed for refugees on the 
international plane.  The problem with that approach however is that the 
standard of treatment set by general international law in relation to foreign 
nationals generally and refugees in particular, remains unsettled. It would 
have been much better to explicitly guarantee these quintessential rights 
under the 1951 Convention, and define the standards of treatment by which 
they would be guaranteed for refugees. 
 
3.8 Standards of treatment under the 1951 Convention 
 
3.8.1 Introduction 
 
This section examines the various standards of treatment accorded to 
refugees under the Convention. An examination of the convention shows that 
two criteria are adopted in determining the various standards of treatment. 
Firstly, the Convention ties the standard of treatment for refugees to their 
degree of attachment to the host State. Secondly, the Convention provides 
for different standards of treatment in respect of different rights. In the latter 
scenario, it seems the differential treatment is based on the nature of a 
specific right in issue. 
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3.8.2 Different standards according to different levels of 
attachment 
 
The 1951 Convention links the extent to which refugees may enjoy various 
rights, to the degree of their attachment to the host State. Hathaway, 
classifies in this respect, the rights that refugees are guaranteed under the 
Convention according to four broad levels of attachment: (a) Rights of 
refugees physically present in the host State; (b) Rights of refugees lawfully 
present in the host State; (c) Rights of refugees lawfully staying in the host 
State; and (d) Rights of refugees with durable residence (or habitual 
residence) in the host State.389 He explains that the 1951 Convention grants 
‘enhanced rights as the bond strengthens between the particular refugee and 
the State party in which he or she is present.’ 390 He states that: 
 
While all refugees benefit from a number of core rights, additional entitlements 
accrue as a function of the nature and duration of the attachment to the asylum 
State. The most basic set of rights inheres as soon as a refugee comes under a 
State’s de jure or de facto jurisdiction; a second set applies when he or she 
enters a State’s territory; other rights inhere only when the refugee is lawfully 
within the State’s territory; some when the refugee is lawfully staying there; and 
a few rights accrue only upon satisfaction of a durable residency requirement. 
Before any right can be claimed by a particular refugee, the nature of his or her 
attachment to the host State must therefore be defined.
391
 
 
This stratification of guaranteed rights for refugees is considered to be 
justified notwithstanding the fact that the rights under the Convention are not 
dependent on the official declaration of refugee status, but rather on whether 
his or her de facto circumstances qualify him or her as a refugee.392The 
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justification for the stratification lies in the fact that the rights under the 1951 
Convention are reserved only for genuine convention refugees and not every 
person who seeks to be recognised as a refugee.393 A balance therefore has 
to be maintained to ensure that whilst genuine refugees are not placed at a 
disadvantage by completely withholding all their convention rights pending 
status determination; the integrity of the refugee protection system should 
also be preserved by ensuring that only those who are genuine refugees 
actually enjoy full protection under the convention. As Carens states, it is 
important that: 
 
[i]n seeking to advance the interests of refugees and other needy people, we 
should be careful not to undermine the legitimacy of one of the few 
institutions that offer them any sort of protection and hope, however limited 
and inadequate it may be in many respects.
394
 
 
Carens warns that there is greater likelihood that unguarded insistence on 
achieving an overly generous rights scheme for refugees and asylum seekers 
might in practice have the opposite outcome. Tuitt has observed, in this 
regard, that the modern asylum system is dogged by fraudulent economic 
migrants who manipulate the rules governing asylum by making bogus 
asylum claims.395 If the scheme for refugee protection becomes greatly 
abused, the legitimacy of the whole refugee protection scheme might be 
undermined and States might become averse to hosting refugees. Thus the 
incremental scheme of rights guarantees, as outlined by Hathaway, helps to 
shield the refugee protection system from abuse by such fraudulent asylum 
applicants, who neither qualify as political or humanitarian refugees, and who 
simply seek to take their chances under refugee law. Such an incremental 
rights scheme helps to ensure that the whole system does not lose legitimacy 
by being over-generous to asylum seekers whose claims might eventually 
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turn out to be fraudulent or manifestly unfounded.  As Mathew observes; if no 
proper mechanisms of checks and balances are adopted in this regard, ‘the 
institution of asylum may be threatened by State policies...that are based on 
fear of abuse of the asylum system by so-called “economic migrants”’. 396 
 
Thus whilst the incremental rights scheme outlined by Hathaway has its 
limitations, in that genuine political refugees are denied immediate full 
guarantee of all convention rights pending the conclusion of status 
determination processes; the scheme is pragmatic and ensures that a proper 
balance is struck between the refugee’s immediate protection needs and the 
host State’s interests in regulating and controlling immigration.  
 
The various categories of rights, as dependent on the refugee’s degree of 
attachment to the host State, are outlined below. 
 
3.8.2.1 Rights of refugees physically present in the host 
State 
 
Under the convention’s scheme, the guarantee of some rights is predicated 
merely upon the refugee's presence in the host State, irrespective of his or 
her legal situation in such a State.397 The language used by the 1951 
Convention in this respect is that the Convention entitles the specific rights 
mentioned to ‘a refugee’, to ‘refugees within their territories’, or to ‘any 
refugee in their territory.’ Instances include the right of non-refoulement under 
Article 33 of the Convention that applies to all refugees, as it simply uses the 
expression ‘a refugee’; 398the right to freedom of religion under Article 4 that 
applies to ‘refugees within [the host State’s territory]’; the right of access to 
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courts under Article 16(1); the right to education under Article 22; and the 
right to be issued with identity papers if not in possession of a valid travel 
document under Article 27.  
 
Other than the right to education, most of the rights guaranteed at this level of 
attachment are civil and political rights. Socioeconomic rights are not 
mentioned. It is submitted however that a better conceptualized and effective 
scheme of refugee protection ought to include the guarantee of at least the 
minimum core content of socioeconomic rights requisite for survival such as 
access to housing, health, food, water and sanitation, among others.  
 
Refugees who are merely physically present in the host State seem to be the 
most vulnerable category of refugees. A significant number of these are 
refugees referred to in Chapter I as ‘those without papers.’ They face the real 
risk of being treated as ‘illegal immigrants’ and thus being denied even the 
general standard of treatment accorded to foreign nationals in the host State 
as provided for under Article 7(1) of the 1951 Convention. It is therefore 
essential that the Convention should be explicit about, expand on the set of 
rights, and clarify on the standard of treatment to be accorded to refugees 
who are only physically present in the host State. 
 
3.8.2.2 Rights of refugees lawfully present in the host 
State 
 
A number of additional rights apply to refugees who are lawfully present in the 
host State. Goodwin-Gill explains that lawful presence implies admission of 
foreign nationals in accordance with the applicable immigration law, for a 
temporary purpose. He states that examples of foreign nationals lawfully 
present in the host State include students, visitors, or recipients of medical 
127 
 
attention.399 Goodwin-Gill is unclear however on how this conception of 
immigrants lawfully present in the territory of the host State helps us to 
conceptualise who is a refugee ‘lawfully present’ in the host State. It is 
submitted that a refugee lawfully present in the host State is one who has 
formally presented himself or herself to the authorities of the host State, and 
who presence in the country is therefore acknowledged by the relevant 
authorities of the host State. In other words, these are asylum seekers whose 
refugee status is pending determination. The additional rights guaranteed to 
refugees falling under this category include the rights to self-employment 
under Article 18, freedom of movement under Article 26, and the right not to 
be expelled from the host State except for reasons of being a threat to 
national security or public order under Article 32 of the Convention. 
 
3.8.2.3 Rights of refugees lawfully staying in the host 
State 
 
Further rights, over and above those accorded to refugees who are physically 
present or lawfully present in the host State, are guaranteed for those 
 refugees who are lawfully staying in the host State.400 Most of the specific 
rights guaranteed under the Convention, including socioeconomic rights, 
apply to this category of refugees. The distinction between lawful presence 
and lawful residence has already been stated. It suffices to simply reiterate 
here, that these are refugees whose status has officially been determined by 
the host State. 
 
The rights guaranteed for this group include freedom of association, under 
Article 15; the right to wage-earning employment under Article 17; the right to 
practise liberal professions under Article 19; the right to housing under Article 
                                                 
399
  Ibid. 
400
  i.e those who have been granted political refugee status in accordance with relevant 
status determination procedures. 
128 
 
21; the right to public relief and assistance in times of emergency, in terms of 
Article 23; labour and social security rights in terms of Article 24; and the right 
to be issued with travel documents under Article 28 of the Convention. 
 
3.8.2.4 Rights if refugees habitually resident in the host 
State 
 
This is the last tier applying to those refugees whose stay in the host State ‘is 
more than a stay of short duration.’401 In other words, these are refugees who 
have essentially ‘made a home’ in the host State. It thus represents the 
highest degree of attachment of the refugee to the host State. However, only 
a few additional rights are reserved for this category of refugees.402These are 
the right to artistic and industrial (or intellectual) property under Article 14 of 
the Convention; the right to the same treatment as nationals in respect of 
access to justice that includes the right to receive legal assistance by the 
State, and to be exempted from cautio judicatum solvi (i.e to be exempted 
from the requirement of posting security for costs in court proceedings by 
reason of being a foreign national).  
 
3.8.3 Standards of treatment and levels of attachment: A 
critique 
 
The discussion above demonstrates that the degree of the refugee's 
attachment to the host State determines the extent to which various 
fundamental human rights, including socioeconomic rights, are guaranteed 
under the 1951 Convention. As the degree of attachment increases, the 
degree of guarantee gets correspondingly heightened.  
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Given the legitimacy of differential treatment between citizens and foreign 
nationals, a structured scheme that draws a difference in  the standards of 
treatment on the basis of the level of attachment to the host State, is 
generally essential. Such a scheme helps to isolate different categories of 
foreign nationals into those that are in immediate need of surrogate political 
community membership and protection; those that are merely in humanitarian 
need of temporary international assistance; and lastly those that do not merit 
any special treatment from the host State (purely voluntary and temporary 
foreign migrants).The last category constitutes those foreign nationals who 
neither have a well-founded fear of persecution, nor are victims of a dire life-
threatening humanitarian situation. This category includes both those that are 
voluntarily and lawfully present or lawfully staying in the host country on the 
one hand; and those that are voluntarily but illegally present or staying in the 
host country on the other. 
 
Whilst this approach seems justifiable, it is submitted that in the case of 
political refugees, there is no necessity for adopting the durable (or habitual) 
residence test as a degree of the refugee's attachment for purposes of 
guaranteeing certain socioeconomic rights. This is because once determined 
to be a political refugee through the relevant RSD process; the refugee ought 
to be granted substitute protection based on the community membership 
principle which entitles him or her to treatment that is as close as possible to 
national treatment. 
 
In the situation of humanitarian refugees however, as argued in Chapter II, 
temporary protection should be the default position. At the same time though, 
it is recognised that it would be inconsistent with human dignity for such 
persons to be accorded lesser (temporary) protection indefinitely, merely on 
account of the fact that they are humanitarian refugees originating from 
burdened and not outlaw States. There must therefore be a scheme that 
ensures that the levels of guarantee of rights for humanitarian refugees get 
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heightened depending on the degree of attachment to the host State. In this 
regard, the structured approach that draws a difference between those 
physically present, lawfully present, lawfully staying and durably (or 
habitually) residing is important under this category of refugees. In this 
regard, it is submitted that where a humanitarian refugee’s residence in the 
host country becomes long enough to qualify as durable residence for 
instance, it becomes imperative to accord him or her substitute protection in 
the host community based on the community membership principle. This 
should therefore, in turn, entitle him or her to the same high standard of 
guarantee as is accorded to political refugees at first instance. Substitute 
community membership in this instance arises from the length of lawful stay 
and degree of attachment, rather than as a result of having his/her 
membership of the State of nationality repudiated by a persecutory (outlaw) 
regime.  
 
It is submitted that an effective and comprehensive legal framework for the 
protection of refugees must necessarily capture both the political and 
humanitarian aspects of refugeehood. A scheme that leaves out one aspect, 
such as the 1951 Convention scheme that does not capture humanitarian 
refugees, is deficient. However, such legal framework must not conflate the 
standards of treatment appropriate for these two categories. The principle of 
substitute membership of a political community should guide law and policy 
on whether a particular refugee should receive full substitute protection or 
temporary protection on a lesser standard.403  
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3.8.4 Different standards according to different rights 
 
This sub-section deals with the standards of treatment that are applicable in 
respect of the different rights guaranteed under the 1951 Convention. Four 
standards of treatment have been identified in this respect. These are: (a) the 
same treatment as is accorded to nationals; (b) the most favourable treatment 
accorded to nationals of a foreign country in the same circumstances; (c) 
treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable 
than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances; and (d) the 
same treatment as is accorded to aliens generally.404 
 
The highest standard of treatment is treatment on the same footing as 
nationals of the host State. This standard applies to a range of rights 
including the right of access to elementary education;405 the right of access to 
public relief and assistance; the right to social security (in the context of 
labour rights);406 the right to the protection of literary, artistic, and scientific 
work;407 and the right to protection of intellectual property including 
inventions, designs, trademarks. The import of this standard is rather plain: 
refugees must be treated in the same manner as nationals.  
 
The second layer of treatment is the most favourable treatment accorded to 
nationals of a foreign country in the same circumstances as the refugees. 
This standard applies in respect of the right to belong to trade unions;408 the 
right to belong to other non-profit organisations;409 and the right to engage in 
wage-earning employment.410 This standard essentially means that refugees 
should be entitled to the best treatment that the host State accords to foreign 
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nationals. In many countries, permanently resident foreign nationals receive 
the most favourable treatment among foreign nationals in the host State.411 It 
has been suggested that this standard can be interpreted to mean that 
refugees should be accorded treatment on the level of parity with permanent 
residents because both categories are essentially entitled to remain in the 
host State indefinitely, and have thereby essentially assumed community 
membership in the host country.412  
 
This standard however is only reserved for a few rights under the 
Convention.413 One notable thing in respect of this standard is that the 
provisions relating thereto have attracted the most reservations under the 
1951 Convention,414 thus casting some doubt on the level of international 
consensus on the essence, acceptability or legitimacy of the same. Be that as 
it may, this thesis argues that it is this standard that fits well into the 
theoretical justification for providing special treatment to political refugees as 
expounded in Chapter II.  
 
 
The third stratum is the standard that enjoins States to ensure treatment as 
favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that 
accorded to aliens (foreign nationals) generally in the same circumstances. 
This standard applies in respect of the right to property;415 the right to practice 
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liberal professions;416 the right to self-employment;417 the right of access to 
housing418 and the right to access to higher education.419 This means that 
refugees should, in any event, not be accorded treatment that is less 
favourable than that accorded to other non-nationals generally, in the same 
circumstances. The use of the words ‘treatment as favourable as possible’ 
suggests that host States are encouraged, but not necessarily bound, to 
move beyond treatment that is accorded to foreign nationals generally in the 
same circumstances, and provide better treatment. 
 
The lowest standard of treatment under the 1951 Convention is ‘the same 
treatment as is accorded to aliens generally’ in the host State.420This 
standard applies in respect of the right to freedom of movement and 
residence;421 and the right to be exempt from reciprocity.422The UNHCR 
observes that whilst the ‘expression “aliens generally” is not a well defined 
term…in the present context it seems to denote aliens who “could not claim 
the special treatment enjoyed by some foreigners under the condition of 
reciprocity” or by virtue of municipal laws instituting preferential treatment of 
certain groups of aliens.’423 This is therefore the lowest standard of treatment 
that the 1951 Convention confers on refugees. 
 
The difference between the third stratum standard described above, and the 
last (lowest) standard, i.e ‘treatment as is accorded to aliens generally’, lies in 
the fact that under the former, States are actively encouraged to ensure 
better treatment than that accorded to other foreign nationals generally; whilst 
under the latter, the Convention does not envisage any need for giving 
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refugees any form of priority in comparison with other foreign nationals in the 
host State. 
 
Notwithstanding these specific Convention standards, Article 7(1) of the 
Convention lays down what might be termed the default (or general) standard 
of treatment for refugees. It provides that ‘[e]xcept where this Convention 
contains more favourable provisions, a Contracting State shall accord to 
refugees the same treatment as is accorded to aliens generally.’ Thus, the 
scheme of the Convention suggests that States parties are under a general 
obligation to accord treatment to refugees on the basis of parity with other 
foreign nationals lawfully staying in the host State.424 The term ‘aliens 
generally’ as used here denotes  those foreign nationals who cannot claim 
the special treatment enjoyed by some foreigners under the condition of 
reciprocity or by virtue of municipal laws instituting preferential treatment of 
certain groups of foreign nationals (such as permanent residents).425 
 
This is particularly significant in respect of rights that are not specifically 
guaranteed under the 1951 Convention. It has been argued that the idea 
behind Article 7(1) is that it should apply to all fundamental rights and not 
merely those specified under the Convention. The purport of Article 7(1) thus 
seems to be that where, under an instrument such as the ICESCR, a right not 
covered by the 1951 Convention is guaranteed, then unless such specific 
instrument prescribes a special standard of treatment to be applicable to 
refugees, the host State would have discharged its obligations under the 
1951 Convention by treating refugees on the same footing as other foreign 
nationals generally, who are not entitled to any form of preferential treatment.  
 
                                                 
424
  Goodwin-Gill states that ‘[t]he Convention…proposes, as a minimum standard, that 
refugees should receive at least that treatment which is accorded to aliens generally” 
– Goodwin-Gill (note 30 above) 298-299. 
425
  Ibid. 
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The default standard under Article 7(1) of the 1951 Convention is, however, 
problematic. An examination of the norms of international aliens law shows 
that according refugees the same treatment as is accorded to other foreign 
nationals generally, would not assure any meaningful protection.426  
Hathaway argues that this is because the primary responsibility to protect the 
interests of foreign nationals:  
 
lies with their State of nationality, which is expected to engage in diplomatic 
intervention to secure respect for the human rights of its citizens abroad. 
Because refugees are by definition persons whose country of nationality either 
cannot or will not protect them, traditional aliens law could be expected to 
provide them with few benefits. For this reason, an essential aspect of 
international refugee protection has always been to provide surrogate 
international protection.
427
  
 
Thus Hathaway seems to advocate here, and appropriately so, treatment to 
be accorded to the political refugee that is constitutive of substitute 
community membership and protection. This type of protection, as shown 
above, entails or ought to entail the highest standard of treatment accorded to 
a foreign national in the host State.   
 
In conclusion, the argument here is that the rights-contingent standards of 
treatment under the 1951 Convention need to be reformed. Instead of the 
general standard of treatment for political refugees being treatment that is 
accorded to other foreign nationals in the country generally as spelt out in 
Article 7(1) of the Convention; the appropriate general standard, consistent 
with the idea of surrogate community membership, ought to be the most 
favourable treatment accorded to a foreign national in the host State.   
 
 
 
                                                 
426
  Hathaway (note 47 above) 193. 
427
  Ibid. 
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3.9 Conclusion 
 
This Chapter has explored a number of principal international human rights 
instruments, noting that all of them have significant relevance in advancing 
the socioeconomic rights of refugees.  The general principle that emerges is 
that foreign nationals, including refugees are generally entitled to the same 
rights as citizens. Klaaren captures this postion well, stating that: 
 
To a large extent, the international human rights of non-citizens are the rights 
that are guaranteed to all persons by those instruments. Thus, foreign nationals 
get all (or almost all) the international human rights law rights that citizens get. 
This is so because international human rights law generally requires that citizens 
and non-citizens be treated equally. Deviations from equal treatment of non-
citizens may, however, be permissible where a legitimate state objective is 
served and where the deviations are proportional to that objective. This equality 
norm is at the heart of international human rights law.
428
 
 
Thus a number of rights, including rights of political participation are restricted 
to citizens, or their enjoyment by foreign nationals is highly limited. The 
enjoyment of economic rights is also generally limited for foreign nationals.  
 
With specific reference to the socioeconomic rights of refugees, whilst the 
general international and regional human rights instruments also apply to 
refugees; the 1951 Convention is the principal instrument to look to when it 
comes to the guarantee of refugee rights in international law. Significantly, the 
Convention provides for various standards of treatment. An analysis of the 
Convention shows that the standards of treatment are highly structured; and 
although the travaux preparatoires for the Convention are rather sparse, it is 
evident that such complex structuralism is a reflection of the animated 
debates and compromises that the delegates to the Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries had to make on a matter as highly emotive as the hosting of 
                                                 
428
  Klaaren (note 8 above) 83. 
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refugees that impacts on immigration policy.  States still jealously guard their 
sovereignty and the admission and hosting of foreign nationals, such as 
refugees, is one of the last bastions of the exercise of sovereignty.  In this 
regard, the 1951 Convention has a two-pronged framework for determining 
the standards of treatment for refugees: one based on the degree of 
attachment to the host State, and the other on the nature of the right that is 
guaranteed.   
 
In respect of the degree of attachment, the standard of treatment heightens 
as the level of attachment to the host State increases. This study argues that 
to a large extent, this approach is justifiable in order to preserve the integrity 
of the international refugee protection regime, shielding it from abuse by mere 
fortune-seekers. However, unlike the present structure that waits until a 
refugee is durably (habitually) resident in the host State before guaranteeing 
him or her the highest spectrum of socioeconomic rights, it is submitted that 
once a person is declared to be a recognised political refugee, based on the 
surrogate community membership principle, he or she should be accorded 
the full spectrum of socioeconomic rights at that stage.  
 
With regard to the nature of the rights framework, it has been observed that 
the general standard of treatment is that refugees under the 1951 Convention 
will receive treatment that is similar to that of other foreign nationals 
generally; unless specifically provided otherwise. It is submitted however that 
this general principle under Article 7(1) of the Convention is inconsistent with 
the proposition of principle pursued in this study, which is that political 
refugees ought to be guaranteed rights on the basis of surrogate community 
membership in the host State. Based on that proposition, it is submitted that 
the appropriate general standard should rather be the most favourable 
treatment accorded to a foreign national. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE LEGAL GUARANTEE OF SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS FOR 
REFUGEES IN SOUTHERN AFRICAN STATES 
 
4.1   Introduction 
 
Refugeehood is a perennial problem in Southern Africa. In Chapter I, the 
study has identified refugees as one of the vulnerable groups in society; and 
pointed out that one of the fundamental challenges that they face in the host 
State is on how to realise their socioeconomic rights. This Chapter critically 
evaluates the extent to which domestic legal regimes in Southern Africa 
guarantee socioeconomic rights for refugees.  
  
An examination of the legal regimes of Southern African States makes it clear 
that the significance of the refugee problem is formally recognised in the 
region. This is evident from the fact that all the Southern African States that 
have been surveyed in this study have adopted refugee-specific legislation.429 
Unlike most post-colonial pieces of legislation that were either a continuation 
of colonial laws or modelled along the lines of similar legislation in the former 
colonial powers,430 the spring of refugee legislation in Southern Africa neither 
represents a continuation of such laws, nor is it modelled along similar 
legislation elsewhere. The adoption of these legislative measures therefore 
                                                 
429
  Botswana - Refugees (Recognition and Control) Act, 1968; Lesotho - Refugee Act 
1983; Malawi, Refugee Act, 1989; Namibia - Namibia Refugees (Recognition and 
Control) Act, 1999; South Africa - Refugees Act 130 1998; Zambia - Refugee 
(Control) Act, 1970; and Zimbabwe - Refugee Act, 1983. 
430
  Munjeru has astitutely observed in this regard that ‘in the African context, most 
legislation dates from the period of colonialism resulting in…laws that do not capture’ 
specific values and contextualised needs of the people to whom it applies.  See D 
Munjeru, ‘Legislation and Practices: The Way Forward’ in W Ndoro & G Pwiti, Legal 
Frameworks for the Protection of Immovable Cultural Heritage in Africa (2009) 1, 
available at www.iccrom.org/pdf/ICCROM_ICS05_LegalFrameworkAfrica_en.pdf 
(accessed 9 December 2011) 
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serves as an exemplification of the significance attached to the refugee 
problem in these States. It shows that the refugee-specific legislation was 
adopted out of specific need rather than by way of imposition by colonial 
powers.  
 
Further, it is significant to observe that all these States have ratified the 1951 
Convention431 and, with the exception of Namibia,432 they have also ratified 
the 1969 OAU Convention.433 This is in addition to their general human rights 
obligations under various treaties, such as the ICESCR,434 the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC)435 and the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), among others, as they relate to refugees.436  
 
                                                 
431
  The following is the status of ratifications/accessions of the 1951 Convention in 
respect of the Southern African countries under study: Botswana – 6 January 1969; 
Lesotho – 14 May 1981; Malawi – 10 December 1987; Namibia – 17 February 1995; 
South Africa – 12 January 1996; Swaziland – 14 February 2000; Tanzania – 12 May 
1964; Zambia – 12 September 1969; and Zimbabwe – 25 August 1981. See UN, 
Treaty Series, Vol. 189, p.137 et seq. 
432
  See African Union, List of Countries Which Have Signed , Ratified/Acceded to the 
African Union Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa, Namibia is yet to ratify/accede to this Convention. Document available on 
http://www.au.int/en/treaties/status (accessed on 9 December 2011). 
433
  The status of ratification/accession by the countries under study is as follows: 
Botswana – 26 February 1973; Lesotho – 18 November 1988; Malawi – 4 November 
1987; Namibia – yet to ratify/accede; South Africa – 15 December 1995; Swaziland – 
16 January 1989; Tanzania – 10 January 1975; Zambia – 30 July 1973; and 
Zimbabwe – 28 September 1985. See African Union, List of Countries Which Have 
Signed , Ratified/Acceded to the African Union Convention Governing the Specific 
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, available on 
http://www.au.int/en/treaties/status (accessed on 9 December 2011).  
434
  According to recent UN records, the following is the status of ratifications/accessions 
to the ICESCR in respect of the countries under study: Botswana – yet to 
ratify/accede; Lesotho – 9 September 1992; Malawi – 22 December 1993; Namibia – 
28 November 1994; South Africa – signed on 3 October 1994 but is yet to 
ratify/accede; Swaziland – 26 March 2004; Tanzania – 11 June 1976; Zambia – 10 
April 1984; and Zimbabwe – 13 May 1991 – See UN, Status of ratification: 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr-ratify.htm (accessed 9 December 2011) 
435
  All the countries under study have ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
See United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 1577, p.3 et seq. 
436
  All the countries surveyed in this study have ratified the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples Rights of 1981 - African Union, List of Countries Which Have Signed , 
Ratified/Acceded to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, available on 
http://www.au.int/en/treaties/status (accessed on 9 December 2011). 
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This Chapter explores and critiques the various constitutional and statutory 
frameworks for the protection of socioeconomic rights in the various States in 
the region and how specifically these apply to, or impact on, refugee 
protection. The Chapter also explores the refugee status determination (RSD) 
schemes in the various States in the region; and highlights the interface 
between the RSD process and the legal guarantee of socioeconomic rights 
for refugees.  
 
4.2  Constitutional frameworks for the protection of 
socioeconomic rights for refugees 
 
All the countries surveyed in this study have adopted written constitutions. 
Observably, with the exception of Namibia, none of these constitutions 
explicitly deals with the issue of refugees. Even in the case of Namibia, the 
concept of asylum is only addressed in the non-binding ‘Principles of State 
Policy’ in Chapter 11 of the Constitution, thereby having minimal legal 
significance.437 However, this general lack of specific provision for 
refugeehood notwithstanding, all of these constitutions guarantee human 
rights to varying extents. This triggers the general question of the applicability 
of the respective bills of rights to foreign nationals generally and refugees in 
particular. This issue is addressed in section 4.2.1 below. 
 
It is also important to note that there is a great divergence in the manner in 
which these constitutions address socioeconomic rights. These divergences, 
as I shall argue below, speak directly to the impact that the nature of 
socioeconomic rights guarantees in a constitution can have on the actual 
enjoyment of these rights. 
 
                                                 
437
  Section 97 provides in this regard that ‘The State shall, where it is reasonable to do 
so, grant asylum to persons who reasonably fear persecution on the ground of their 
political beliefs, race, religion or membership of a particular social group.’ 
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4.2.1 Do the general constitutional (human rights) guarantees 
apply to refugees? 
 
An analysis of the State constitutions explored in this study shows that they 
can, in this respect, be placed into two broad categories. First are 
constitutions that have a specific personal application clause (what is 
hereafter called a ratione personae application clause). The second category 
comprises those that have no ratione personae application clause.  
 
4.2.1.1 Bills of rights with specific ratione personae 
application clauses 
 
In respect of the constitutions with a ratione personae application clause, two 
preliminary observations can be made. Some State constitutions have striking 
similarities in the manner in which the relevant provisions are couched; 
whereas in other States, the provisions are uniquely formulated. The 
constitutions with striking similarities are those of Botswana, Lesotho and 
Zambia.438 In addition to their clear linguistic semblance, another 
commonality among the ratione personae application provisions under these 
constitutions is that they all have two interrelated segments: the specific 
                                                 
438
  Section 3 of the Constitution of Botswana provides, in part, that ‘every person in 
Botswana is entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the 
individual…whatever his race, place of  origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex, 
but subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public 
interest’.  
Section 4(1) of the Constitution of Lesotho provides, in part, that ‘every person in 
Lesotho is entitled, whatever his race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status to fundamental 
human rights and freedoms’ guaranteed in the Constitution. 
Article 11 of the Constitution of Zambia provides, in part that: ‘Every person in 
Zambia has been and shall continue to be entitled to the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of the individual…whatever his race, place of origin, political opinions, 
colour, creed, sex or marital status, but subject to the limitations contained in this 
Part.’ 
By way of exception, a further common feature among these constitutions is that they 
limit the guarantee of political rights and the right of freedom of movement to 
‘citizens’ only. 
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application segment and the non-discrimination segment. The specific 
application segment expresses the guarantee of the protected rights under 
the respective bills of rights as being for ‘every person’. In other words, the 
rights guaranteed are expressed to be applicable to ‘every person’. The non-
discrimination segment on the other hand provides that the rights in the bill of 
rights are guaranteed on the basis of equality, without discrimination on such 
grounds as race, sex, religion or political opinion among others.  
 
On the other hand, the constitutions with uniquely formulated ratione 
personae application clauses are those of Malawi, South Africa, Swaziland 
and Zimbabwe. In Malawi, the general ratione personae application clause is 
embodied in Section 12 of the Constitution that contains what are referred to 
as the ‘Fundamental Principles’ of the Constitution.   Specifically, section 
12(iv) provides that: 
 
The inherent dignity and worth of each human being requires that the State and 
all persons shall recognize and protect fundamental human rights and afford the 
fullest protection to the rights and views of all individuals, groups and minorities 
whether or not they are entitled to vote.
439
 
 
The language of recognition and protection of fundamental human rights 
under this section makes it clear that constitutional protections of human 
rights under the Malawian constitution must receive the widest application 
possible, and this extends, by necessary implication, to foreign nationals.440 
Consistent with these fundamental principles, courts in Malawi have adopted 
a broad approach in terms of the meaning of the words ‘every person’ or ‘any 
person’ as used in the bill of rights. In the case of The Registered Trustees of 
                                                 
439
  Emphasis supplied. 
440
  Section 12(iv) of the Constitution. This point was expressly made by Chombo J in the 
case of Abdihaji & 67 Others Others v The Republic, Criminal Appeal Case No. 74 of 
2005 (LDR, unreported).   
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the Public Affairs Committee v Attorney General & Another (PAC 
Case)441Chipeta J  held that: 
 
Any Person or group of persons [under the Constitution] cannot mean anything 
other than what it says and narrowing it to a special species of any person or 
group of persons violates the liberal and wide style of interpreting a Constitution. 
 
Addressing the same point in relation to the application of the bill of rights to 
foreign nationals in Malawi, Mwaungulu J in Okeke v Minister of Home Affairs 
and Another,442 in construing the meaning of the words ‘any person’ under 
section 15(2) of the Constitution, stated that ‘any means any’ and therefore 
does not exclude foreign nationals. Similarly, in Peter Von Knipps v Attorney 
General,443 the court held that foreign nationals in Malawi are entitled to the 
procedural rights to fair and just administrative action in terms of section 43 of 
the Constitution as read with sections 41(2) and 41(3) that guarantee the 
rights of access to justice and effective judicial remedies respectively, and 
that ‘[t]he Constitution is generously and reasonably silent on the exclusion of 
aliens from enjoying those rights including recognition as a person before the 
law,’ that are guaranteed in the bill of rights. The court also observed that the 
right to equality is included among the provisions under the Constitution that 
do not permit of any derogation, restriction or limitation.444  
 
Chirwa has argued however, that when it comes to socioeconomic rights 
under the Malawian Constitution, particularly with regard to the positive 
                                                 
441
  Civil Cause No. 1861 of 2003 (HC, PR, unreported) 
442
  Civil Cause No. 73 of 1997, (PR) [2001] MWHC 36. 
443
  Miscellaneous Civil Cause No. 11 of 1998 (HC, PR unreported), per Ndovi J. 
444
  Section 44 (1)(g) of the Constitution. It is perhaps pertinent to mention here that 
whilst on its face the guarantee of the right to equality in terms of section 20 of the 
Malawian Constitution seems to have been elevated to the status that permits of no 
limitations or restrictions in terms of section 44(1) of the Constitution, the Malawi 
Supreme Court of Appeal held, in Attorney General v Malawi Congress Party & 
Others, MSCA Civ. App. No. 22 of 1996 (unreported), that this right admits of 
differential treatment of different categories of people with the ultimate aim of 
achieving substantive equality (in other words, the case represents an affirmation of 
affirmative action in Malawi). 
144 
 
obligations that these rights impose on the State, foreign nationals have no 
guarantees. He argues that: 
 
Although the socioeconomic rights provisions in the bill of rights do not explicitly 
limit the range of rights holders to citizens, some of the principles of national 
policy, which serve as an important interpretative aid, define these rights in 
relation to ‘the people of Malawi’ or ‘citizens of Malawi’. For example, s.13 of the 
Constitution requires the state to ‘actively promote the welfare and development 
of the people of Malawi’. In particular, s 13(d)(ii) obligates the state to provide a 
healthy living and working environment for the people of Malawi.’ Furthermore, 
s. 13(f)(ii) requires the state to ‘make primary education compulsory and free to 
all citizens of Malawi’. This suggests that the state’s positive obligations, 
especially the obligation to provide, [are] intended for the benefit of Malawian 
citizens only.
445
 
 
Chirwa’s approach seems too narrow and is perhaps not completely in 
conformity with the broad and generous approach to constitutional 
interpretation that Malawian courts have adopted.446 It is submitted that in 
making specific reference to the fullest protection of the rights of all 
individuals and groups; and irrespective of any person’s or group’s political 
status or eligibility to vote; section 12(iv) of the Constitution includes foreign 
nationals as the beneficiaries of these rights. Foreign nationals often stand at 
a disadvantage in terms of the guarantee of their human rights by host States 
by reason of their political status as they are often among ‘those groups in 
society whose needs and wishes [political] officials have no apparent interest 
in attending.’447A broad and generous interpretation to section 12 to include 
foreign nationals is therefore crucial. Indeed, in Abdihaji & 67 Others Others v 
The Republic, Chombo J adopted such an approach in holding that Section 
                                                 
445
  DM Chirwa (2011), Human Rights Under the Malawian Constitution, (2011) 9. 
446
  See the PAC case (note 594 above). See also Fred Nseula -v- Attorney General and 
Malawi Congress Party M.S.C.A. Civil Appeal No. 32 of 1997 (SC, unreported) 
447
  Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, (1989) 56 DLR (4th) 1, 32. This decision 
was cited with approval in the South African case of Larbi-Odam v MEC for 
Education (North-West Province) 1998(1) SA 745 (CC), at Para.19, per Mokgoro, J. 
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12 was pertinent in the interpretation and application of refugee rights in 
Malawi. 
 
Further to Section 12(iv), it is also significant to note that Section 4 of the 
Constitution, an equal protection clause, provides that ‘all the peoples of 
Malawi are entitled to the equal protection of this Constitution, and laws made 
under it.’ Chirwa seems to premise his conclusion that socioeconomic rights 
under the Constitution apply to citizens only by reference to the expression 
‘the people of Malawi’ as used in Section 13. It is noteworthy that the more 
specific term ‘citizens of Malawi’ is used only under one exception in that 
section, namely Section 13(f)(ii) that provides for compulsory and free primary 
education. Nowhere else in the constitutional principles, the principles of 
national policy, or the bill of rights is the term ‘citizens’ used to qualify the 
beneficiaries of human rights. This distinction shows that the legislature must 
have intended a substantive difference by using  the specific words ‘citizens 
of Malawi’ only in one subsection, and using more generalised terms such as  
‘every person’ in the bill of rights; or ‘the people of Malawi’  in the 
constitutional principles and the principles of national policy.448  
 
Perhaps the vexing issue here is how to determine what the Constitution 
means by the term ‘the people of Malawi’. Is this expression synonymous with 
‘citizens of Malawi’ or it is broader?  Since the Constitution does not explicitly 
provide an answer, we may answer this question by analysing a number of 
provisions. Section 12(1)(c) of the Constitution for instance, provides that  ‘the 
                                                 
448
  Kim for instance argues that the ‘use of both words in the same provision can 
underscore their different meanings’  - See Y Kim, Statutory Interpretation: General 
Principles and Recent Trends: Congressional Research Service Report for 
Congress, 2008, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf (accessed 9 
December 2011), citing Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) where the Federal 
Supreme Court held that the use by Congress ‘of the permissive ‘may’ . . . contrasts 
with the legislators’ use of a mandatory “shall” in the very same section’ Similarly, in 
Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993) (quoting Russello v. United 
States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)), the US Federal Supreme Court held that ‘where 
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in 
another . . . , it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely 
in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’ 
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authority to exercise power of State is conditional upon the sustained trust of 
the people of Malawi and that trust can only be maintained through open, 
accountable and transparent Government and informed democratic choice’. 
This Section mentions two important things for our purposes: first, it mentions 
‘the people of Malawi’, and it then predicates the continued legitimacy of the 
exercise of State power on the exercise by those people, of ‘informed 
democratic choice.’ Democratic choice in turn is exercised in terms of Section 
77(2)(a) of the Constitution that defines the persons that are entitled to vote.  
That Section provides that ‘a person shall be qualified to be registered as a 
voter in a constituency if... at the date of the application for registration, that 
person is a citizen of Malawi or, if not a citizen, has been ordinarily resident in 
the Republic for seven years.’ Thus clearly, at least non-citizens who are 
durably resident in the country are also entitled to vote. In terms of the 
constitutional principle in Section 12(1)(c), they must, therefore, be 
considered to be members of the community of ‘the people of Malawi’ as 
expressed in that Chapter. In this regard, it is not correct to use the 
expression ‘the people of Malawi’ as delimiting the guarantee of 
socioeconomic rights under the Constitution to citizens only. 
 
Yet another dimension in addressing the issue of the application ratione 
personae of the bill of rights, and specifically socioeconomic rights, to foreign 
nationals under the Malawian Constitution is consideration of the country’s 
international law obligations under the ICESCR. The CESCR has explicitly 
stated in its General Comment No. 20, in relation to the principle of non-
discrimination, that Covenant rights apply to everyone including non-nationals 
such as refugees and asylum-seekers.449Courts in Malawi are obliged under 
Section 11(2)(c) of the Constitution, to have regard to applicable norms of 
public international law, of which the ICESCR is part. 
  
                                                 
449
  See also General Comment No. 30 of the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination on non-citizens (2004). 
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It is therefore submitted that under the Malawian Constitution, nationality 
should not be and is not a bar to the enjoyment of socioeconomic rights – 
inclusive of the positive obligations imposed by these rights. This study 
agrees with Chirwa, however, that there is a margin of discretion provided to 
developing States under Article 2(3) of the ICESCR, where such States are 
given some reprieve by being permitted to restrict, in appropriate cases, the 
enjoyment of economic rights guaranteed under the Covenant to their 
nationals only. It is submitted that, under section 11(2)(c) of the Malawian 
Constitution, the principle under Article 2(3) of the ICESCR can be invoked as 
an interpretative tool in excluding or restricting foreign nationals from the 
guarantee of economic rights under the Constitution. It must be emphasized 
however that the discretion under Article 2(3) of the ICESCR is narrow, 
applying only to economic rights and it does not extend to social rights. 
 
Specifically in relation to refugees, the application ratione personae of the bill 
of rights was highlighted by the High Court in the case of Aden Abdihaji & 67 
Others Others v The Republic (the Aden Abdihaji case)450 where Chombo J 
held that the principle of dignity in Section 12(iv) of the Constitution 
guarantees refugees and asylum seekers the protection of substantive 
constitutional rights as well as, specifically, the right to equal protection under 
the Constitution. Significantly, in sharp contrast with the constitutions of most 
of the other countries surveyed in this study, the Malawian bill of rights does 
not have an explicit provision that restricts the guarantee of some specific 
rights, such as rights of political participation and freedom of movement to its 
citizens only.451 Thus the State cannot simply exclude some people who are 
within the State’s jurisdiction from the enjoyment of any of the rights 
guaranteed under the bill of rights without proper justification.452 In this 
                                                 
450
  Abdihaji Case (note 440 above). 
451
  The other country that does not have such an exception is Swaziland. 
452
  Chirwa (note 445 above) 11. 
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regard, the general limitation clauses under sections 12(v), 44(2)453 and 44(3) 
of the Constitution (read together) have to be sufficiently analysed and 
applied every time the State in Malawi seeks to exclude some persons or 
categories of persons from the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed under the Constitution.454Given the emphasis placed on the right 
to equality in section 20 the Constitution, the justification for such limitation or 
restriction, that amounts to discrimination on the basis of nationality,  must be 
compelling. 
 
South Africa also has a unique ratione personae application clause. Section 
7(1) of the South African Constitution provides that the bill of rights is a 
cornerstone of democracy, and that ‘it enshrines the rights of all people’ in the 
country.455  The words ‘all people’ are sufficiently wide to apply to both 
citizens and foreign nationals.456 In the case of Khosa and Others v Minister 
                                                 
453
  Section 44(2) in particular is the general limitation clause under the Constitution of 
Malawi. It provides that: ‘Without prejudice to subsection (1), no restrictions or 
limitations may be placed on the exercise of any rights and freedoms provided for in 
this Constitution other than those prescribed by law, which are reasonable, 
recognized by international human rights standards and necessary in an open and 
democratic society.’ 
454
  Section 12(v) provides that: ‘As all persons have equal status before the law, the only 
justifiable limitations to lawful rights are those necessary to ensure peaceful human 
interaction in an open and democratic society’, Section 44(2) provides that: ‘Without 
prejudice to subsection (1), no restrictions or limitations may be placed on the 
exercise of any rights and freedoms provided for in this Constitution other than those 
prescribed by law, which are reasonable, recognized by international human rights 
standards and necessary in an open and democratic society’, whilst section 44(3) 
states that: ‘Laws prescribing restrictions or limitations shall not negate the essential 
content of the right or freedom in question, shall be of general application.’ 
455
  Emphasis supplied. 
456
  Section 8 of the Constitution is the general application clause but it addresses other 
aspects of the application of the bill of rights that are not of direct relevance to this 
discussion . The Section  provides as follows:  
‘8. Application.--(l) The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the 
executive, the .judiciary and all organs of state. 
(2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the 
extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature 
of any duty imposed by the right. 
(3) When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in 
terms of subsection (2), a court- 
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the 
common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right; and 
(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation 
is in accordance with section 36 (1).  
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of Social Development and Others (the Khosa case),457 the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa (the Constitutional Court) expressly relied on section 
7(1) of the Constitution as the primary basis for extending the applicability of 
bill of rights guarantees to foreign nationals in South Africa, stating that this 
was so ‘given that the Constitution expressly provides [in section 7(1)] that 
the Bill of Rights enshrines the rights of “all people in our country.”’458 The 
Court therefore held that in the absence of any indication that the 
socioeconomic rights guarantees under section 27(1) of the South African 
Constitution were restricted to citizens as in other provisions of the Bill of 
Rights, the word ‘everyone’ in section 27(1) could not be construed as 
referring to citizens only.459 In the premises, the Court held that permanently 
resident foreign nationals in South Africa are entitled to the socioeconomic 
rights guarantees under section 27 of the Constitution, on the same footing as 
citizens. 
 
Just like in Malawi, courts in South Africa have adopted a broad, generous 
and purposive approach of constitutional interpretation.460 South African 
courts have similarly linked the purposive and broad approach in matters of 
application ratione personae to the value of human dignity. Thus in Minister of 
Home Affairs v Watchenuka,461 the Supreme Court of Appeal stated that: 
 
Human dignity has no nationality. It is inherent in all people — citizens and non-
citizens alike — simply because they are human…[a]nd while that person 
                                                                                                                                           
(4) A juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent required 
by the nature of the rights and the nature of that juristic person.’ 
457
  2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) 
458
  Ibid, para.47. 
459
  Ibid. See also M. Pieterse, ‘Foreigners and socio-economic rights: Legal entitlements 
or wishful thinking?’ 2000(63)THRHR, 51. 
460
  In S v Mhlungu, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), the Constitutional Court held that the 
Constitution ‘must broadly, liberally and purposively be interpreted so as to 
avoid…“the austerity of tabulated legalism” and so as to enable it to continue to play 
a creative and dynamic role in the expression and achievement of the ideals and 
aspirations of the nation, in the articulation of the values bonding its people and in 
disciplining its government.’ The Court emphasised that the bill of rights has to 
receive ‘a construction which is “most beneficial to the widest amplitude”. 
461
  2004 (4) SA 326 (SCA) 
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happens to be in this country— for whatever reason — it must be respected, 
and is protected, by section 10 of the Bill of Rights.
462
 
 
Further, similar to most constitutions in the region, all the rights catalogued 
under the South African bill of rights are guaranteed for ‘everyone’, with the 
exception of political rights under section 19; the right to citizenship under 
section 20, the right to leave and to enter or re-enter the country under 
section 21, and the right to freedom of trade, occupation and profession 
under section 22. In Lawyers for Human Rights v Minister of Home 
Affairs,463a case dealing with the rights of detained foreigners, the 
Constitutional Court held  that: 
 
Once it is accepted, as it must be, that persons within our territorial boundaries 
have the protection of our courts, there is no reason why ‘everyone’ in sections 
12(2) and 35(2) should not be given its ordinary meaning.  When the 
Constitution intends to confine rights to citizens it says so.  All people in this 
category are beneficiaries of section 12 and section 35(2).
464
 
 
Similarly, in Union for Refugee Women & Others v The Director: The Private 
Security Industry Regulatory Authority (Union of Refugee Women case),465 
the Constitutional Court made it plain that under the South African 
Constitution a foreigner who is inside the country ‘is entitled to all the 
fundamental rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights except those expressly 
limited to South African citizens.’466 
 
The conclusion therefore is drawn that the rights enshrined in the bill of rights, 
as a general rule, apply to citizens and foreign nationals alike, subject to (a) 
specific internal limitations, such as with regard to the rights to political 
participation rights, citizenship and the right to freely leave and enter or re-
                                                 
462
  Ibid, para.25. 
463
  2004 (4) SA 125 (CC) 
464
  Ibid, para. 27 (per Yacoob J) 
465
  2007 (4) BCLR 339 (CC), per Kondile J, at para. 46.  
466
  Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 
(4) SA 125 (CC); 2004 (7) BCLR 775 (CC) at para 27. 
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enter the Republic; and (b) general limitations in terms of section 36 of the 
Constitution.467 
 
In Swaziland, a constitutional provision with similar effect is section 14(3), 
which provides that: 
 
A person of whatever gender, race, place of origin, political opinion, colour, 
religion, creed, age or disability shall be entitled to the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of the individual contained in this Chapter but subject to 
respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest.  
 
It is submitted that adopting a broad and generous interpretative approach, 
the words ‘a person’ in this provision must be given a wide meaning to 
encompass all natural persons. This means that citizens as well as foreign 
nationals are guaranteed protection under the Swazi bill of rights and any 
limitations placed must be justified in terms of section 15(2) of the 
Constitution. 
 
In Zimbabwe, the matter is addressed under section 11 of the Constitution. 
The relevant part of that section provides that ‘[all] persons in Zimbabwe are 
entitled, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, to the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of the individual specified in’ the bill of rights. A broad 
and generous interpretation of this provision similarly points to the conclusion 
that the general position is that foreign nationals in Zimbabwe are entitled to 
the rights guaranteed under the Constitution, subject to internal (i.e provision 
                                                 
467
  Section 36 of the South African Constitution is in the following terms: ‘(1) The rights 
in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the 
extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all 
relevant factors, including- 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b)  the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c)  the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, 
no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.’ 
152 
 
specific) limitations, as well as limitations in terms of the general limitations 
clause.468 In terms of the internal limitations, just like in several other 
countries surveyed,469 Section 22(3)(d) of the Zimbabwean Constitution limits 
the guarantee of freedom of movement to citizens and permanent residents in 
the country. 
 
4.2.1.2 Bills of rights with no specific ratione personae 
application clauses 
 
As mentioned above, the second category comprises constitutions whose 
bills of rights do not have a specific clause on application ratione personae. 
These are the constitutions of Namibia and Tanzania. Under this category, 
we need to look at and analyse the specific provisions of the constitution in 
order to gauge whether the human rights guarantees therein can similarly be 
interpreted to apply to foreign nationals.  
 
On analysis, the picture that emerges is similar to the rest of the constitutions 
that have already been examined. In Namibia for instance, although the 
Constitution does not have a specific general provision that states that the 
rights guaranteed under the Constitution are applicable to all persons or 
individuals within their jurisdictions; the scheme of the human rights 
guarantees, as gleaned from the tenor of the specific provisions in the bill of 
rights, shows that the protected rights equally apply, as a general rule, to all 
persons in Namibia.470  
                                                 
468
  Section 11of the Constitution of Zimbabwe recognises that permissible limitations in 
respect of the rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights are those ‘limitations designed to 
ensure that the enjoyment of the said rights and freedoms by any person does not 
prejudice the public interest or the rights and freedoms of other persons.’ 
469
  With the exception of Malawi and Swaziland that, as a general rule, guarantee all the 
rights under the Bill of Rights to all people in the country. 
470
  This can be seen from various constitutional provisions. E.g, Art. 7 on the right to 
personal liberty (the words used are: ‘no persons shall be deprived’); Art. 8 on human 
dignity (the words used are: ‘all persons’); Art. 9 on prohibition of slavery (the words 
used are: ‘no persons’); Art. 10 on equality (the words used are: ‘all persons’); Art.11 
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The question of the applicability of the Namibian bill of rights to foreign 
nationals was considered in the case of African Personnel Services v 
Government of Namibia and Others.471 In that case, the Namibian High Court 
was called upon to interpret Article 21(1)(j) of the Constitution that provides 
that ‘All persons shall have the right to practice any profession, or carry on 
any occupation, trade or business.’ It was submitted on behalf of the State 
that, notwithstanding the apparent plain meaning of the words ‘all persons’ 
used in that section, the rights guaranteed therein were restricted to citizens 
of Namibia. Parker J rejected the State’s argument, and held that: 
 
Concerning…the respondents’ contention that the applicant has no locus 
standi to bring the application primarily on the basis that the right 
guaranteed by Article 21(1)(j) (hereinafter referred to as “the Article 
21(1)(j) right”) vests in natural persons who are Namibian citizens… I am 
of the view that the right which is the subject matter of the present 
application vests in all persons whether they are citizens or non-citizens 
of Namibia, but, of course nothing precludes Parliament from enacting 
legislation which restricts the enjoyment of the right to non-citizens who 
meet prescribed statutory requirements, e.g. work permits and permanent 
resident permits, allowing them to lawfully reside in Namibia in order to 
practise any profession, or carry on any occupation, trade or business.
472
 
 
Parker J proceeded to state that: 
 
                                                                                                                                           
on arrest & detention (the words used are: ‘no persons’ and ‘all persons’); Art. 12 on 
fair trial (the words used are: ‘All persons’);  Art.13 on privacy (the words used are: 
‘No persons’);  Art.14 on family (the words used are: ‘men and women of full age, 
without any limitation due to race, colour, ethnic origin, nationality, religion, creed or 
social or economic status);  Art.16 on property (the words used are: ‘all persons’); 
Art.18 on administrative justice (the words used are: ‘persons’); Art.19 on culture (the 
words used are ‘every person’); Art.20 on education (the words used are: ‘all 
persons’ and ‘children’);  and Art. 21 on general fundamental freedoms – including 
expression, conscience, assembly, association, and religion (the words used are: ‘all 
persons’).   
471
  Case No.: A 4/2008) [2008] NAHC 148 (1 December 2008)  
472
  Ibid. 
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If it was the intention of the makers of the Constitution to restrict the 
enjoyment of all the rights in Article 21(1) to only natural persons who are 
Namibian citizens they would have made such of their intention known by 
clear words…The result is that I find that the respondents’ position is 
indefensible and their submission baseless.
473
 
 
A similar position obtains under the Constitution of Tanzania where, although 
there is no specific provision on the general application of the rights under the 
bill of rights, the rights under specific provisions are guaranteed for ‘everyone’ 
save in a few instances where they are limited to citizens. These exceptions 
include section 17(1) (the right to freely leave and enter the Republic), section 
18(2) (the right to receive information on relevant social and global issues), 
section 21(1) (the right to participate in the affairs of governing the country), 
and section 22(2) (the right of equal opportunity to hold any position of 
employment or activity under the authority of the State). 
 
4.2.1.3 Conclusion 
 
What is evident from the foregoing, therefore, is that the rights guaranteed 
under Southern African Constitutions, as a general rule, apply to citizens and 
foreign nationals alike, without discrimination. It follows that refugees, as a 
vulnerable subcategory of foreign nationals, are also entitled, as a general 
rule, to the human rights guarantees under these constitutions. Courts in 
Malawi, South Africa and Namibia have explicitly affirmed this point.  
 
4.3 The extent of socioeconomic rights guarantees 
 
In this section, I proceed to explore the extent to which these constitutions 
guarantee socioeconomic rights. These constitutions can, in this regard, be 
classified into three categories. Those that have a comprehensive set of 
                                                 
473
  Ibid. 
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socioeconomic rights guarantees; those that have a bifurcated scheme where 
some socioeconomic rights are entrenched in the bill of rights and others 
contained in directive principles of State policy, and finally those that are 
conspicuously silent on the guarantee of socioeconomic rights.474 
 
In his article on the protection of socioeconomic rights under the Malawian 
Constitution, Danwood Chirwa presents us with the interesting metaphor ‘A 
Full Loaf is Better than Half’ in classifying African constitutions generally into 
these three categories and urging for greater protection of socioeconomic 
rights under the Malawian Constitution.475  Chirwa’s argument is that whilst it 
is better to at least have a bifurcated scheme for the protection of 
socioeconomic rights where these are partially entrenched as enforceable 
rights in the bill of rights and partially provided for as non-binding principles of 
State policy,476 rather than having none at all; it is even better to have a 
scheme where all these rights are comprehensively entrenched as 
enforceable rights in the bill of rights (hence the ‘full loaf’ of such rights).477 
 
 
                                                 
474
  DM Chirwa, ‘A Full Loaf is Better than Half: The Constitutional Protection of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Malawi’, Journal of African Law, 49, 2 
(2005), 207–241, at 212. 
475
  Ibid, 207. 
476
  Thus entailing that only ‘half of the loaf’ of these rights as internationally recognised 
are guaranteed. 
477
  Chirwa states, in this regard, that: ‘In general, these constitutions have followed three 
models of protecting these rights. The first model consists of constitutions that 
entrench these rights in the Bill of Rights as justiciable rights. Examples include the 
Constitutions of Benin (1990), Cape Verde (1990), Sao Tome and Principe (1990), 
Burkina Faso (1991), Gabon (1991), Madagascar (1992), Mali (1992), Niger (1992), 
Togo (1992), Seychelles (1993), and South Africa (1996). The second model 
comprises constitutions that recognize selected socio-economic rights in the Bill of 
Rights and the rest as directive principles of state policy in a separate chapter in the 
constitution. The Constitution of Malawi (1994) falls in this category, and so do the 
Constitutions of Namibia (1990) and Ghana (1992). The last model represents 
constitutions that do not contain socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights but 
recognize them as directive principles of state policy only. With the exception of the 
Constitutions of Sierra Leone (1991) and Nigeria (1999), such constitutions are no 
longer common in Africa.’ According to his classification, the Malawian Constitution 
only guarantees ‘half a loaf” rather than a ‘full loaf’ of socioeconomic rights. See 
Chirwa (note 504 above) 207. 
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4.3.1 South Africa: a full loaf of guarantees 
 
The South African Constitution is widely acclaimed, with good reason, for 
guaranteeing a comprehensive set of guarantees of socioeconomic rights in 
the bill of rights. The inclusion of socioeconomic rights as binding entitlements 
was expressly endorsed by the Constitutional Court in the 1st Certification 
case.478 Accordingly, a wide range of socioeconomic rights have been 
included in the South African Constitution in sections 22-31 of the 
Constitution.479 The clearest affirmation that the justiciability of these rights 
under the South African Constitution is beyond question was expressed by 
the Constitutional Court in the Grootboom case480where Yacoob J stated that: 
 
While the justiciability of socio-economic rights has been the subject of 
considerable jurisprudential and political debate, the issue of whether socio-
economic rights are justiciable at all in South Africa has been put beyond 
question by the text of our Constitution as construed in the Certification 
judgment…Socioeconomic rights are expressly included in the Bill of Rights; 
they cannot be said to exist on paper only. Section 7(2) of the Constitution 
requires the state “to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of 
Rights” and the courts are constitutionally bound to ensure that they are 
protected and fulfilled.481 
 
Following these early landmark jurisprudential developments, the 
Constitutional Court has considered and pronounced its decisions on 
socioeconomic rights issues covering a range of subjects including 
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  Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1
st
 Certification 
Case), 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) 
479
  These rights are: Freedom of trade, occupation and profession (section 22); labour 
rights (section 23); environmental rights (section 24); property (section 25); housing 
(section 26); access to health care, food, water and social security (section 27); 
children’s rights (section 28); education (section 20); and language and culture 
(section 30). 
480
  Government of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) BCLR 
1169 (CC) (Grootboom case). 
481
  Ibid, para.20. 
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emergency medical treatment,482 access to adequate housing,483 access to 
healthcare services,484 access to social security,485 access to sufficient 
water,486 access to basic services including electricity,487and access to basic 
sanitation, among others.488  
 
Sections 26(2) and 27(2) of the South African Constitution provides that the 
State should ‘take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation’ of these rights. 
Currie and De Waal state that the notion of progressive realisation does not 
entail that the State might as well simply ‘postpone its obligations to some 
distant or unspecified time in the future.’489 They state that the key to the 
justiciability of socioeconomic rights in the 1996 Constitution is the standard 
of reasonableness. However, the term reasonableness as used here 
regrettably does not yet have a precise definition. Even the Grootboom case 
in which the South African Constitutional Court first articulated this concept in 
the context of socioeconomic rights, did not provide such a precise 
definition.490 As Currie and De Waal state, the Court instead emphasised that 
the enquiry of reasonableness must be conducted on a case-by-case basis; 
and that it is context-sensitive.491 The Court in Grootboom stated that 
‘reasonableness must be determined on the facts of each case.’492  
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  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal, 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) 
(Soobramoney case). 
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  Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (TAC case), 
2002 (5) SA 703. 
485
  Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others; Mahlaule and 
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The Court however provided some pointers that must necessarily be present 
if at all the measures adopted by the State are to satisfy the reasonableness 
test. Thus the Court in Grootboom stated that: 
 
Reasonableness must also be understood in the context of the Bill of Rights 
as a whole. The right of access to adequate housing is entrenched because 
we value human beings and want to ensure that they are afforded their basic 
human needs. A society must seek to ensure that the basic necessities of life 
are provided to all if it is to be a society based on human dignity, freedom 
and equality. To be reasonable, measures cannot leave out of account the 
degree and extent of the denial of the right they endeavour to realise. Those 
whose needs are the most urgent and whose ability to enjoy all rights 
therefore is most in peril, must not be ignored by the measures aimed at 
achieving realisation of the right. It may not be sufficient to meet the test of 
reasonableness to show that the measures are capable of achieving a 
statistical advance in the realisation of the right. Furthermore, the 
Constitution requires that everyone must be treated with care and concern. If 
the measures, though statistically successful, fail to respond to the needs of 
those most desperate, they may not pass the test. 
 
The South African understanding of socioeconomic rights does not 
encapsulate the notion of the minimum core content of these rights that has 
been discussed in previous Chapters. The Constitutional Court in the 
Grootboom case,493 and in a series of subsequent decisions, including the 
TAC case494and the Mazibuko case,495 has expressly rejected this notion, 
preferring instead to stick to the reasonableness approach. It can therefore 
safely be argued that South African courts have developed and crystallised 
their standard for measuring compliance by the State with the obligations 
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  Ibid, paras. 31 & 32. 
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  Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others 2002 (5) SA 
721 (CC); Paras. 34 & 38. 
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  Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others, 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC), Para. 
56. 
159 
 
imposed by socioeconomic rights on the notion of reasonableness.496A major 
problem though seems to be that South African courts have dwelt on defining 
the obligations of the State and not defining the content and contours of the 
rights.497 
 
Thus the comprehensiveness of the socioeconomic rights guarantees under 
the South African bill of rights today is indeed beyond question and is borne 
out by this panoply of jurisprudence. Where debate still rages is on the 
adequacy of the approaches that courts have taken in adjudicating 
socioeconomic rights claims. 
 
4.3.2 The ‘Half Loaf’ jurisdictions  
 
A number of Southern African States have adopted constitutions in which, 
socioeconomic rights are guaranteed in the bill of rights, but only to a limited 
extent. These bills of rights are those of Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, 
Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia. These are now examined in turn. 
 
4.3.2.1 Lesotho 
 
The Constitution of Lesotho of 1993 contains an entrenched bill of rights. 
However, with the exception of the rights to family life in section 11 and 
property in section 17, the bill of rights only concerns itself with civil and 
political rights. Socioeconomic rights are consigned to a second-class status 
in Chapter III of the Constitution that deals with ‘Principles of State Policy’. 
Section 25 of the Constitution explicitly states that these principles ‘shall not 
                                                 
496
  RE Kapindu, ‘The desperate left in desperation: A court in retreat - Nokotyana & 
Others vs Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality & Others revisited’, 2010 (3) 
Constitutional Court Review, 201, 201-204.  
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  See for instance DI Bilchitz, ‘Is the Constitutional Court wasting away the rights of the 
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be enforceable by any court.’ The socioeconomic rights that have been 
relegated to this status under the Lesotho Constitution include protection of 
health (section 27); access to education (section 28); access to opportunities 
for work (section 29); just and favourable conditions of work (section 30); 
protection of workers' rights and interests (section 31); protection of children 
and young persons (section 32); rehabilitation, training and social 
resettlement of disabled persons (section 33); economic opportunities 
(section 34); participation in cultural activities (section 35); and protection of 
the environment (section 36).  
 
However, significantly, like all the other constitutions in the region, the 
Lesotho constitution has guaranteed the right to life in section 5. Section 5(1) 
of the Constitution provides that ‘every human being has an inherent right to 
life. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life’. Pausing there, for reasons 
that will become evident shortly, it is appropriate to consider the question of 
the guarantee of socioeconomic rights under the Indian Constitution. In India, 
the Constitution has a similar scheme of rights guarantees to that of Lesotho, 
that is to say that socioeconomic rights provisions have been reduced to the 
status of non-binding directive principles of state policy. However there is a 
substantial corpus of jurisprudence generated by Indian courts where they 
have progressively and creatively interpreted the right to life guaranteed 
under section 21 of the Indian Constitution to include a number of core 
socioeconomic rights such as the rights to livelihood, food, health, and 
housing amongst others.498  
 
With such an established corpus of jurisprudence from a major common law 
jurisdiction, one would have thought that given the opportunity to pronounce 
on similar issues, courts in other countries, such as Lesotho, would adopt a 
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  See Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipality Corporation [1985] 2 Supp SCR 51; People’s 
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similar approach. This however has not been the case in Lesotho. In the case 
of Khathang Tema Baitsokoli & Another v Maseru City Council & others499 an 
application was made for a declaratory order under the Constitution for the 
grant of permits to the applicants allowing them to trade as hawkers and 
street vendors along the Kingsway road in the metropolis of Maseru (the 
Capital City of Lesotho). The applicants argued that the refusal by city 
authorities to grant the permits, and the decision to remove them from the 
Kingsway road for purposes of trade, were unconstitutional and violated their 
right to life as guaranteed under section 5 of the Constitution. The court 
extensively considered the Indian jurisprudence that, as shown above, has 
read into the right to life a range of socioeconomic rights. The court 
proceeded to concede, in this regard, that ‘[t]he Indian approach to the right 
to life is indeed very progressive and deserves all laudation.’500However, 
notwithstanding its admiration of the Indian approach, the court decided 
against adopting it. Interestingly, the court expressly stated that it would 
rather opt for a conservative rather than a broad and generous approach. 
Thus the court concluded that: 
 
A fair reading of section 5 of our Lesotho Constitution gives one an irresistible 
impression that it is the "right to life" of the human being and its biological 
existence as a living organism that is being protected by the Constitution rather 
than its wellbeing, happiness or welfare. The Court comes to this somewhat 
restrictive interpretation because under section 5, what may be abridged under 
subsections 2 (a) (b) (c) and (d) is not the livelihood but the deprivation of 
human life itself e.g. through act of war, lawful execution (i.e. hanging) or self 
defence.
501
 
 
The court took the firm approach that civil and political rights under the 
Constitution of Lesotho cannot be creatively interpreted to give effect to 
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socioeconomic rights. The Court stressed that ‘[i]n…Lesotho…socio-
economic and cultural rights are not justiciable.’502 
 
The Lesotho approach brings to the fore the fact that the bifurcation of the 
guarantee of socioeconomic rights into entrenched rights in the bill of rights 
on the one hand, and non-binding principles of state policy on the other, does 
have a direct practical significance in the implementation and enforcement of 
socioeconomic rights, albeit in a negative sense. From the interpretative 
approach adopted in Lesotho, it is clear that the country is far from 
guaranteeing a comprehensive set of socioeconomic rights for its people. 
Afortiori, this bodes very negatively for refugees.  
  
4.3.2.2 Malawi 
 
The Malawian Constitution also bifurcates the inclusion of socioeconomic 
rights into entrenched rights on the one hand and directive principles of State 
policy on the other. Thus, whilst rights such as family life, education, culture 
and language, property, economic activity, development and fair and safe 
labour practices are clearly and separately guaranteed as entrenched 
justiciable rights under the bill of rights; others such as the rights to health, 
food and nutrition, and environmental rights are only included as non-binding 
directive principles of national policy.503,  
 
However, it is submitted that the socioeconomic rights provisions under the 
Malawian Constitution, whilst perhaps not as comprehensive and clear as 
those of South Africa, are still more progressive than other constitutions in the 
region. It is submitted that with a more innovative and robust approach to the 
interpretation of these rights, the bifurcation in the inclusion of socioeconomic 
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rights provisions should have a minimal effect in the judicial enforcement of 
socioeconomic rights in Malawi. In particular, section 30 of the Constitution is 
of great significance in the scheme for the protection of socioeconomic rights 
as ‘it provides an avenue for protecting many socio-economic rights not 
expressly recognized in the Malawian Constitution.’504 Section 30(1) provides 
that: 
 
All persons and peoples have a right to development and therefore to the 
enjoyment of economic, social, cultural and political development and women, 
children and the disabled in particular shall be given special consideration in the 
application of this right. 
 
Further, section 30(2) states that: 
 
The State shall take all necessary measures for the realization of the right to 
development. Such measures shall include, amongst other things, equality of 
opportunity for all in their access to basic resources, education, health services, 
food, shelter, employment and infrastructure. 
 
In addition, section 30(4) provides that: ‘The State has a responsibility to 
respect the right to development and to justify its policies in accordance with 
this responsibility.’ 
 
Considering that Malawian courts have adopted a broad and generous 
approach to the interpretation of rights protected under the Constitution,505 
and that section 30(2) of the Constitution makes provision for ‘access to basic 
resources, education, health services, food, shelter, employment and 
infrastructure,’ a purposive and broad interpretation of this provision would 
ensure a significant measure of protection of these rights. This is more so 
when section 30 supplements other socioeconomic rights specifically 
provided for such as education, property, economic activity, work and the free 
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164 
 
pursuit of a livelihood, among others. However, the potential of this wide 
ranging right is yet to be exploited506 as Malawian courts are yet to pronounce 
on the content of this right.  
 
4.3.2.3 Namibia 
 
The Namibian Constitution guarantees only a few socioeconomic rights in its 
bill of rights; and relegates the rest to non-binding principles of state policy.507 
John Nakuta takes the view that ‘apparently, the drafters of the Constitution 
[of Namibia] bought into the idea that ESC rights were not true rights and that 
they related instead to goals, policies and programmes.’508The 
socioeconomic rights that are expressly guaranteed under the Namibian bill 
of rights are family rights (article 14); property (article 16); culture (article 19) 
and education (article 20). The Principles of State Policy are found in Chapter 
11 of the Constitution. The rights included under the non-binding principles of 
state policy include rights relating to fair labour practices (article 95 (a)-(d); 
(i)); reasonable access to public facilities and services (article 95(e)); old age 
entitlement to receive a regular pension adequate for the maintenance of a 
decent standard of living and the enjoyment of social and cultural 
opportunities (article 95(f)); social security for the unemployed, the 
incapacitated, the indigent and the disadvantaged (article 95(g)); legal aid 
(article 95(h)); nutrition (article 95(j)); and preservation of the natural 
environment (article 95(l)).  
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  Article 101 of the Namibian Constitution defines the character of the Principles of 
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However, the Namibian Constitution has a striking unique feature that can be 
creatively used to directly read international obligations of the State into it 
binding domestic socioeconomic rights obligations. Article 144 of the 
Namibian Constitution provides that:  
 
Unless otherwise provided for by this Constitution or Act of Parliament, the 
general rules of public international law and international agreements binding 
upon Namibia under this Constitution shall form part of the law of Namibia.  
 
Thus in Namibia, once a treaty has been ratified or acceded to by the State; 
the presumption is that it forms part of the local law.509 The presumption can 
only be rebutted by showing that the Constitution or specific legislation has 
provided that the treaty provisions in issue be excluded from national law. 
Whilst an argument might perhaps be made that the inclusion of 
socioeconomic rights in the principles of state policy means that these rights 
should not be inferred from treaty provisions as binding on Namibian courts; it 
is submitted that a generous interpretation would favour the guarantee of 
these rights in terms of article 144; and should only be read as excluding 
these rights in instances where either the Constitution or legislation has 
specifically and expressly excluded the application of particular treaty 
provisions. 
 
 It is argued that since Namibia has ratified treaties that guarantee 
socioeconomic rights; including  the ICESCR, the CRC, the 1951 Convention, 
and the ACHPR, among others; unless there be a law specifically excluding 
these from being read as part of national law; Namibian courts are bound to 
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  This is referred to as monism under international law. See F Viljoen, International 
human rights law in Africa, (2007) 22. Dausab states that ‘monists…perceive that 
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‘International law vis-à-vis municipal law: An appraisal of Article 144 of the Namibian 
Constitution from a human rights perspective’, in A Bösl, et al (eds.) Constitutional 
democracy in Namibia A critical analysis after two decades (2010) 262. 
166 
 
accept them as part of binding domestic law. In the result, it is submitted that 
it is at least plausible to argue that the full range of socioeconomic rights 
guaranteed under the ICESCR forms part of Namibian law and is binding in 
terms of article 144 of the Constitution. This interpretation is supported by 
available jurisprudence. In Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs510 the High 
Court of Namibia considering the applicability of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights in Namibia, stated that: 
 
The Namibian Government has, as far as can be established, formally 
recognized the African Charter in accordance with art 143 read with art 63(2)(d) 
of the Namibian Constitution. The provisions of the Charter have therefore 
become binding on Namibia and form part of the law of Namibia in accordance 
with art 143, read with art 144 of the Namibian Constitution.  
 
This position was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Namibia in the case of 
Government of the Republic of Namibia v Mwilima511 where Strydom, CJ, 
delivering judgment on behalf of the Court, after considering that Namibia had 
ratified the ICCPR, categorically stated that: ‘‘[i]t is…clear that the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is binding upon the State 
and forms part of the law of Namibia by virtue of Article 144 of the 
Constitution’ 
 
However, the position with regard to socioeconomic rights is still not clear as 
Namibian courts are yet to specifically consider the position of treaty 
obligations in respect of these rights. In particular, courts are yet to 
specifically position the ICESCR in relation to article 144 of the Namibian 
Constitution. The reticence on the part of lawyers in Namibia to bring cases in 
the area of socioeconomic rights for adjudication before the courts on the 
basis of article 144 of the Constitution is concerning. It could perhaps be 
attributed to the perception that since a number of these rights are already 
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provided for in the principles of state policy, then they must necessarily be 
non-justiciable; and that bringing such cases before the courts would be an 
otiose exercise with no prospects of success. The analysis here however 
demonstrates that there remains potential for reading the ICESCR as part of 
Namibian law and using section 144 of the Constitution as a springboard for 
adjudicating and advancing socioeconomic rights in the country. 
 
4.3.2.4 Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia 
 
Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia also fall into the ‘half loaf’ category in the 
guarantee of socioeconomic rights. The provision of socioeconomic rights in 
these countries finds expression in the bill of rights to a very minimal extent; 
but largely so in non-binding principles of state policy.512  
 
The Swazi bill of rights guarantees the rights to property (section 19) and 
family life (section 27). The remainder of the socioeconomic rights are 
provided for in the non-binding principles of state policy in Chapter 5 of the 
Constitution. A range of economic rights are provided for in section 59(2) of 
the Constitution under the heading ‘Economic Objectives’. These include fair 
remuneration for productivity; and development, among others. Social rights, 
under the heading ‘Social Objectives’, are provided for in section 60 of the 
Constitution. These include social security for vulnerable groups (section 
60(5); education and provision of basic health care services (section 60(8)), 
among others.  
 
Similarly, under the Constitution of Tanzania, provisions on socioeconomic 
rights are split between entrenched rights in the bill of rights (Part III of the 
Constitution); and Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State 
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   The three countries are listed together here because the socioeconomic rights 
guaranteed under their constitutions are very minimal in comparison with those under 
the Malawian and Namibian constitutions; and there has been no specific 
socioeconomic rights jurisprudence worth exploring as if the case with Lesotho. 
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Policy (Part II of the Constitution). As with all other constitutions examined in 
this study that contain similar principles, these objectives and principles of 
State policy are non-binding.513 Among the entrenched socioeconomic rights 
are the right to work, with concomitant rights relating to the conditions and 
terms of work such as fair and just remuneration (articles 22 & 23); and the 
right to property (article 24). It can perhaps also be argued that the right to 
housing is guaranteed in a limited way under article 16(1) of the Constitution. 
The relevant part of that section provides that ‘[e]very person is entitled to… 
respect and protection of his residence.’ It is submitted that, at the very least, 
this guarantee connotes the negative duty of the State not to interfere with the 
right to housing. The guarantee also entails that the State is under a positive 
obligation to protect a person’s residence from undue interference by third 
parties.514 It would appear however that this provision, by and of itself, cannot 
be interpreted to imply the positive duty to fulfil in respect of this right.  The 
Tanzanian Constitution also guarantees the right to life in article 14 that, as 
earlier demonstrated, has been widely interpreted in other jurisdictions, to 
imply a wide range of socioeconomic rights that are essential for a person’s 
livelihood. The rights that only find expression in the non-binding directive 
principles of State policy include the rights to education; social security for 
some vulnerable groups such as the elderly and people with disabilities; and 
the pursuit of a livelihood (article 11). 
 
The Constitution of Zambia only guarantees the right to property in the bill of 
rights (article 16). Under the non-binding principles of state policy;515the State 
is enjoined to endeavour, among other things, to create conditions under 
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  Art.7(2) of the Constitution of Tanzania provides that ‘The provisions of this Part of 
this Chapter are not enforceable by any court. No court shall be competent to 
determine the question whether or not any action or omission by any person or any 
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  See SERAC case (note 347 above) 
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  Article 111 of the Zambian Constitution provides that “The Directive Principles of 
State Policy set out in this Part shall not be justiciable and shall not thereby, by 
themselves, despite being referred to as rights in certain instances, be legally 
enforceable in any court, tribunal or administrative institution or entity.” 
169 
 
which all citizens are able to secure adequate means of livelihood and 
opportunity to obtain employment (article112(c)); to provide clean and safe 
water, adequate medical and health facilities and decent shelter for all 
persons, and take measures to constantly improve such facilities and 
amenities (article 112(d)); to provide equal and adequate educational 
opportunities in all fields and at all levels for all (article 112(e)); and to provide 
to persons with disabilities, the aged and other disadvantaged persons such 
social benefits and amenities as are suitable to their needs and are just and 
equitable article 112(f)); 
 
Unlike in Lesotho, it would appear that courts in Swaziland, Tanzania and 
Zambia are yet to be seized of claims based on socioeconomic rights. Thus it 
is unclear whether they would adopt Lesotho’s restrictive approach or the 
Indian broad and generous approach in determining such claims. It is hoped 
that given the opportunity, courts would adopt the Indian approach. 
 
The general human rights protection systems in these three countries also 
differ from Namibia in a significant way in that whilst Namibia has adopted a 
monist approach to international law, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia, by 
contrast, have adopted a dualist approach. Under this approach, binding 
international law treaties do not automatically form part of domestic law 
unless specifically domesticated through legislation by way of incorporation or 
transformation. 
 
The result is that the constitutional guarantee of socioeconomic rights in 
Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia is generally weaker. 
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4.3.2.5 An empty plate of socioeconomic rights: Botswana and 
Zimbabwe 
 
The third category in the schemes for the guarantee of socioeconomic rights 
in Southern Africa comprises those constitutions that I have classified as 
having an empty plate of socioeconomic rights guarantees. In this study, the 
constitutions identified in this regard are those of Botswana and Zimbabwe. 
These neither guarantee substantive socioeconomic rights in their bills of 
rights, nor provide for them in principles of State policy. The only 
socioeconomic right that finds expression under these constitutions is the 
right to property.516 The inclusion of the right to property in virtually all the 
constitutions surveyed is quite interesting given that, as discussed in Chapter 
III, the recognition of the right has generated a lot of controversy on the 
international plane. As we have seen in that Chapter, the right is not generally 
recognised as a fundamental human right in international human rights law.517  
 
The right is perhaps less controversial for States to guarantee because it 
essentially imposes negative obligations on the State against arbitrary 
deprivation, or deprivation without compensation, but does not impose 
resource-demanding positive duties of fulfilment on the State. Thus, 
notwithstanding that the constitutions of Zimbabwe and Botswana both 
guarantee the right to property, considering such special aspects of the 
content of the right, it is submitted that we can safely conclude that 
essentially, the intention of the legislature in carving out these bills of rights 
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  In Zimbabwe, the right to property, expressed in the form of the right not to be 
arbitrarily deprived of property, is guaranteed in section 16 of the Constitution. In 
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  Krause & Alfredsson point out that ‘the right to property is controversial among the 
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was, in principle, to exclude altogether the guarantee of socioeconomic rights 
from their province.518 
  
The question remains whether it is still possible for courts in Zimbabwe and 
Botswana to deal with these rights through a generous interpretation of civil 
and political rights such as the right to life. It would appear that this possibility 
is real. It appears that this will depend on the interpretative approach adopted 
by the courts. Courts in Botswana and Zimbabwe, upon being seized with 
socioeconomic rights claims, have the option of taking a conservative 
approach, as has been the case in Lesotho; or the broad and liberal approach 
as in India. In the absence of actual challenges having been brought before 
the courts in Botswana and Zimbabwe; it remains at this stage a matter of 
conjecture as to the approach that courts in the two countries are likely to 
adopt between these two options.  
 
4.4 Specific socioeconomic rights guarantees for refugees: 
the legal framework 
 
So far, it has been demonstrated that bills of rights in Southern Africa apply to 
foreign nationals, including refugees, as a general rule. It has also been 
shown that in various ways, socioeconomic rights are guaranteed in a 
number of constitutions; albeit with different degrees of emphasis and 
comprehensiveness. This section proceeds to examine the specific 
socioeconomic rights guarantees for refugees in the respective States. South 
Africa is examined first; because it is at the moment the foremost refugee 
receiving country in the region.519  
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4.4.1 The Guarantee of socioeconomic rights for refugees in 
South Africa: The legal framework 
 
As discussed earlier, the South African bill of rights is silent on the guarantee 
of refugee rights. However, it has also been demonstrated that the bill of 
rights applies to foreign nationals generally, including refugees, and that this 
application extends to the area of socioeconomic rights. The question that 
arises is: to what extent are socioeconomic rights guaranteed for refugees in 
South Africa? To answer this question, we have to consider the bill of rights, 
legislation and international law obligations.  
 
The framework legislation in the area of refugee law in South Africa is the 
Refugees Act 130 of 1998.520 The major aims of the Act are well summarised 
in the Long Title to the Act that states, in part, that the Act was passed in 
order: 
 
To give effect within the Republic of South Africa to the relevant international 
legal instruments, principles and standards relating to refugees; to provide for 
the reception into South Africa of asylum seekers; to regulate applications for 
and recognition of refugee status; to provide for the rights and obligations 
flowing from such status; and to provide for matters connected therewith. 
 
This study focuses on how the Act provides ‘for the rights…flowing from such 
[refugee] status’. The Act defines a refugee in section 3 of the Act and, in this 
regard, adopts verbatim the definitions adopted under the 1951 convention 
and the 1969 OAU convention respectively. No distinction is drawn between 
refugees falling under the 1951 Convention and those under the 1969 OAU 
Convention, in terms of the standards of treatment. The consequence is that 
the Act conflates the humanitarian and political conceptions of refugeehood. 
The rights and obligations of a refugee are provided for under Chapter 5 of 
the Act. Of crucial importance is section 27(b) of the Act that provides that ‘a 
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refugee enjoys full legal protection, which includes the rights set out in 
Chapter 2 of the Constitution [the bill of rights] and the right to remain in the 
Republic in accordance with the provisions of this Act.’ This section clearly 
suggests that refugees are entitled to the full range of socioeconomic rights 
guaranteed under the Constitution, with the exception of those rights that are 
guaranteed for citizens only.  
 
Over and above the general guarantees of refugee rights in section 27(b), the 
Act also specifically guarantees certain rights. These guarantees are 
contained in section 27(f) that provides that a refugee ‘is entitled to seek 
employment’, and section 27(g) that provides that a refugee ‘is entitled to the 
same basic health services and basic primary education which the inhabitants 
of the Republic receive from time to time.’ From this, one can conclude that 
the South African protection regime for the rights of refugees is very broad 
and generous.  It is notable that no distinction is drawn in terms of the 
standards of treatment for humanitarian and political refugees. The lack of 
distinction in the standards of treatment is however less problematic in the 
case of South Africa than with other Southern African countries because 
rights for both categories are guaranteed at a sufficiently high level in 
comparison with other foreign nationals generally.  
 
However, whilst the fact that the legislative guarantee for refugee rights is 
broad and generous is well settled; a number of court cases have shown that 
the implementation of the rights in some instances raises a number of critical 
issues for consideration. The study now explores the approach that South 
African courts have taken in respect of some socioeconomic rights as they 
relate to refugees. 
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4.4.1.1 The right to work 
 
The right to work is vital for refugees. Through their engagement in productive 
work, they can have a renewed sense of meaning and purpose for life after 
what are frequently traumatic displacing circumstances that forcibly uproot 
them from, or prevent them from returning to, their home countries.  
 
It has been observed however that, at the same time, the right to work ‘seems 
to be one of the rights that have received the least judicial attention world 
wide’.521  The right, that includes wage earning employment, self-employment 
and professional practice, is guaranteed both under the 1951 Convention in 
articles 17, 18 and 19 of the Convention respectively; and the ICESCR under 
article 6. The 1951 Convention is of particular significance here since South 
Africa is a party thereto. The question becomes: Does the domestic law in 
South Africa provide for this right – and specifically so with regard to 
refugees? As we have seen, the Refugees Act, save for a few rights in 
sections 27(f) and 27(g), does not contain specific socioeconomic rights 
guarantees in its text. What it does is to make a general reference to the full 
protection of the rights set out in the bill of rights with regard to refugees.522  
 
The right to work is one of those rights that are guaranteed, in part, under the 
Refugees Act. Section 27(f) of the Act entitles refugees ‘to seek employment’ 
in South Africa. No distinction is made under the Act between wage-earning 
employment and self-employment. Thus the right guaranteed under section 
27(f) of the Act in this respect extends to both wage-earning and self-
employment, and is in this respect consistent with articles 17 and 18 of the 
1951 Convention. 
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An important case in which the issue of the right to work for refugees in South 
Africa was raised is Union for Refugee Women & Others v The Director: The 
Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (Union of Refugee Women 
case). 523 The case is seminal under South African refugee law as it dealt with 
the interplay between national law and international law in terms of the 
standards of treatment for refugees. The applicants argued, among other 
things, that the exclusion of refugees from engaging in work in the private 
security industry was unfairly discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional. 
The Constitutional Court dismissed the application. The court held that the 
activity in issue, the provision of private security services, did not fall within a 
sphere of activity protected by a constitutional right available to refugees and 
other foreigners.524 The Court stated in this regard that whilst ‘the Refugees 
Act guarantees the applicants the right to seek employment’,   the right to ‘the 
choice of vocation…is reserved only for citizens and permanent residents.’525  
 
This case represents one of the exceptions to the general position under 
South African law, which is that refugees are entitled to full legal protection, 
including the guarantee of the rights provided for in the bill of rights. Refugees 
in this case were denied the right to work in a specific industry based on 
general security considerations.  A thorny issue that the court had to deal with 
was how to justify why permanent residents were allowed to operate in the 
private security industry under the Private Security Industry Regulation Act 56 
of 2001, whilst refugees were not allowed, notwithstanding the guarantee of 
the right to seek employment for refugees under section 27 of the Refugees 
Act. The Applicants relied on Article 17(1) of the 1951 Convention. They 
argued that since the standard of treatment for refugees under Article 17(1) of 
the 1951 Convention was the ‘most favourable treatment accorded to 
nationals of a foreign country’, refugees had to be accorded rights on the 
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same footing as permanent residents since the latter are the category of 
foreign nationals thet are accorded the most favourable treatment. 
 
The Court rejected this argument, stating that regard should also be had to 
the expression ‘in the same circumstances’ that qualified the compass of 
Article 17(1). In terms of Article 6 of the 1951 Convention, the term ‘in the 
same circumstances’ means that: 
 
any requirements (including requirements as to length and conditions of sojourn 
or residence) which the particular individual would have to fulfil for the 
enjoyment of the right in question, if he were not a refugee, must be fulfilled by 
him, with the exception of requirements which by their nature a refugee is 
incapable of fulfilling” 
 
Construing Article 17(1) in the light of Article 6 of the 1951 Convention, the 
court concluded that refugees were not foreign nationals ‘in the same 
circumstances’ as permanent residents ‘for the simple reason that they have 
yet to meet the requirements for permanent residence’.526 In this regard, the 
Court noted that section 27(d) of the Immigration Act 2002 as read with 
section 27(c) of the Refugees Act provided an avenue for refugees to acquire 
permanent residence status in South Africa, and that in order to acquire such 
status, primarily a refugee should have been continuously resident in South 
Africa for five years after he/she was granted asylum.527  
 
In their minority judgment however, Mokgoro and O’Regan JJ, emphasised 
the need, in addressing the issues, to have: 
 
some understanding of the predicament in which refugees generally find 
themselves.  Refugees have had to flee their homes, and leave their livelihoods 
and often their families and possessions either because of a well-founded fear of 
persecution on the grounds of their religion, nationality, race or political opinion 
                                                 
526
  Ibid, para. 65 (Per Kondile, AJ). 
527
  Ibid, para.50. 
177 
 
or because public order in their home countries has been so disrupted by war or 
other events that they can no longer remain there.  Often refugees will have left 
their homes in haste and find themselves precariously in our country without 
family or friends, and without any resources to sustain themselves.
528
   
 
In this regard, they emphasised that: 
 
One of the most important obligations of a state in relation to refugees relates to 
the refugees’ right to work.  This is of particular importance in South Africa as no 
form of grant or social assistance is available to refugees and a refugee will 
generally have no other way of providing for the basic necessities of life unless 
he or she is able to find work.
529
 
 
Mokgoro and O’Regan JJ concluded that the exclusion of refugees under 
section 23(1) of the Security Act, notwithstanding their vulnerable status, 
amounted to unfair discrimination in terms of section 9(3) of the Constitution.  
 
In his separate opinion, Sachs J emphasised that when entertaining 
entitlement claims from refugees, relevant authorities should keep in mind 
that: 
 
[t]hey are responding to claims made under international and domestic law, and 
their discretion is bound by the need to take account of corresponding legal 
obligations.  These obligations strongly favour acknowledging the right of 
refugees to seek employment in all spheres of economic activity.  Only clear and 
specific legislatively required reasons would authorise any avenues being closed 
to them. In this regard the mere fact that they are non-nationals, which is built 
into their status as refugees, could not on its own render it fair to keep them out.   
 
Sachs J concluded that the exclusion of refugees from the scheme of section 
23(1)(a) of the Security Act was justified on objective grounds, and he agreed 
with the majority decision. He pointed out however that he could have been 
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inclined to agree with the minority decision of Mokgoro and O’Regan JJ, ‘if 
there were no escape from the peremptory terms of section 23(1)’. He 
however agreed with Kondile AJ, that section 23(6) that granted the Minister 
discretion to grant exemptions from this restriction in appropriate cases was 
an escape route. 
 
It is submitted that if one is to adopt a positivistic approach, the majority 
decision would represent the correct approach. Given the fact that refugees in 
South Africa are not automatically granted the right of indefinite residence 
upon the grant of refugee status,530and the fact that requirements have been 
stipulated under the Immigration Act in order for a refugee to acquire 
permanent residency; a reading of Article 6 of the 1951 Convention shows 
that refugees and permanent residents are not foreign nationals ‘in the same 
circumstances’. Article 6 of the Convention makes it clear that if ‘requirements 
as to length and conditions of sojourn or residence’ must be satisfied as a 
pre-condition for the guarantee of the rights in issue, then a refugee will only 
be considered to be in the same circumstances with a foreign national in the 
most favoured category if those conditions have been satisfied. Clearly under 
the South African refugee law regime, viewed through a positivist’s prism, a 
refugee is required to satisfy certain conditions relating to sojourn or 
residence before he/she can be admitted to permanent residence status and 
the rights appertaining thereto.  
 
Normatively though, the problem is that the justification for the approaches of 
both the 1951 Convention, in this respect in terms of Article 17(1) as read 
with Article 6 of the Convention; and the Refugees Act of 1998 as read with 
the Immigration Act of 2002; are ethically deficient. Under the 1951 
Convention, that deals only with political refugees (as discussed in Chapters I 
& II), Article 6 in particular does not seem to take account of the ethical 
imperatives of surrogate State protection and community membership.  
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The South African refugee and immigration law regimes mask the essential 
distinction between political and humanitarian refugees, conflating the two 
phenomena into one. The result is that the refugee law regime seems to 
proceed from an assumption of temporary refuge for all refugees, whether 
political or humanitarian, that can only later, upon satisfaction of some 
conditions of residence and sojourn, be elevated to durable protection that 
provides a proper sense of substitute community membership.  As 
demonstrated in Chapter II, such masking of this essential distinction is 
problematic. It appears however that the Court, in the Union of Refugee 
Women case, based its understanding on this conflated understanding. To be 
fair on the court though, the conflation here seems to lie in the positive law, 
and the ultimate solution lies in legislative reform. 
 
It is submitted that had the law, and hence the court, adopted a nuanced 
approach that is based on the differences between humanitarian and political 
refugees, it would have treated political refugees on the same footing as 
permanent residents right from the start; whilst humanitarian refugees could 
justifiably be subjected to the standards of treatment that currently prevail. 
 
The minority decision in the Union of Refugee Women case suffered from a 
similar problem of conflating humanitarian refugeehood with political 
refugeehood, and hence making a blanket proposition that refugees are 
people who are in the same circumstances as permanent residents. That can 
certainly not be so, for the reasons advanced in Chapter II. Humanitarian 
refugees should not, necessarily, be treated as if they were in the same 
circumstances as permanent residents, right from the beginning. The starting 
point is to offer them temporary protection. 
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The issue of the guarantee of the right to work in respect of refugees was 
also in issue in the case of Minister of Home Affairs v Watchenuka.531One of 
the central questions that the Supreme Court of Appeal was invited to decide 
was on the extent to which refugees could be prohibited from being employed 
whilst waiting for the determination of their status as refugees by the relevant 
authorities. The court considered the issue from the broader premise of the 
right to human dignity in terms of section 10 of the Constitution. The court 
noted that the right to dignity could be permissibly limited on grounds of one’s 
nationality status. The court, in this respect, began by saying that: 
 
the protection even of human dignity – that most fundamental of constitutional 
values – is not absolute and s 36 of the Bill of Rights recognises that it may be 
limited in appropriate circumstances… If the protection of human dignity were to 
be given its full effect in the present context – permitting any person at all times 
to undertake employment – it would imply that any person might freely enter and 
remain in this country so as to exercise that right. But as pointed out by the 
United States Supreme Court over a century ago in Nishimura Ekiu v The United 
States:
532
 ‘It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign 
nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-
preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit 
them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to 
prescribe.’
533
 
 
The Court therefore held that: 
 
It is for that reason, no doubt, that the right to enter and to remain in the 
Republic, and the right to choose a trade or occupation or profession, are 
restricted to citizens by ss 21 and 22 of the Bill of Rights… Those considerations 
alone, in my view, constitute reasonable and justifiable grounds for limiting the 
protection that s 10 of the Bill of Rights accords to dignity so as to exclude from 
its scope a right on the part of every applicant for asylum to undertake 
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employment – a limitation that is implied by s 27(f) of the Refugees Act, and that 
has been expressed in the Standing Committee’s decision.
534
 
 
However, the court concluded that this restriction did not extend to instances 
where the consequence of restriction or limitation of the right to dignity would 
be to render a person destitute. The court thus said that: 
 
where employment is the only reasonable means for the person’s support other 
considerations arise. What is then in issue is not merely a restriction upon the 
person's capacity for self-fulfilment, but a restriction upon his or her ability to live 
without positive humiliation and degradation. For it is not disputed that this 
country, unlike some other countries that receive refugees, offers no State 
support to applicants for asylum.
535
 
 
All in all, it is evident that the Supreme Court of Appeal adopted quite a 
restrictive approach towards the right of refugees to work in South Africa. It 
would appear that the court proceeded from the premise that in principle, 
refugees are to be treated like any other foreign nationals in the country. It is 
submitted that this restrictive approach is contrary to the basic essence of the 
principle of refugee protection. Whilst the approach can be justified in the 
case of humanitarian refugees generally, for the reasons advanced in 
Chapter II, it is inappropriate to conflate the situation of foreign nationals 
generally in the country, with the specific case of political refugees.  
 
In adopting a scheme of justification for differential treatment between citizens 
and foreign nationals with regard to the right to work that does not recognise 
political refugeehood as a unique status deserving of special and preferential 
treatment when compared to other foreign nationals in the country generally, 
the approach adopted in the Watchenuka case does not seem to accord with 
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the above theoretical principled grounding of political refugeehood. It 
amounts, in principle, to equal treatment of people in different circumstances 
which is unfair.  
 
In conclusion, whilst the Watchenuka decision should be commended for the 
progressive statements it made in terms of the dignity of all people including 
foreign nationals in the country; and the fact that the applicants in the case 
were granted an effective remedy based on their unique circumstances, it is 
submitted that the court missed an opportunity to clarify the essential 
difference that has to be drawn in the treatment of refugees and other foreign 
nationals generally; and also the fact that refugees fall into different 
categories: humanitarian and political. The proper thing for the court to do 
would have been to acknowledge that as a matter of principle, refugees 
deserve special protection and that, whether their status has been so 
declared or not (asylum seekers), they should generally be allowed to 
exercise their right to work freely as long as their stay in the country remains 
lawful. However, in the case of humanitarian refugees, the host State can 
impose conditions to the exercise of this right as they apply to other foreign 
nationals generally. For those humanitarian refugees in desperate 
circumstances, temporary protection, as discussed in Chapter II, is germane. 
 
4.4.1.2 The right to education 
 
The right of access to education is clearly quintessential for refugees. As 
forcibly displaced people outside their home countries and without the 
protection of such home countries, without a guarantee for their education, 
their futures would clearly be doomed and their sense of marginalisation and 
general vulnerability perpetuated. 
 
The right to education is another of those rights that are specifically provided 
for under the Refugees Act, albeit also guaranteed only in part. The relevant 
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part of section 27(g) of the Act provides that a refugee ‘is entitled to the 
same…basic primary education which the inhabitants of the Republic receive 
from time to time.’ Thus, in terms of primary education, the Refugees Act 
plainly requires that refugees have to be treated on the same footing as 
citizens. This is consistent with Article 22(1) of the 1951 Convention, which 
requires that States parties should accord refugees the same treatment as 
nationals in respect of elementary education. Under the South African 
Schools Act,536 school attendance for children between the ages of seven 
and fifteen years is compulsory. Section 3(1) of the Act imposes a duty on 
every parent (including a guardian) to cause every learner within that age 
bracket for whom he or she is responsible to attend school from the first day 
of the school year. Further, section 5(1) of the Act provides that ‘[a] public 
school must admit learners and serve their educational requirements without 
unfairly discriminating in any way.’ In addition, Section 5(3)(a) of the same Act 
provides that ‘[n]o learner may be refused admission to a public school on the 
grounds that his parent is unable to pay or has not paid …school fees’.  
 
From these provisions, it is submitted that the law requires all children of the 
defined school going age to attend school, and that no child should be denied 
the right to basic primary education. This includes refugee children. This 
proposition is cemented by the provisions of the 1989 Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC) to which South Africa is a party.537 In the context of 
the CRC, ‘a child means every human being below the age of 18 years 
unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.’538 
The CRC Committee has authoritatively stated that ‘States parties have the 
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obligation to ensure that all human beings below 18 enjoy all the rights set 
forth in the Convention without discrimination (art. 2).’539  
 
Further, the CERD Committee has also stated in its General Comment No. 
30, that State parties to the Convention, such as South Africa, are under an 
obligation to ‘[e]nsure that public educational institutions are open to non-
citizens and children of undocumented immigrants residing in the territory of a 
State party.’540 The reference to ‘undocumented immigrants’ makes it clear 
that the CERD Committee was making reference to those people that are 
commonly referred to as illegal immigrants. All in all, it seems plain that 
refugees (whether asylum seekers or declared refugees) are similarly entitled 
to the right to education. 
 
It is therefore clear that a proper interpretation of the section 29 of the 
Constitution, as read with the provisions of the Refugees Act, and with due 
consideration of international law,541 leads to the inescapable conclusion that 
refugees, particularly refugee children, should be accorded an unqualified 
right to basic education on equal footing with nationals. 
 
Further, notwithstanding the narrow compass of section 27(g) of the 
Refugees Act that is limited to basic primary education, the deficiency is 
covered by section 27(b) of the Act, that entitles refugees to the full protection 
of the right to education as more broadly provided for under section 29 of the 
Constitution.  
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The relevant part of section 29 of the Constitution provides, in this respect, 
that: 
 
Everyone has the right- 
a. to a basic education, including adult basic education; and 
b.  to further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, 
must make progressively available and accessible. 
 
The question of the right to education for asylum seekers was considered in 
the Watchenuka case.542 In that case, Nugent, JA observed that just like the 
right work, the right to education is also inherent in human dignity because 
without it a person is deprived of the potential for human fulfilment.543 The 
judge further noted that the right is expressly protected by section 29(1) of the 
Bill of Rights, which guarantees everyone the right to a basic education, 
including adult basic education, as well as the right to further education. He 
proceeded to point out that ‘an applicant for asylum is not ordinarily entitled to 
take up employment or to study pending the outcome of his or her 
application, but that there will be circumstances in which it would be unlawful 
to prohibit it.’544In this regard, Nugent JA stated that: 
 
For reasons that I have already advanced that right, too, cannot be absolute, 
and is capable of being limited in appropriate circumstances, for I reiterate that 
the State cannot be obliged to permit any person to enter this country, and then 
to remain, in order that he or she might exercise that right. But where, for 
example, the person concerned is a child who is lawfully in this country to seek 
asylum (there could be other circumstances as well) I can see no justification for 
limiting that right so as to deprive him or her of the opportunity for human 
fulfilment at a critical period, nor was any suggested by the appellants. A general 
prohibition that does not allow for study to be permitted in appropriate 
circumstances is in my view unlawful.
545
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The court persisted with a relatively narrow approach in recognizing the right 
of refugees to education, particularly as it relates to children. Firstly, the court 
failed to make a categorical finding that under no circumstances can a child 
be deprived of the right to education in South Africa, irrespective of his or her 
status for staying in the country. That seems to be the proper reading to be 
attached to section 29(1) of the Constitution, as read with sections 5(1) and 
5(3) of the South African Schools Act, and the relevant international law 
provisions and principles spelt out above. A reading of Nugent, JA’s decision, 
however, seems to suggest that a refugee child who is ‘not lawfully in South 
Africa’ may be denied the right of access to education.546This prospect 
renders the position adopted slightly at odds with South Africa’s obligations 
under international law. Further, it is submitted that, just like with regard to its 
analysis on the right to work, the court missed an opportunity to make it clear 
that political refugees ought to be given preferential treatment over other 
foreign nationals generally. The court insisted on proceeding from the 
premise that there are justifiable grounds for limiting the protection of the right 
to education so as to exclude asylum seekers from its scope.547 This, again, 
is at odds with the principled theoretical grounding for refugeehood as 
discussed in Chapter II. 
 
The better approach is to reverse the general principle and instead, proceed 
from the premise that refugees should be treated on the same footing as, at 
the least, permanent residents and at best nationals when it comes to the 
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enjoyment of the right to basic education. In contrast with the Watchenuka 
approach, it is in exception to this general generous approach that one might 
then show justifiable grounds for limiting the protection of the right to 
education.  
 
4.4.1.3 The right to housing 
 
Unlike the rights to work and education that are, in part, specifically 
guaranteed under article 27 of the Refugees Act, the right to housing is not 
specifically provided for thereunder. However, as already demonstrated, this 
omission is not fatal because in terms of section 29(b) of the Refugees Act, 
the right to housing as guaranteed under section 26 of the Constitution is also 
guaranteed for refugees. Section 26 of the Constitution provides as follows: 
 
1. Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. 
2. The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within 
its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this 
right. 
3.  No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home 
demolished, without an order of court made after considering all the 
relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions. 
 
The right to housing is arguably the most litigated socioeconomic right in 
South Africa, with a comparatively rich panoply of jurisprudence developed 
around it.548 The locus classicus in terms of this right is Government of the 
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Republic of South Africa v Grootboom and Others (the Grootboom case)549 
where the Constitutional Court found that a Government housing policy that 
did not, among other things, take into account the immediate needs of people 
who were in desperate need, fell short of the requirement of reasonableness 
envisaged under section 26(2) of the Constitution.550The Grootboom case is 
significant in that it established reasonableness as the standard of review to 
be adopted in assessing whether Government conduct or policies comply 
with the constitutional obligations imposed in respect of socioeconomic rights. 
 
The discussion in relation to the rights to work and education above has 
demonstrated the general approach that courts have taken in relation to the 
guarantee of socioeconomic rights for refugees. Notwithstanding the clearly 
liberal and generous language of section 27(b) of the Refugees Act that 
refers to the full protection of the rights in the bill of rights, courts have taken 
the approach that even the right to human dignity under section 10 of the 
Constitution is limitable for refugees, basically on the same premises as it 
would be limited for other foreign nationals in the country generally.  
 
An important question in this regard is whether there is any discernible 
approach that South African courts have taken with regard to the right to 
housing for refugees. There is, however, not much guidance from 
jurisprudence in this respect. The only decision that stands out is that of 
Mamba & Others v Minister of Social Development & Others (the Mamba 
case).551In May 2008, a spate of xenophobic attacks against foreign nationals 
from various African countries broke out in various townships across South 
Africa. Foreign nationals were indiscriminately targeted and attacked, and 
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many were killed in the process. Thousands of African foreign nationals, 
including refugees, were displaced from their residences.552  
 
In response, the South African Government established temporary shelters 
(tent camps) for the displaced migrants, where they were provided with basic 
necessities such as food and water. Government made it clear that these 
shelters were merely temporary, and that the displaced foreign nationals, 
including refugees, had to find a way of quickly reintegrating themselves back 
into the communities. Consequently, it made a decision to close the camps by 
15 August 2008, irrespective of the circumstances of the refugees. Mr.Odinga 
Mamba and other similarly placed recognised refugees made an urgent 
application to the High Court for an order that the Government be interdicted 
from dismantling the camps and that the camps had to remain open until the 
Government came up with a plan of how the applicants were to be re-
integrated in society.553  
 
The High Court dismissed the application, holding that the applicants had 
failed to show what plan they had in mind for the Government to devise; and 
secondly that in any case, the Refugees Act did not provide for the right of 
refugees to positive governmental action in the sense of coming up with such 
a plan. In his judgment, Makgoba J asked: ‘In the circumstances, one asks 
oneself as to what rights have been infringed. Do [refugees] to start with, 
have any right at all, to claim that the Government should provide them with 
accommodation as they seek?’ He answered this question in the negative, 
stating that ‘I am not persuaded at all that they, as refugees, have a right, 
which has been infringed by the Government.’ The Judge made no reference 
whatsoever to the provisions of section 27(b) of the Refugees Act, and why 
that provision could not be read to directly imply the guarantee of the right to 
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housing under section 26 of the Constitution for refugees. The applicants 
sought leave to appeal directly to the Constitutional Court. The Court 
however, after dealing with numerous technical preliminary issues relating to 
the application, made an order directing the parties to: 
 
engage with each other meaningfully and with all other stakeholders as soon as 
it is possible for them to do so in order to resolve the differences and difficulties 
aired in this application in the light of the values of the Constitution, the 
constitutional and statutory obligations of the respondents and the rights and 
duties of the residents of the shelters.
554
 
  
The Court proceeded to clarify that the objective of such meaningful 
engagement was to secure ‘the closure of the camps by no later than 30 
September 2008.’ Significantly, the Court further ordered Government not to 
‘forcefully move any resident from his or her shelter or take down such shelter 
other than for the purpose of consolidating camps or moving such occupants 
to facilities pending their repatriation.’555 
 
Notwithstanding the express order that no resident was to be forcefully 
removed from his or her shelter, or have his or her shelter taken down without 
provision of alternative accommodation, the authorities proceeded to do 
exactly that on or about 30 September 2008. This was in view of the fact that 
the court order had effectively endorsed the position that the camps were to 
be taken down by no later than 30 September 2008, thus creating confusion 
on the effect of the order against forced eviction. Liebenberg correctly 
observes that the approach of the court in the Mamba case was problematic, 
as ‘the scope of the engagement was specifically circumscribed by the 
requirement that its objective was “to secure the closure of the camps by no 
later than 30 September.”’556 She argues that ‘meaningful engagement in this 
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context had to occur in a normative vacuum without substantive guidance 
from the Court on the implications of the constitutional rights and principles at 
stake. This raises serious questions about whether the engagement order in 
this case was capable of effectively vindicating the constitutional rights of the 
refugees.’557   
 
Further, the rather ambivalent approach adopted by the Constitutional Court 
in the Mamba case left unchallenged the decision of the High Court on the 
matter. As shown above, the High Court took the view that the State did not 
have any obligations towards refugees in respect of housing. This approach 
is evidently troubling. Section 7(2) of the Constitution makes it clear that ‘the 
state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.’ 
The duty to protect is a positive duty that obliges the State to take appropriate 
and effective measures to protect its subjects from violation of their rights by 
third parties (non-state actors).558The fact that all applicants before the court 
were either recognised refugees or documented asylum seekers was not in 
dispute. Neither was the fact that they were all victims of xenophobic attacks 
and were thus ‘internally displaced refugees’ as it were. Their right to housing 
had therefore been interfered with by third parties. This meant that 
Government was responsible to ensure their protection in terms of section 
7(2) of the Constitution. It was therefore an error of law for the High Court to 
hold that Government did not have any obligation towards the refugees in 
respect of the forced displacement and subsequent internal resettlement. 
Secondly, the High Court took the view that it was incumbent upon the 
applicants to demonstrate to the Court specific and detailed plans and 
measures that the Government had to adopt in order to ensure their effective 
resettlement, and failure of which was fatal to their case.  
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Again this approach seems to be at odds with the standard established in the 
Grootboom case. In Grootboom, whilst the Court held that section 26 of the 
Constitution did not entitle ‘the respondents to claim shelter or housing 
immediately upon demand’, it proceeded to observe that ‘section 26 does 
oblige the state to devise and implement a coherent, coordinated programme 
designed to meet its section 26 obligations.’559Thus if such a coherent 
programme (or plan) is not available in respect of the housing entitlements of 
a significant but vulnerable group of people in South Africa, the burden ought 
to lie on the State to justify the absence of such a plan. The burden should 
not be on the applicant to detail to the court a specific plan that could be 
adopted by Government. Liebenberg also argues that in such cases, the 
burden of proof ought to rest on the State rather than on the applicant. She 
states that: 
 
Placing the burden to present evidence and arguments in relation to the 
reasonableness of its measures on the State may well be critical in ensuring that 
socioeconomic rights litigation is practically accessible to disadvantaged groups. 
At the very least a failure to present such evidence should lead to negative 
inferences being drawn regarding the reasonableness of the State’s conduct.
560
  
 
Thus it is submitted that the approach of the High Court did not only show 
disturbing insensitivity towards the plight of the refugees, but was also flawed 
legally. One can conclude therefore, based on the courts’ approach in the 
Mamba case, that the enforcement of the guarantee of the right to housing for 
refugees remains rather tenuous in South Africa. 
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4.4.1.4 The right of access to healthcare  
 
Good health is one of the most important conditions necessary for existence 
and the enjoyment of a good life for every person. Gross has emphasised the 
importance of guaranteeing the right to health, stating that:  
 
any conception of human rights intended to protect the things most vital for a 
person’s existence in the world and their ability to live a life of dignity and 
equality, free of degradation and with the capacity to make the most meaningful 
choices in life, will accord health a prominent status.
561
  
 
This notwithstanding, not many States have entrenched the right to health as 
a fully justiciable right in their bills of rights. Notably, the South African 
constitution is one of the few constitutions in the world that contain a 
genuinely justiciable right to health.562 This right is guaranteed through 
various constitutional provisions concerning health. One of these provisions is 
section 27. Section 27(1) (a) in particular, provides that ‘everyone has the 
right to have access to health care services, including reproductive health 
care.’ In this regard, the State is placed under an obligation to take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within available resources, to 
achieve the progressive realisation of this right.563 Further, under section 
27(3), the Constitution specifically emphasizes that ‘[n]o one may be refused 
emergency medical treatment.’564 As earlier argued, since this right is 
guaranteed for everyone, it is applicable to refugees as well.  
 
Other rights concerning health find expression in section 12 that guarantees, 
among other things, the right of everyone to bodily and psychological 
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integrity; section 28(1)(c) that guarantees every child the right to basic health 
care services; section 24(a) that guarantees everyone the right ‘to an 
environment that is not harmful to their health’; and section 35(2)(e) that 
guarantees every prisoner the right to be detained in conditions consistent 
with human dignity that include the provision of ‘adequate medical treatment’ 
at State expense.565 Taken together, these provisions comprise a fairly 
comprehensive guarantee of the right to health under the South African 
Constitution. 
 
Section 27(g) of the Refugees Act provides that ‘a refugee is entitled to the 
same basic health services…which the inhabitants of the Republic receive 
from time to time.’ It is interesting that section 27(g) of the Act limits the 
specific guarantee here to ‘basic health services.’ Whilst basic health services 
have not been defined under the Act, it seems the expression ‘basic health 
services’ is synonymous with the expression ‘primary health care services’ as 
used by the CESCR under the ICESCR scheme. In this regard, the CESCR, 
in General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of 
Health (Article 12)566 has observed that: 
 
In the literature and practice concerning the right to health, three levels of health 
care are frequently referred to: primary health care typically deals with common 
and relatively minor illnesses and is provided by health professionals and/or 
generally trained doctors working within the community at relatively low cost; 
secondary health care is provided in centres, usually hospitals, and typically 
deals with relatively common minor or serious illnesses that cannot be managed 
at community level, using specially-trained health professionals and doctors, 
special equipment and sometimes in-patient care at comparatively higher cost; 
tertiary health care is provided in relatively few centres, typically deals with small 
numbers of minor or serious illnesses requiring specialty-trained health 
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professionals and doctors and special equipment, and is often relatively 
expensive.
567
 
 
Thus, it would appear that section 27(g) of the Refugees Act could be 
understood to mean that refugees, in terms of the Act, are entitled to the right 
to health on the same footing as citizens only is so far as treatment for 
‘common and relatively minor illnesses [which] is provided by health 
professionals and/or generally trained doctors working within the community 
at relatively low cost is concerned.’568 When it comes to secondary and 
tertiary health care services, as expressed by the CESCR, the refugees’ right 
to health could be circumscribed within the same parameters as are 
applicable to other foreign nationals in South Africa.  
 
However, senior appellate courts have not yet taken any definitive position on 
this matter. Following the reasoning in the Watchenuka and Union of Refugee 
Women cases examined above, one might perhaps conclude that given the 
evidently narrow compass of section 27(g) of the Refugees Act, they might 
still come to the conclusion that as much as the right to health is guaranteed 
for everyone under sections 24 and 27 of the Constitution, the enjoyment of 
this right by refugees could as well be limited in terms of section 36 of the 
Constitution, on the same basis upon which the rights of other foreign 
nationals generally in the country are limited, save for the provision of basic 
healthcare services in respect of which they receive the national treatment 
standard.  
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4.4.2 The Guarantee of socioeconomic rights for refugees in 
Malawi: The legal framework 
 
The framework legislation that governs the treatment of refugees in Malawi is 
the Refugee Act of 1989.569 The Act, like most similar pieces of legislation in 
Southern Africa, adopts a definition of a refugee that is broad, combining the 
definitions under the 1951 Convention and under the 1969 OAU 
Convention.570 However, Bonaventure Rutinwa has observed that the 
Refugee Act of Malawi is ‘perhaps more notable for what it did not contain 
than what it provided for’.571 Notably, like numerous other pieces of refugee 
legislation in Southern Africa, the Act defines a refugee, establishes various 
institutions for the administration of the Act and outlines their functions. It also 
provides for non-refoulement and procedures for refugee status 
determination, appeals and cessation of refugee status. However, the Act is 
conspicuously silent on substantive human rights guarantees for refugees.572 
It is therefore evident that this silence places the Malawian refugee protection 
regime in sharp contrast with its South African counterpart which, by contrast, 
has a comparatively generous scheme for the guarantee of human rights for 
refugees generally, including socioeconomic rights. 
 
Further, under the Malawian scheme, in addition to the fact that the Refugee 
Act contains no substantive guarantees on socioeconomic rights; the country, 
at the time that it ratified the 1951 Convention, entered a number of 
reservations. These include provisions on exemption from reciprocity;573 the 
right to property for refugees;574 the right to freedom of association;575 the 
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right to wage-earning employment;576 the right to practice by refugees of 
liberal professions;577 the right of access to public education;578 provisions on 
labour legislation and social security;579 the right of freedom of movement;580 
and provisions on naturalisation and assimilation of refugees.581 These 
reservations have a direct impact on the domestic guarantee of 
socioeconomic rights for refugees. 
 
4.4.2.1 The right to work 
 
Whilst the Refugee Act is silent on the guarantee of socioeconomic rights for 
refugees, this study has earlier demonstrated that the bill of rights, all the 
same, applies to refugees. The right to work is expressly provided for under 
the Malawian bill of rights. Section 29 of the Constitution provides that ‘Every 
person shall have the right freely to engage in economic activity, to work and 
to pursue a livelihood anywhere in Malawi.’ The question then is: what is the 
effect of this right on the status of the right to work of refugees in Malawi? 
 
It will be recalled that Malawi entered a reservation on the right to wage-
earning employment under Article 17 of the 1951 Convention. The 
reservation reads as follows: 
 
The Government of the Republic of Malawi does not consider itself bound to 
grant a refugee who fulfils any of the conditions set forth in subparagraphs (a) to 
(c) to paragraph (2) of article 17 automatic exemption for the obligation to obtain 
a work permit. In respect of article 17 as a whole, the Government of the 
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Republic of Malawi does not undertake to grant to refugees rights of wage 
earning employment more favourable than those granted to aliens generally.
582
 
 
It would appear that the thinking behind Malawi’s reservation in this regard is, 
at best, not to accord refugees any preferential treatment in comparison with 
other foreign nationals in Malawi.  A related issue is whether the adoption of 
the 1994 Constitution in Malawi might have changed the legal significance of 
the reservations and the general legal landscape in relation to the right to 
work; regard being had to the provisions of section 29 of the Constitution set 
out above.  
 
In the case of The State vs Department of Poverty and Disaster Management 
Affairs and the Commissioner for Disaster Preparedness, Relief and 
Rehabilitation, Ex-Parte Frodovard Nsabimana & 83 Others (the Nsabimana 
case),583the Court was called upon to determine whether the encampment 
policy adopted by Government, where refugees are required to reside in 
designated camps outside of urban areas unless they have a special urban 
residence permit, was unconstitutional. The Court found that the encampment 
policy was reasonable, stating that this was important for reasons of security 
and public order, and also that the policy was ‘a sound administrative 
measure to ensure certainty of their population, provision of basic necessities, 
communication of information, protection of their persons and property, 
facilitation of repatriation etc.’  Referring to the reservation entered by Malawi 
in respect of Article 26 of the 1951 Convention on freedom of movement, the 
court observed that ‘it has been further argued that…the reservation does not 
apply because the current Constitution embraces human rights.’584In 
response, Chinangwa J held that ‘the reservation is still applicable until 
Malawi expressly rescinds it.   As a matter of fact section 9 of the Refugees 
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  UN, ‘Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees – Declarations and 
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  Section 39 of the Malawian Constitution guarantees the right of every person to 
freedom of movement. 
199 
 
Act585in a way augments its validity than otherwise.  The reservation is in 
conformity with the Constitution.’ 
 
In the light of this decision, it would appear that the court would take a similar 
approach in respect of the other reservations entered by Malawi including the 
reservation relating to the right to wage-earning employment. Indeed, the 
court endorsed the approach taken by the Malawi Government to subject 
refugees to the same procedure relating to the acquisition of work permits as 
it applies to other foreign nationals generally in the country. It should be 
pointed out that most refugees in Malawi are political refugees.586 Bearing in 
mind the justification for the grant of political refugee status, and preferential 
treatment for such refugees over other foreign nationals, it is submitted that 
the approach adopted in this matter was inconsistent with the principle of 
surrogacy that aims to provide the refugee with an alternative membership to 
a political community. 
 
The other limb of the right to work, as earlier shown, relates to the right to 
self-employment. The question here is: do the same limitations that relate to 
the right to wage-earning employment equally apply to the right to self-
employment in Malawi? The answer seems to be in the negative. Whilst in 
the Nsabimana case above the court rested its justification for limiting the 
right to wage-earning employment and the right to freedom of movement and 
residence on the fact that Malawi had entered reservations in respect of 
Articles 17 and 26 of the 1951 Convention respectively; Malawi has not 
entered any reservation in respect of the right to self-employment under 
Article 18 of the 1951 Convention. By guaranteeing every person the right to 
‘pursue a livelihood’ in section 29 of the Constitution, it is clear that this 
encompasses the refugee’s right of self-employment.  
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  Sec.9 of the Refugees Act provides that ‘Any person granted refugee status under 
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Recognising the importance of work for the realisation of human dignity and a 
general sense of human self-worth, it is submitted that the right to pursue a 
livelihood under section 29 of the Constitution, which entails self-employment 
among other things, should be read expansively to include, within its 
compass, refugees. This is more so in light of the position adopted by Malawi 
to exclude Article 18 of the 1951 Convention from those provisions in respect 
of which it entered reservations. 
 
4.4.2.2 Other socioeconomic rights 
 
Are there any good prospects that socioeconomic rights for refugees would 
more broadly receive appropriate recognition and enforcement by Malawian 
courts?  The jurisprudence on refugee rights has thus far been a mixed bag 
of fortunes.  The Aden Abdihaji case provided some promise, in so far as it 
demonstrated the importance of placing emphasis on human dignity for all, 
including refugees. The decision also affirmed the import of section 12(iv) of 
the Constitution, stressing that every individual, including those individuals or 
groups of persons that are not entitled to the vote, are entitled to the fullest 
protection of their rights under the Constitution.   
 
However, the Nsabimana case dampened that promise by emphasizing that 
the reservations entered by Malawi must be strictly adhered to. The case also 
affirmed the encampment policy that consigns refugees to designated camps, 
thereby depriving them the opportunity to pursue an independent livelihood. 
The decision also generally affirmed the restrictive approach to the 
recognition of refugee rights on the purported basis of national security. Other 
decisions on refugees, although not specifically on socioeconomic rights, 
have also tended to emphasise the need for government to adopt a restrict 
approach in according rights to refugees on the grounds of public order and 
national security, without much elaboration on how these matters would be 
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impacted.587 The picture that emerges therefore is that the prospects of 
having the socioeconomic rights of refugees effectively guaranteed through 
innovative, pro-rights jurisprudence by Malawian courts in the near future 
seem rather uncertain. 
  
4.4.3 The Guarantee of socioeconomic rights for refugees in 
other Southern African countries: The legal framework 
 
The guarantee of refugee rights in the legislative frameworks of the other 
Southern African countries can be categorized into two groups: those that are 
silent on the guarantee of substantive human rights (as is the case of Malawi 
above); and those that, to varying degrees make provision for at least some 
such guarantees. Countries that fall into the first category are Botswana, 
Swaziland and Zambia. Incidentally, these are among the earliest pieces of 
refugee legislation in the region, with Botswana’s Refugees (Recognition and 
Control) Act having been passed in 1968; and Zambia’s Refugee (Control) 
Act passed in 1970; whilst Swaziland’s Refugees Control Order was 
promulgated in 1978. From the very names of these pieces of legislation, it is 
evident that the legislatures, and the King in the case of Swaziland, were 
preoccupied with ensuring that refugees were ‘controlled’ rather than have 
their substantive human rights guaranteed. The second category of countries 
comprises Lesotho, Namibia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.  
  
4.4.3.1 Botswana, Swaziland and Zambia 
 
The Refugees (Recognition and Control) Act of Botswana,588 as its name 
suggests, is more of a regulatory and control framework for refugees than it is 
                                                 
587  See, e.g. Jones and Others v Refugee Committee [2005] MWHC 24  
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  Cap.25:03 [Botswana]  of 5 April 1968, available online on UNHCR Refworld at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b4d60.html [accessed 16 September 2008] 
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a framework for the recognition and guarantee of refugee rights in the 
country. In the only instance where the Act touches on the guarantee of 
fundamental human rights, it takes the approach of treating all refugees on 
the same footing as other foreign nationals in the country. This is evident from 
section 14 that addresses the issue of the right to wage-earning employment 
for refugees. Section 14(1) of the Act states that: 
 
 Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), sections 3 to 6 of the Employment of 
Visitors Act, 1968, shall apply to refugees as they apply to visitors and any 
regulations made under the provisions of section 7 of that Act shall, unless the 
context otherwise requires, apply to refugees as they apply to visitors. 
 
Further, section 14(2) proceeds to provide that: 
 
Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1) the Minister may, in his 
discretion, instruct that a work permit issued to a refugee shall be renewed for 
such period as he may deem fit notwithstanding that any such renewal will have 
the effect of extending the validity of such permit for more than 12 months. 
 
These provisions clarify at least two points in respect of the position of 
Botswana, specifically in relation to the right to wage-earning employment. 
Firstly, subsection (1) states that the refugees’ right, in this regard, is on the 
same footing as ‘visitors’ generally in the country. This therefore suggests, for 
instance, that refugees are to be subjected to the same work permit 
requirements as any foreign ‘visitor’ to Botswana would be required to satisfy. 
Secondly, subsection (2) stresses that the continued validity of a work permit 
issued to a refugee is dependent on the exercise of ministerial discretion. The 
language of discretion as used in this provision is inconsistent with the 
conception of an entitlement on the part of a refugee to continue working in 
the country for as long as his or her condition of refugeehood subsists. Shorn 
of such an entitlement, no guaranteed right can be read into section 13 of 
Botswana’s Refugees (Recognition and Control) Act. In the result, in the 
absence of general guarantees of socioeconomic rights under Botswana’s 
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Constitution, coupled with the manifest failure of the applicable legislation to 
provide for such rights; it is concluded that in Botswana, the legal position on 
the guarantee of socioeconomic rights for refugees is, at best, highly tenuous. 
 
The Refugees Control Order of Swaziland of 1978;589 and the Refugee 
(Control) Act of Zambia of 1970590 both contain no guarantees at all in 
respect of the substantive human rights of refugees. They are, just like the 
Botswana regime, principally instruments of regulation and control of 
refugees. The minor difference with Botswana, which is merely nominal, lies 
in the fact that the Botswana Act mentions issues relating to work for the 
refugee.  It is a nominal difference because, as demonstrated above, the 
purported guarantee under section 13 of the Botswana Act is also, ultimately, 
effectively empty. As earlier mentioned, courts in these countries are yet to be 
seized of claims based on socioeconomic rights; and it is therefore unclear as 
to whether, when called upon to decide, they would adopt the restrictive 
approach that emphasises the non-binding status of these rights under the 
constitution; or the Indian broad and generous approach that ensures that 
these rights are judicially enforceable.  
 
This lack of certainty rings loudly in view of the approach taken by Lesotho 
where the High Court, fully aware of the extant progressive Indian 
jurisprudence, decided to follow the non-justiciable route in relation to 
socioeconomic rights. Thus it is submitted that given the lack of certainty in 
terms of the constitutional status of socioeconomic rights in Swaziland and 
Zambia, coupled with the manifest silence in the guarantee of such rights for 
refugees under the applicable refugee legislation; it is reasonable to conclude 
that the overall guarantee of socioeconomic rights for refugees in Swaziland 
and Zambia is at best highly tenuous. In the case of Zambia, the situation is 
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  Promulgated on 14 April 1978, available online on UNHCR Refworld at: 
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made even more precarious in light of the various reservations that Zambia 
entered upon acceding to the 1951 Convention. Zambia entered similar 
reservations to those entered by Malawi, and the reservations of the two 
countries in respect of the right to wage-earning employment under Article 17 
of the Convention, and the right to freedom of movement and residence in 
terms of Article 26 of the Convention, are identical. 
 
4.4.3.2 Tanzania, Lesotho, Namibia and Zimbabwe 
 
i.    Tanzania 
 
Tanzania’s Refugees Act of 1998591 replaced the Refugee Control Act of 
1966. As its name suggests, the 1966 Act focused on the regulation and 
control of refugees rather than the guarantee of their substantive human 
rights.  
 
The socioeconomic rights guarantees for refugees under the Refugees Act of 
1998 of Tanzania are so perfunctory that one might even feel tempted to 
classify Tanzania as having no socioeconomic guarantees at all. However, 
the Act marks a significant positive departure from some of the earlier pieces 
of refugee legislation in the region, as section 31 thereof explicitly guarantees 
the right to basic (primary) education to all refugees in the country. This is 
consistent with Tanzania’s obligations under the 1951 Convention (Article 
22), the ICESCR (Articles 13 and 14) and the CRC (Article 28), amongst 
others. Of concern, however, is the fact that the right to education is not well-
guaranteed when it comes to secondary and post-secondary education. The 
responsible Minister is granted very wide discretion to make decisions 
relating to the extent to which this right might be guaranteed for refugees. As 
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the scope and enforcement of the right in this respect rests on expansive 
executive discretion, its normative foundations are therefore shaky.  
 
It has been noted that the 1951 Convention itself is also deficient in this 
regard in so far as it narrows the refugee’s entitlement to education to primary 
school education, and provides a wide margin of discretion to the State in 
respect of higher education.592 The ideal position is to guarantee refugees 
most favourable treatment accorded to foreign nationals which should be as 
close as possible to the treatment of citizens. 
 
Section 32 addresses work issues in relation to refugees. It essentially 
requires that refugees have to satisfy work permit requirements, just like any 
other foreign nationals generally in the country. In this regard, the Tanzanian 
position largely mirrors that of Botswana. This is inconsistent with the political 
and ethical justification for the recognition and protection of political refugees 
in particular. 
 
As is the case with Swaziland and Zambia, the Tanzanian constitutional 
scheme for the guarantee of socioeconomic rights generally is in the ‘half loaf’ 
category which bifurcates the guarantee of these rights into non-binding 
principles on the one hand and entrenched rights on the other. The 
justiciability of socioeconomic rights based on the constitution has not yet 
been judicially tested. However, at least on the basis that the right to 
education at the basic (primary) level is expressly guaranteed under the 
Refugees Act of 1998, it is submitted that this aspect of the right is not 
tenuous. However, although the guarantee of socioeconomic rights for 
refugees under the Act is more progressive than the legislative frameworks in 
Malawi, Swaziland and Zambia; it is still not comprehensive enough and there 
remains room for substantial improvement.  
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ii.   Lesotho, Namibia and Zimbabwe 
 
The specific refugee legislation in Lesotho,593 Namibia594and 
Zimbabwe,595has one common positive feature: they all guarantee for 
refugees within their jurisdictions, the full scope of the rights contained under 
the 1951 Convention and the 1969 OAU Convention.596 The express 
incorporation of the 1951 Convention and 1969 OAU Convention is highly 
significant because, as demonstrated in Chapter III, the 1951 Convention in 
particular has a fairly significant catalogue of socioeconomic rights. This is 
particularly germane for Zimbabwe because the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
does not guarantee socioeconomic rights. Thus, although some rights, 
namely the right of wage-earning employment (Article 17 of the 1951 
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  Sec.13(2) of the Refugee Act of 1983 of Lesotho provides, in this regard, that 
‘Notwithstanding sub-section (1), a refugee shall enjoy the rights and be subject to 
the duties defined in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of 
Refugees and the 1969 OAU Convention governing the specific aspects of refugee 
problems in Africa.’  
In Namibia, the Namibia Refugees (Recognition and Control) Act of 1999 provides, in 
section 18, that: 
‘Subject to the provisions of this Act, every recognized refugee and every protected 
person in Namibia- 
(a)  shall be entitled to the rights conferred, and be subject to the duties imposed, by- 
(i)   the provisions of the UN Convention on Refugees, 1951, which are set out in Part 
I of the Schedule to this Act; and 
(ii)   the provisions of the OAU Convention on Refugees, 1969, which are set out in 
Part II of the Schedule to this Act, as if the references therein to refugees were 
references to recognized refugees and protected persons;’ 
Finally in Zimbabwe, section 12 of the Refugee Act of 1983 provides that:   
‘(1)Subject to the provisions of this Act, every recognized refugee and every 
protected person within Zimbabwe - 
(a)shall be entitled to the rights and be subject to the duties contained in - 
(i)the Articles of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of the 28th July, 
1951, which are set out in Part 1 of the Schedule; and 
(ii)the Articles of the Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific 
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa of the 10th September 1969, which are set 
out in Part II of the Schedule; as if the references therein to refugees were references 
to recognized refugees and protected persons’ 
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Convention) and the right of freedom of movement and residence (Article 26 
of the 1951 Convention) were expressly excluded from the incorporated 
provisions; the general incorporation of all the other rights under the 1951 
Convention into Zimbabwe’s domestic law is of great legal and 
socioeconomic significance for refugees in Zimbabwe.  
 
In Lesotho, the incorporation of these instruments is similarly significant 
considering that the High Court established in Khathang Tema Baitsokoli & 
Another v Maseru City Council & others that socioeconomic rights are not 
justiciable in Lesotho. By specifically incorporating these instruments, and 
without excepting their justiciability, the refugee legislation has arguably 
placed the legal guarantee of socioeconomic rights for refugees on a 
significantly higher footing since a refugee can bring his or her claim directly 
under the Refugee Act, and rely on the convention rights as incorporated.  
 
Finally, in the case of Namibia, which also generally incorporates the rights 
guaranteed under the 1951 Convention, including socioeconomic rights, there 
is one striking feature: the Act does not incorporate Article 22(1) of the 1951 
Convention that guarantees that ‘[t]he Contracting States shall accord to 
refugees the same treatment as is accorded to nationals with respect to 
elementary education.’ It is unclear why Namibia decided to exclude this right, 
which has been classified by the CESCR as forming part of the minimum core 
obligations of all States in relation to the right to education,597 from the 
incorporated rights. Be that as it may, Namibia is to be lauded for being more 
progressive than some countries in the region by incorporating the large part 
of the socioeconomic rights for refugees guaranteed under the 1951 
Convention.  
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  CESCR, General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education (Article 13 of the 
Covenant), UN. Doc.E/C.12/1999/10 
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It must also be recalled that Namibia has been singled out for adopting the 
monist approach when it comes to the effect of treaty obligations assumed by 
the State. In this regard, whilst no test case has yet come before Namibian 
courts in respect of socioeconomic rights, it remains a significant possibility 
that the ICESCR, for instance, can be read as part of Namibian law. The 
same applies to the CRC, particularly in view of the omission of Article 22(1) 
of the 1951 Convention from the list of provisions directly incorporated under 
the Refugees (Recognition and Control) Act. Article 28(1) of the CRC that 
makes primary school education free and compulsory for all could be 
particularly useful. All in all, the picture in Namibia in relation to the guarantee 
of socioeconomic rights for refugees seems promising, and there are good 
prospects that the legal regime could be used in a manner that advances the 
full guarantee of socioeconomic rights for refugees. It can perhaps be safely 
concluded that Namibia’s legal framework, in so far as the extent of 
guarantee of socioeconomic rights for refugees is concerned, lies only 
second to South Africa in the region. 
 
4.5 Refugee status determination regimes 
 
Another important aspect of the legal guarantee of refugee rights in Southern 
Africa is that of refugee status determination (RSD). RSD refers to the 
process whereby a government authority or the UNHCR examines whether 
an individual who has submitted an asylum application (an application to be 
granted refugee status) or has otherwise presented himself or herself to 
authorities of the host State for purposes of asylum, is indeed a refugee.598 
As pointed out above, refugee laws are fashioned differently in different 
countries in Southern Africa. These differences include how RSD is 
conducted.  In the context of socioeconomic rights, the importance of RSD in 
a legal scheme for the protection of refugees lies in the fact that any special 
treatment that a refugee ought to receive in the guarantee of socioeconomic 
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rights ultimately rests on whether or not he or she indeed qualifies as a 
refugee within the meaning of the applicable definition. In this regard, the 
study provides here, a synopsis of the various RSD processes adopted in 
various countries under study. 
 
In South Africa, RSD is done by the Department of Home Affairs (DHA). Until 
recently, the responsibility for making status determinations was, in terms of 
section 24 of the Refugees Act, vested in Status Determination Officers 
(SDOs) at the various Refugee Reception Offices established by the Minister 
in terms of section 8(1) of the Act. Section 24(1)(c) allowed the SDOs to 
‘consult with and invite a UNHCR representative to furnish information on 
specified matters.’  The decisions of the Refugee SDOs were reviewable by 
the Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs established in terms of section 9 
of the Act.    
 
The situation however has substantially changed with the passing of the 
Refugee Amendment Act No. 12 of 2011 passed in August 2011.  As a result 
of the August 2011 amendments, SDOs have been replaced with Status 
Determination Committees (SDCs) set up by the Director General of the DHA 
under section 8(1) of the Act. Section 8(2) empowers SDCs to set up sub-
committees for their effective operation. The responsibility for RSD under 
section 24 of the Act now vests in the SDCs.   Where the SDC makes a 
decision that an application is manifestly unfounded or fraudulent, section 
24A(1) makes it mandatory for the Director General of the DHA to review 
such decision. Otherwise, where an applicant for refugee status is not content 
with an adverse decision made by the SDC, he or she is entitled, in terms of 
section 24B(1), to lodge an appeal with the Refugee Appeals Authority. The 
involvement of the UNHCR in the RSD process remains minimal as the SDC, 
just like the SDO before it, is only required to, where necessary, ‘consult with 
and invite a UNHCR representative to furnish information on specified 
matters.’   
210 
 
 
In Malawi, the Refugee Committee established under section 3 of the 
Refugee Act of 1989 is empowered to conduct RSD and also the correlative 
power to ‘cancel or revoke its decision granting refugee status.’599 The 
committee comprises a number of senior officials from various government 
ministries and/or departments including the Attorney General, the Secretary 
for Home Affairs, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the head of the Malawi 
Police Service and a UNHCR representative as an observer.600 Section 6, as 
read with section 2(1) of the Act (the definition section) shows that as a 
general rule, Malawi has adopted an individual status determination 
procedure whereby each person’s application has to be dealt with separately 
on its merits. However, section 7(3) grants the Minister the power to, by 
notice published in the Gazette, ‘direct that, with respect to any group of 
foreign nationals specified in the notice, seeking refugee status in Malawi, the 
Committee shall apply…group determination.’ This is what is commonly 
referred to as prima facie RSD. No guarantee for legal representation at State 
expense, or at all, during the process of RSD is made under the Act. Broadly 
similar RSD processes to that of Malawi are followed in Botswana,601 
Lesotho,602 Namibia,603 Tanzania604 and Zimbabwe605where a Government 
Committee is set up to consider and make determinations on RSD. 
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In Zambia by contrast, a very different model is adopted.   Unlike all the other 
countries surveyed in this study, with Swaziland being the only other 
exception, the Refugee (Control) Act of 1970 does not provide a definition 
based on the 1951 and 1969 OAU Conventions. Instead, it only defines a 
refugee as a person belonging to a class of persons to whom a declaration 
has been made by the Minister under section 3 of the Act. The powers of 
RSD are vested in the Minister under section 3 of the Act. A similar procedure 
is adopted in Swaziland under the Swaziland Refugees Control Order of 
1978.606  
 
An analysis from this overview of RSD schemes in Southern Africa shows 
that there are four different RSD models in the region. The first model 
comprises those States where RSD is done by a committee established by or 
under statute and where the UNHCR is only allowed to participate as an 
observer.  These include Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia and Tanzania. The 
second model comprises those States that have a similar model, but the 
involvement of the UNHCR is limited to only being consulted where 
necessary. Thus the UNHCR in this case does not even have an observer 
status in the RSD process as an incident of law. South Africa is a good 
example of this model.  
 
The third model comprises those States that also have a government 
established status determination committee (under statute) but the UNHCR is 
not formally mentioned at all in the legal framework. It might as well be that in 
practice the UNHCR is involved in some form, but this is not a requirement 
under domestic law. These States include Botswana and Zimbabwe. All the 
                                                                                                                                           
representative of the UNHCR. See also Michael S Gallagher, Refugee Status 
Determination in Southern Africa, (2010), 55. 
606
  The definition of a refugee under section 2 of Swaziland’s Refugee Control Order of 
1978 are in pari materia with those under section 2 of Zambia’s Refugee Control Act 
of 1970. Similarly, the Ministerial Powers declared under section 3 of the Swazi Act 
are again in pari materia with those under section 3 of the Zambian Act. 
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States in the above three models have adopted the refugee definitions under 
the 1951 Convention and the 1969 AU Convention. The fourth model 
comprises those States whose refugee legislative frameworks do not 
establish a status determination committee at all, and they also do not have a 
prescribed definition of a refugee. The powers to determine who is a refugee, 
and who should be granted refugee status, vest exclusively in the Minister 
responsible for home affairs (and/or internal security). These are Swaziland 
and Zambia. 
 
In the next Chapter, the thesis examines some of the challenges posed by 
these disparate RSD processes in the region. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
The realisation of socioeconomic rights by refugees is, among other things, 
dependent on host States having a comprehensive and effective legal regime 
that guarantees these rights. In Southern Africa, with the exception of South 
Africa; constitutional frameworks do not provide for a comprehensive set of 
socioeconomic rights guarantees.  In many instances, the guarantee of these 
rights is bifurcated into non-binding principles of State Policy and, to a lesser 
extent, entrenched constitutional rights. In a few other instances, such as 
Botswana and Zimbabwe, the constitutions do not guarantee these rights.  
 
An examination of the various pieces of refugee legislation in Southern Africa 
reveals a number of issues. First is what I call the Malawian paradox. Whilst 
this Chapter shows that Malawi’s Constitution is generally laudable for the 
extent to which it has guaranteed socioeconomic rights in comparison with 
most constitutions in Southern Africa, the country’s refugee legislation has the 
unpleasant credential of being ‘perhaps more notable for what it did not 
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contain than what it provided for.’607 The Refugee Act of 1989 is completely 
silent on the guarantee of rights. This is perhaps because the Act was 
enacted in 1989, before the progressive 1994 Constitution was adopted. 
Secondly, an examination of the respective pieces of refugee legislation 
shows that in a number of cases, the legislation has salvaged an otherwise 
hopeless case for the guarantee of socioeconomic rights for refugees. A 
classic example is Zimbabwe whose constitution is silent on the guarantee of 
socioeconomic rights; but whose Refugee Act of 1983 has incorporated, with 
minor omissions, the full range of rights guaranteed under the 1951 
Convention, that include a significant amount of socioeconomic rights.   
 
Then there is Namibia, that has a Constitution which, although on its face it 
bifurcates the guarantee of socioeconomic rights into non-binding directive 
principles of State policy on the one hand and  binding rights in the bill of 
rights on the other, has a great potential of being read in a way that renders 
the full spectrum of internationally guaranteed socioeconomic rights under the 
ICESCR enforceable in Namibia by reason of its monist approach to 
international law in terms of Article 144 of the Constitution.  
 
Further, where socioeconomic rights have not been expressly guaranteed, 
apart from Lesotho where courts have already considered the point; there 
remains a possibility of drawing inspiration from Indian jurisprudence and 
arguing that socioeconomic rights, including socioeconomic rights for 
refugees, be implied in the right to life that is guaranteed in virtually all the 
constitutions of the Southern African States under study. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
607
  Rutinwa (note 571 above). 
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CHAPTER V 
 
TOWARDS A MORE EFFECTIVE HARMONISED FRAMEWORK 
FOR THE GUARANTEE OF SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS FOR 
REFUGEES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
Thus far, the study has explored and illustrated the nature and extent of the 
refugee problem in Southern Africa. It has also provided a theoretical 
framework, both ethical and legal, within which the guarantee of 
socioeconomic rights for refugees ought to be conceptualised and applied. 
Further, in the last Chapter, the study has explored the extent to which 
socioeconomic rights are guaranteed for refugees in Southern Africa, and the 
processes for refugee status determination. This Chapter proceeds to make 
some recommendations; both normative and institutional, on how a more 
effective regional framework for refugee protection generally, and specifically 
for the guarantee of socioeconomic rights for refugees in Southern Africa, can 
be constructed.  
 
This Chapter advances two main arguments. First, it argues that in order to 
have a coherent and effective refugee protection regime, particularly in 
respect of the guarantee of socioeconomic rights, Southern African States 
should ensure that there is a scheme for burden-sharing of the refugee 
problem. This would help to ensure that no single country in the region is 
disproportionately over-burdened with the problem of refugees, whether by 
accident of geographical location or for other reasons. Secondly, the Chapter 
argues that in order to have such a regime in the region, it is important to 
ensure that the legal arrangements for the protection of refugees in the region 
be harmonised. In this respect, the harmonisation should entail reform of the 
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various domestic legislative frameworks on refugee protection. On the 
international law plane, the study proposes creative utilisation of the existing 
SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, and in that 
connection, the adoption of an operational charter relating to the status and 
treatment of refugees in the SADC region as a regional mechanism for 
addressing refugee rights issues. It also proposes the adoption of model 
legislation on refugee protection. 
 
5.2  Burden sharing 
 
Our resources are very limited and the demands made upon us are very large. 
But I do not believe that dealing with the problems of 3.5 million people [African 
refugees] and giving them a chance to rebuild their dignity and their lives is an 
impossible task for 46 nations and their 350 million inhabitants.–  Julius Nyerere 
(1979) 
 
Perhaps the most contentious issue in devising a harmonised, coordinated 
and integrated regime for the protection of refugees in southern Africa is how 
to address the question of burden-sharing. The issue of burden sharing 
directly relates to the issue of resource constraints, discussed in Chapter I, 
that affect the way that host States treat foreign nationals generally. The 
UNHCR Executive Committee (the EXCOM) has observed that refugee 
problems throughout the world are ‘grave’ and ‘complex’;608 and that they ‘are 
the concern of the international community’ at large.609 The EXCOM has 
further stated that the resolution of refugee problems ‘is dependent on the will 
and capacity of States to respond wholeheartedly, in a spirit of true 
humanitarianism and international solidarity.’610 As discussed in Chapter I, the 
                                                 
608
  UNHCR Executive Committee, Conclusion No 52(XXXIX) – 1988: International 
Solidarity and Refugee Protection, Report of the 39
th
 Session: UN doc.A/AC.96/721, 
para.24. 
609
  Ibid. 
610
  Ibid. 
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refugee problem is an international problem.611 It therefore requires an 
international response which necessarily entails, among other things, refugee 
burden-sharing 
 
5.2.1 Burden sharing and the 1951 Convention 
 
The issue of burden-sharing has not been expressly addressed in the text of 
the 1951 Convention. Although the Convention appropriately points out in its 
Preamble that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on 
certain countries, and that the satisfactory solution of the refugee problem 
cannot be achieved without international co-operation;612the substantive 
provisions of the Convention are silent on how burden-sharing should be 
dealt with in addressing refugee challenges. Daniel Barkley states that this is 
perhaps because ‘[t]he Convention drafters anticipated that the refugee 
problem would be confined to moderately developed countries in Europe that 
could rely on their own resources to handle the refugees.’613 He observes 
however that today, the world is experiencing mass movements of people to 
underdeveloped States in the third world who find it necessary to call on the 
international community for assistance.614  
 
Although the text of the 1951 Convention does not explicitly address the issue 
of burden-sharing, the principle has all the same been widely embraced as an 
appropriate mechanism to ensure that refugee problems, which are 
international in character, equally assume solutions of an international 
character. Some challenges however are manifest in international refugee 
burden-sharing.  One of the key challenges is the lack of willingness among 
States to demographically share the refugee burden. Asha Hans and Astri 
                                                 
611
  See Haddad (note 25 above). 
612
  See 1951 Convention, fourth preambular citation. 
613
  Daniel W. Barkley, ‘Hope for the Hopeless: International Cooperation and the 
Refugee’  21 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 319 1989-1990, 328. 
614
  Ibid. 
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Suhrke have observed, for instance, that in both ‘the UN and regional fora, 
the discussion of principled [burden] sharing with respect to refugees has 
focused on financial aid, rather than redistribution.’615 This practice is 
generally inequitable in light of various competing considerations such as 
spatial, demographic, and financial disparities among States.616  In cases of 
mass influx of refugees for instance, the State that is most disproportionately 
burdened by the refugee crisis is frequently either the neighbouring country or 
the nearest safe country. This has led the EXCOM to stress that situations of 
mass influx of refugees are the responsibility of the international community. 
It has stated that: 
 
States which because of their geographic situation, or otherwise, are faced with 
a large-scale influx should as necessary and at the request of the State 
concerned receive immediate assistance from other States in accordance with 
the principle of equitable burden-sharing.
617
  
 
 The EXCOM has further stated that: 
 
As mass influx may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries; a 
satisfactory solution of a problem, international in scope and nature, cannot be 
achieved without international cooperation.
618
 
 
The EXCOM has, however, also stressed that even in cases of refugee mass 
influx and in the light of severe resource constraints, the obligation on the part 
of States to maintain scrupulous observance of the principle of non-
refoulement, including non-rejection at the frontier, should be upheld.619 
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   A Hans & A Suhrke, ‘Responsibility Sharing’ in JC Hathaway (ed.), Reconceiving 
International Refugee Law, (1997)102. 
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  UNHCR, ‘Sharing the Burden: Capacities and Contributions of Host Countries’ in 
2004 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook (Geneva: UNHCR, 2004) 51-54. 
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  UNHCR EXCOM, Conclusion No. 15 (XXX) – 1979: Refugees Without an Asylum 
Country, Report of the 30
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 Session: UN Doc.A/AC.96/572, para. 72(2). 
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  Ibid, para. IV(1). 
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  UNHCR Executive Committee, Conclusion No.22 ‘Protection of Asylum-Seekers in 
Situations of Large-Scale Influx ‘(1981), para. II(A)(2). 
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Whilst the idea of refugee burden-sharing, broadly conceived, seems to 
receive general international consensus, problems arise when it comes to the 
practical implementation of the burden-sharing principle. Tally Kritzman-Amir 
observes in this regard that:  
 
[t]he disagreement begins when we ask the following questions: Which State will 
be responsible? Whose budget will bear the costs of protecting and assuring the 
socio-economic rights of refugees? And which State must divert resources 
traditionally dedicated to securing the rights of its nationals in order to secure the 
rights of refugees?
620
 
 
Hans and Suhrke state that there are no easy answers to these questions, 
particularly when attempt is made to address them at the international level. 
They argue that the issue of burden-sharing on the international level poses 
greater challenges when compared with burden-sharing at the regional level. 
They observe that most regions around the word have developed 
mechanisms of cooperation on a wide spectrum of issues including economic 
and security issues. They contend that these ‘[e]xisting patterns of regional 
cooperation may be capable of extension to refugee matters.’621  They further 
argue that ‘[t]he sense of commonality which prevails within a region will 
incline States to consider sharing more readily than in a situation where 
refugees come from outside the region.’622 This is an important observation 
and it lends weight to the view, advanced below, that refugee protection in 
Southern Africa would be more effective if a regional grouping such as SADC 
                                                 
620
  Tally Kritzman-Amir, ‘Not in my Backyard: On The Morality of Responsibility Sharing 
in Refugee Law’, 34 Brookings Journal of International Law 355 2008-2009, 357. 
Stressing the general ambivalence of States to engage in refugee burden-sharing, 
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came up with a concerted and harmonised legal and administrative 
mechanism to deal with the issue of refugees. 
 
5.2.2 Burden-sharing obligations under other instruments 
 
Apart from the 1951 Convention, obligations of States in respect of refugee 
burden-sharing can be drawn from several other instruments including the 
1969 OAU Convention, the UN Charter, the ICESCR and the SADC Treaty. 
The 1969 OAU Convention is more explicit and substantive on the issue of 
burden-sharing than the 1951 Convention. Article 2(4) of the 1969 OAU 
Convention provides that: 
 
Where a Member State finds difficulty in continuing to grant asylum to 
refugees, such Member State may appeal directly to other Member States 
and through the [AU], and such other Member States shall in the spirit of 
African solidarity and international co-operation take appropriate measures to 
lighten the burden of the Member State granting asylum. 
 
This provision clearly creates a collective obligation of burden-sharing on 
States parties to the Convention; mandating unburdened or less burdened 
States to ‘lighten the burden’ of heavily burdened host States. Although this is 
so, there are regrettably no formal mechanisms or institutional structures that 
have been set up by the AU to give effect to this important provision. The 
result is that, as George Okoth-Obbo observes, there has been ‘relatively 
poor implementation’ of this provision and, in practice, only a few countries 
have disproportionately borne the burden of hosting refugees in 
Africa.623Thus, as Peter Nobel states, it is essential that ‘legal and 
                                                 
623
  G Okoth-Obbo, ‘Thirty Years On: A Legal Review of the 1969 OAU Refugee 
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa’, (2001) 
Vol.20, No.1 Refugee Survey Quarterly, 79, 93. 
220 
 
administrative machineries for burden-sharing must be constructed and 
implemented.’624 
 
In addition to the 1951 Convention and the 1969 OAU Convention, there are 
also various instruments at international law that can be liberally interpreted 
to encapsulate burden-sharing responsibilities. First, the responsibility for 
refugee burden sharing can be inferred from the Charter of the United 
Nations. One of the purposes of the U.N. under Article 1 of the U.N. Charter 
is ‘[t]o achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of 
an economic, social, cultural and humanitarian character, and in promoting 
and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.’625 
Another purpose of the organization is ‘to be a centre for harmonizing the 
actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.’626 This position is 
reiterated in Article 55(a) of the U.N. Charter that states, among other things, 
that the U.N. shall promote ‘solutions of international economic, social, health 
and related problems.’627  
 
In addition, Article 56 of the U.N. Charter provides that ‘[a]ll members pledge 
themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the 
organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.’ 
These provisions impose humanitarian and human rights (including 
socioeconomic rights) obligations on member States of the U.N. towards the 
international community at large. Since refugee problems are human rights 
issues, the clear position is therefore that the treatment of refugees is a 
matter of international concern that imposes joint and several responsibilities 
and obligations of mutual co-operation and assistance on all member States 
of the UN in resolving them.628   
                                                 
624
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Secondly, for the Southern African countries that are party to the ICESCR, 
burden sharing responsibilities also flow from article 2(1) of the Covenant, 
which requires member States to cooperate with and assist each other in 
order to achieve the full realization of socioeconomic rights. Further, when 
one State in the region is faced with a situation of mass influx, it is submitted 
that the SADC treaty may be interpreted in such a manner as to impose a 
collective responsibility of international cooperation and assistance in respect 
of such a situation. Article 5(1)(i) of the SADC Treaty requires SADC member 
States to, among other things, ‘secure international…co-operation and 
support, and mobilise the inflow of public and private resources into the 
region’ in addressing regional problems. It is submitted that this can be 
properly interpreted to include general regional cooperation and support, and 
the pooling together of necessary resources to give effect to the 
socioeconomic rights of refugees in the region. Thus the UN Charter, the 
ICESCR and the SADC Treaty, among others, can in this regard, be mutually 
reinforcing in respect of the duty of States in imposing obligations for 
international and regional cooperation and mutual assistance including in the 
economic and technical assistance spheres.  
 
5.2.3 Exploring effective ways of refugee burden sharing 
 
Whilst the various international and regional instruments above show that an 
international obligation of refugee burden sharing exists; these instruments do 
not suggest the specific burden-sharing schemes that may be adopted. In this 
section, various avenues of ensuring an effective burden sharing scheme are 
explored.  
 
Firstly, it is important that Southern African States should devise a 
mechanism for the redistribution of refugee populations within the region, 
particularly in cases of mass influx. It has been observed that the international 
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community is more amenable to providing financial and material assistance 
as a way of international burden sharing of the refugee problem, and that 
demographic redistribution is frequently not envisaged as one of the preferred 
and viable burden sharing options.629 Even in cases of mass influx of 
refugees, where some States are disproportionately burdened in comparison 
with others, demographic redistribution is only sparingly explored.630 
 
It is submitted that, considering the principle of equitable burden sharing as 
specifically articulated by the EXCOM and the 1969 OAU Convention, 
demographic redistribution should be one of the preferred solutions, 
particularly in cases of mass influx of refugees. This would help in partly 
addressing concerns about resource constraints and the disproportionate 
heavy burden borne by host States when providing the refugees with the 
necessary socioeconomic assistance and protection. It is axiomatic that 
refugee hosting, especially when there is a mass influx of refugees, takes a 
heavy toll on the economy (which in respect of developing countries is often 
fragile).631 Refugee hosting in cases of mass influx also tends to have a 
negative impact on the environment, and frequently has the potential to 
destabilise the social configuration and values of the host society.  
 
In the SADC region, Article 5(1)(d) of the SADC Treaty calls for ‘collective 
self-reliance, and the interdependence of Member States’ in SADC. It is 
submitted that equitable demographic redistribution of refugee populations, 
particularly in cases of mass influx of refugees, would be an example of 
collective self-reliance and interdependence of SADC member States, in 
terms of Article 5(1)(d).  
 
One might perhaps wonder whether demographic burden-sharing is merely 
an idealistic notion rather than a practical possibility. It is submitted that it is a 
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practical possibility. First, the issue of demographic burden-sharing in respect 
of refugees is not completely alien to southern Africa. Bonaventure Rutinwa 
observes, in this regard, that: 
 
Countries in the sub-region [historically] practised some degree of intra-regional 
burden-sharing. For example, in the 1970s and early 1980s, when Botswana, 
Lesotho and Swaziland came under intense pressure from South Africa for 
hosting South African refugees, they sought and obtained resettlement for these 
refugees in Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Refugees were also offered 
limited opportunities for naturalisation.
632
 
 
Okoth-Obbo observes that during the days of apartheid, even the frontline 
States of Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Zambia had to seek the assistance of 
other countries further-off from South Africa, to help with the burden of 
hosting South African refugees.633 He states that: 
 
It will be recalled that, in the face of destabilization, intimidation, armed 
attacks and sabotage perpetrated by the apartheid regime, a number of the 
Frontline States in effect became unable to provide safe and secure asylum 
for the South African refugees arriving on their territories. However, it was 
possible to provide protection for these refugees principally because several 
countries throughout Africa agreed to receive them, even if they had not 
arrived directly in the latters’ territory.
634
 
 
As a matter of fact, the idea of demographic redistribution of refugees is not 
alien to contemporary international refugee law and refugee protection 
system. The UNHCR, for instance, has an established scheme of refugee 
resettlement through which refugees are moved from ‘a transit or country of 
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first asylum to another or third State.’635 Goodwin-Gill properly summarises 
some of the major objectives of international refugee resettlement. He states 
that: 
 
Resettlement policy aims to achieve a variety of objectives, first and perhaps 
most fundamental being to provide a durable solution for refugees unable to 
return home or to remain in their country of immediate refuge. A further goal is to 
relieve the strain on receiving countries, sometimes in a quantitative way, at 
others in a political way, by assisting them in relations with countries of origin.
636
 
 
He states that successive refugee crises around the world have underlined 
the necessity for States on occasion to go beyond financial assistance and to 
offer resettlement opportunities.637 Thus, it is submitted that the issue of 
demographic redistribution of the refugee population in cases of mass influx 
is a matter that should be specifically addressed in Southern Africa through 
SADC.  
 
The need to create such a mechanism engenders the need for Southern 
African States to have a coordinating institutional mechanism under which the 
burden sharing scheme can be implemented. This coordinating responsibility, 
it is submitted, can properly be read into the mandate of SADC. According to 
the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SPPDSC), 
the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (the SADC 
Organ) is mandated to, among other things, ‘encourage the observance of 
universal human rights as provided for in the Charters and Conventions of the 
[African Union] and United Nations respectively’,638 and further, to ‘enhance 
regional capacity in respect of disaster management and co-ordination of 
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international humanitarian assistance.’639Although refugee protection in some 
cases goes beyond mere humanitarian assistance as shown earlier in this 
thesis; the term ‘humanitarian assistance’ is frequently loosely used to include 
refugee protection, and the framers of the SPPDSC are likely to have 
considered refugee protection matters as falling within the compass of 
humanitarian assistance.  
 
Various options can be weighed in this regard on the nature or character that 
such a coordinating institutional mechanism should take. Wary of creating 
further multiple institutions on the African continent in the area of human 
rights monitoring and enforcement, this study argues against creating a 
completely new institutional mechanism under SADC for this purpose. The 
SADC organ referred to above can be creatively used to address this issue. 
Article 3(1) & (2) of the SPPDSC provides that:  
 
1. The Organ shall be an institution of SADC and shall report to the Summit. 
2. The Organ shall have the following structures: 
a) the Chairperson of the Organ; 
b) the Troika; 
c) a Ministerial Committee; 
d) an Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC); 
e) an Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC); and 
f) such other sub-structures as may be established by any of the ministerial 
committees. 
 
The issue of refugee burden-sharing and coordination can be addressed 
under the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC), which can 
in turn create a sub-structure, under Article 3(2)(f) of the SPPDSC, on the 
‘Movement and Treatment of Refugees in the SADC Region’. Such a sub-
structure can be located within the SADC Secretariat pursuant to Article 9 of 
the SPPDSC.  In this way, decisions on burden sharing in cases of mass 
influx would be taken at the level of the ISPDC, which is a ministerial 
                                                 
639
  Article 2(l) of the Protocol. 
226 
 
committee within SADC, and coordinated and implemented by the proposed 
sub-structure on the ‘Movement and Treatment of Refugees in the SADC 
Region’. In order to operate effectively in its coordination role, the sub-
structure could then have to closely collaborate with the UNHCR Southern 
Africa office so as to utilise the existing skills, institutional competencies and 
capacities of the UNHCR. Inviting the collaboration of the UNHCR in this 
respect would be consistent with international practice.640 
 
In addressing the issue of burden sharing, it is evident from what has been 
discussed earlier, that various complex and polycentric factors would have to 
be taken into account in order to have an effective, fair and efficient system. 
The Organ would have to take into account the fact that various States in 
Southern Africa have varying economic, demographic and spatial capacities 
that inform the extent to which they might be considered over-burdened by a 
refugee influx. As the UNHCR has noted: 
 
The GDP per capita is the most widely used measure of a country’s wealth. 
By comparing the refugee population with the GDP per capita of a country, a 
measure is obtained of the relative burden of providing protection. If the 
number of refugees per 1 USD GDP per capita is high, the burden can be 
considered high although protection and assistance are not only a wealth 
issue. In contrast, if there are few refugees per 1 USD GDP per capita, the 
burden is considered as small.
641
 
 
However, GDP per capita is obviously not the only consideration in the matrix 
of measuring the extent of the refugee burden for each State. As the UNHCR 
further states: 
 
Although less important than GDP per capita, the size of the national 
population nevertheless provides a useful indication of the capacity of 
countries to host refugees. Countries with larger populations can be 
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assumed to absorb refugees more easily than countries with smaller 
populations.
642
 
 
The complexity of taking into account these factors in the burden sharing 
matrix is exemplified by the UNHCR’s observation that: 
 
 It may be argued that the capacity to absorb refugees is higher for larger 
countries, both in terms of national population size and surface area, than for 
smaller ones. While widely available, these parameters have considerable 
limitations. In most countries, refugees are not evenly distributed over the 
national territory, but are often concentrated in border areas or cities. 
Applying nation-wide indicators provide therefore a very simplified picture. 
Similarly, the national surface area does not take into account that large 
areas of a country may not be available for productive use. The GDP - 
although the most widely available and used indicator for development - may 
not adequately take into account the informal economy, which tends to be 
sizeable in developing countries as well as other factors as reflected in the 
United Nations Development Programme’s human development index.
643
 
 
A comprehensive and scientific analysis and exposition of how the ISPDC 
through the proposed sub-structure on the ‘Movement and Treatment of 
Refugees in the SADC Region’ could integrate and synthesise these complex 
matters for purposes of decision-making is outside the scope of this thesis, 
and is perhaps an area that scholars in other areas of social scientific study 
might wish to take up for further research. What the thesis attempts here is 
only to provide a proposal of an appropriate legal framework under SADC 
within which the issue of refugee-burden sharing in the region can operate; 
and the broad outlines of how the proposed sub-structure on the ‘Movement 
and Treatment of Refugees in the SADC Region’ can effectively function. 
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5.2.4 Conclusion 
 
It is submitted that a collective approach to burden-sharing would address 
some of the simmering concerns by States of being overwhelmed by refugee 
flows, especially mass influxes which in turn are likely to take a heavy toll on 
the resources of the host State and are also likely to change the social 
configuration of the existing polity. A collective approach would help in 
reducing the incidences of refugee refoulement by States wary of assuming 
an unbearable refugee burden; and also serve as an appropriate tool for 
educational campaigns aimed at reducing xenophobic attitudes that are 
fanned by, among other things, the belief that refugees present a 
disproportionately heavy burden on particular individual States and not 
others.644 
 
5.3 Harmonisation of refugee protection frameworks in 
Southern Africa 
 
In order for southern African States to carve out a common and effective 
approach for the guarantee and implementation of the human rights of 
refugees, particularly socioeconomic rights; it is of the essence that they have 
a harmonised refugee protection system.  Such a harmonised system should, 
firstly, provide for a common definition of who a refugee is. Secondly, it 
should engender a common scheme for determining refugee status. Thirdly it 
should address the issue of the standards of treatment, i.e determine the 
level at which the socioeconomic rights of refugees should be pitched. Finally, 
it must address the issue of burden-sharing discussed in the previous 
Section. Charles Mwalimu has properly captured the essence of 
harmonisation of refugee protection systems vis-à-vis burden-sharing, stating 
that: 
                                                 
644
  See Barkely (note 17 above) 
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Harmonization would have an immediate impact on refugee burden sharing. 
Costs of hosting refugees would be reduced in each of the countries… A 
synchronized regime of laws would encourage similar and more humane 
treatment of refugees, reflecting similar tenets, rules, and regulations requiring 
consistent practices in all the countries. This, in turn, would attract greater 
regional and international support, encouraging the pooling of resources for 
refugee assistance, assimilation in host countries, citizenship, and integration as 
the ultimate durable solution to the refugee crisis.
645
 
 
Without a common and harmonised approach that addresses these critical 
issues, it would not be feasible, both legally as well as for purposes of policy 
planning and implementation, to have an integrated and effective refugee 
protection system in the region.646 
 
SADC, it is submitted, is an appropriate institution to deal with such 
harmonisation issues through the SADC Organ. This is so because regional 
socioeconomic integration is one of the main objectives of SADC. Article 5(1) 
of the SADC Treaty states that one of the objectives of the organisation is ‘to 
achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and 
programmes’,647 and Article 5(2) provides that in order to achieve the 
objectives listed in Article 5(1), SADC States agree to, among other things, 
‘harmonise political and socio-economic policies and plans of Member 
States.’648 
                                                 
645
  Charles Mwalimu, ‘The Legal Framework on Admission and Resettlement of African 
Refugees with an Emphasis on Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda’, (2004)18 Emory 
International Law Review 455, 477. 
646
  Charles Mwalimu states that refugee legislation in East Africa is disparate, and that 
laws are not harmonised. He observes that recently, Kenya and Uganda have 
embarked on a process of revising their refugee legislation and that efforts at 
harmonisation are being made. He states that: ‘[t]he efforts by Kenya and Uganda in 
their new refugee Bills are an attempt to forge the comity of laws on refugees, which 
is prescriptively more successful in SADC countries.’ – Mwalimu (note 645 above) 
455 2004. It is unclear though how SADC countries are successful in this regard. My 
research, as demonstrated both in this Chapter as well as Chapter IV, clearly shows 
that SADC countries are not any better in this regard. 
647
  Art.5(1)(e) of the SADC Treaty. 
648
  Art.5(2)(a) of the SADC Treaty. 
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5.3.1 Harmonisation of the refugee definition and RSD 
procedures 
 
The Refugee Status Determination (RSD) process is an important gateway 
for the refugee to access various rights, including socioeconomic rights.649 
From the general overview of RSD processes in the region in Chapter IV, it is 
clear that RSD processes in different countries in the sub-region are 
significantly discordant. For instance, the refugee definition adopted is not 
always the same, raising the challenge that definitionally, a person might 
qualify as a refugee in one SADC State, but not in another. The composition 
of the status determination committees is also structurally dissimilar in 
different countries, with the result that the levels of expertise on these 
committees are bound to be significantly different. Indeed, in some countries 
such as Swaziland and Zambia, there is no established committee at all, and 
the powers of RSD are vested in a Minister who does not even have an 
operative legal definition of a refugee from the applicable legislation. These 
differences in turn impact on how RSD is ultimately done in the various 
countries and may result in significant variations of the conception of who, in 
fact and in law, qualifies as a refugee. 
 
In order for southern African States to have a collaborative approach that 
ensures the effective guarantee and implementation of the human rights of 
refugees, particularly socioeconomic rights; it is of the essence that RSD 
processes be harmonized so that the region has a common system of firstly, 
defining who a refugee is and secondly, the structures and processes for 
determining refugee status. Without a common approach in this regard, it 
would not be feasible both legally as well as for purposes of policy and 
planning, to have an integrated and effective system for the guarantee of 
socioeconomic rights for refugees.650  
                                                 
649
   Haddad (note 6 above) 
650
  Mwalimu (note 645 above) 455. 
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In this regard it is recommended that the best approach would be for States in 
the region to uniformly adopt the definition under the OAU 1969 Convention 
that includes and expands on the definition of a refugee under the 1951 
Convention. Thus, Swaziland and Zambia in particular, that do not reflect any 
of the definitions of a refugee at international law in their domestic legislation, 
ought to revise their refugee legislation in order to incorporate this definition. 
Secondly, these two countries also need to ensure that their legislative 
frameworks establish competent and independent committees to be 
responsible for RSD. This would help to eliminate elements of arbitrariness in 
status determination that would in turn adversely affect the guarantee of 
fundamental human rights for refugees.  
 
 Another important issue to observe is the critical role played by the UNHCR 
in addressing refugee issues in all the countries under study. Under the 1951 
Convention and 1967 Protocol, contracting States have undertaken to 
cooperate with the ‘UNHCR in the exercise of its functions and, in particular, 
to facilitate its specific duty of supervising the application of the provisions of 
these instruments.’651 Indeed, the Convention itself recognizes that: ‘the 
effective co-ordination of measures taken to deal with this [refugee] problem 
will depend upon the co-operation of States with the High Commissioner.’652 
Further, considering the increasing recognition of the importance of the 
Convention and the Protocol in the establishment of minimum standards for 
the treatment of refugees, it is of paramount importance that the UNHCR be 
actively involved in RSD processes, even in cases where (as is the case in 
most countries) the responsibility of conducting RSD lies with the host 
Government rather than the UNHCR itself.  
 
                                                 
651
  Arts 35 of the 1951 Convention. See also UNGA, Resolution 2198 (XXI): Introductory 
note by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
652
  Last Preambular citation to the 1951 Convention. 
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Involving the UNHCR in these processes would not amount to a violation of 
state sovereignty. By contrast, in view of the obligation to co-operate with the 
UNHCR in the implementation of the Convention, the inclusion of a UNHCR 
representative as a substantive member of a status determination committee 
in the host States would be consistent with their existing and voluntarily 
assumed obligations under international law. Practically, it is submitted that 
the inclusion of a UNHCR representative on such RSD committees would be 
important as he or she would bring the necessary refugee law, human rights 
and humanitarian law expertise necessary for the advancement of refugee 
rights, and especially so in the highly contested space of socioeconomic 
rights guarantees.  Indeed, as the UN itself has stated, UN member ‘States 
and the UNHCR are joined in the common pursuit of solutions for refugee 
problems and the international protection of the fundamental human rights of 
refugees’.653 This therefore underscores the importance of ensuring a more 
prominent role for the UNHCR is scheming solutions for refugee problems in 
various countries. The involvement of a UNHCR representatives in the RSD 
processes would also help in ensuring uniform application of the refugee 
definition and the Convention generally in the region. However, although the 
UNHCR is central in international refugee protection, none of the countries 
explored in this study has included the UNHCR representative as a 
substantive member of the status determination committee.  
 
Thus it is recommended that under the harmonized approach, all Southern 
African States should ensure that the UNHCR’s role is not relegated to mere 
observer status or less; but rather, it should be accorded substantive 
membership to their respective status determination committees. Their 
inclusion is necessary by reason of not only the experience and expertise 
they bring, but also to assist in the goal of ensuring the harmonised treatment 
of refugees in the region. 
                                                 
653
  UNHCR Executive Committee, Conclusion No 52(XXXIX) – 1988: International 
Solidarity and Refugee Protection, Report of the 39
th
 Session: UN doc.A/AC.96/721, 
para.24. 
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With a harmonised RSD regime in southern Africa, it should follow that once 
a person has been declared a refugee in one SADC State, he or she should 
be recognised as a refugee in all other member States. Thus there should be 
no need for the person to undergo another assessment and determination 
process should he or she move from one SADC State to another. What 
should matter, as this study further argues below, is firstly, the standard of 
treatment that a refugee should receive if he or she decides to move from one 
safe country to another within the sub-region. Secondly, the right of 
admission into another safe country can also be constrained by general 
immigration laws. 
 
5.3.2 A proposed scheme for the SADC sub-structure on the 
Movement and Treatment of Refugees  
 
In order to effect a harmonized and integrated scheme for the protection of 
refugees, this study further proposes that the sub-structure on the ‘Movement 
and Treatment of Refugees in the SADC Region’ should have an operational 
Charter on the Movement and Treatment of Refugees in the SADC Region 
(the Charter) that should guide its operations. This section sketches the major 
highlights of the protection scheme to be adopted under the proposed 
Charter. 
 
First, the Charter needs to draw a clear definitional distinction between 
humanitarian refugees and political refugees. It should then adopt a scheme 
that ensures that once a person has been determined to be a political refugee 
in one SADC State, he or she should be entitled to enjoy the most favourable 
treatment accorded to a foreign national, as a general standard of treatment, 
only in the host State. In all other States, such a refugee should receive 
treatment on the level of parity with other foreign nationals in the host country 
generally. However, if a political refugee has been resettled to a third State 
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within SADC, again the most favourable treatment standard should be 
guaranteed only in the State of resettlement. In all other SADC States, the 
refugee should be entitled only to treatment at parity with other aliens 
generally, complete with the necessary immigration entry, residence, work 
and other requirements.  
 
Such a scheme would have a deterrent effect on refugees who keep moving 
around from a safe country of first asylum to other States, not necessarily in 
pursuit of further surrogate protection from persecution in the State of origin; 
but generally in pursuit of better economic opportunities. It is submitted that 
once a political refugee finds himself or herself in a safe host State that is 
able and willing to provide effective protection from persecution, the refugee 
should only be entitled to special treatment in that State.  
 
In terms of the range of substantive guarantees of socioeconomic rights, the 
recommendations for better schemes for their guarantee, made in Chapters 
III and IV above, should be adopted. Any further movement  of such a political 
refugee to third States should, logically, either render him or her as an 
ordinary voluntary immigrant who is merely in search of better economic 
opportunities; or as a humanitarian refugee who moves on to a third safe 
State not because the country of first asylum is unwilling to offer protection (in 
the sense of the Rawlsian outlaw State), but because such State lacks the 
resources to provide the basic minimum essentials of life requisite for a 
person to have the basic capabilities to live a life of dignity. In either case, as 
demonstrated earlier in this study, there would be justification for lowering the 
standard of treatment at first instance, and only to heighten the same based 
on objective factors such as the level of attachment to the host State 
(measured in terms of the degree of permanence of stay). 
 
Practically, in the context of Southern Africa, such an approach would help 
limit the extent to which refugees pass through various ‘transit’ safe States in 
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order to come to South Africa where they essentially seek better economic 
opportunities.  The disproportionate number of refugees who transit through 
various safe States in order to come and seek asylum in South Africa 
essentially owes to the fact that (a) South Africa has a bigger and stronger 
economy and hence providing more economic opportunities for the refugees; 
and (b) the fact that South Africa’s refugee legal regime is more generous in 
terms of socioeconomic rights. If the scheme for the guarantee of 
socioeconomic rights in the region is harmonised; and also if the approach of 
according the most favourable treatment standard only in the first safe 
country within SADC is adopted, it is likely that a number of refugees might 
prefer to stick to a country where they are offered treatment that is as close 
as possible to national treatment; instead of coming to South Africa and be 
subjected to the stringent requirements that other foreign nationals generally 
have to satisfy.  
 
In terms of this scheme, South Africa would then have to closely work with 
other SADC States, under the aegis of the proposed sub-structure on the 
‘Movement and Treatment of Refugees in the SADC Region’, to determine 
the extent to which refugees in other burdened Southern African States can 
be resettled to South Africa. 
 
For such a system to effectively work, it would also be essential for SADC to 
have an integrated system of RSD that would ensure that information on 
decisions taken is shared among authorities in member States in real time. 
With such a system, it would be possible to bar refugees from making 
multiple asylum applications in various safe States within the sub-region as 
they essentially seek better economic opportunities. An integrated system of 
this nature is within the technological capacity of SADC States.654  
                                                 
654
  SADC States already have a common database on Driving Licences in terms of 
Article 6.10 of the SADC Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology of 
1996. Under that scheme, traffic authorities in any member State are able to 
electronically verify the authenticity of a Driving Licence issued within SADC.  
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With regard to humanitarian refugees, the Charter should be explicit that 
these will initially be offered temporary protection. Temporary protection 
would entail ensuring that the refugee receives treatment that meets the basic 
minimum essentials of life requisite for a person to have the basic capabilities 
to live a life of dignity; but generally treat such person as any other foreign 
national in the host State generally. Within the scheme of standards of 
treatment under the 1951 Convention, this would entail ‘treatment as 
favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that 
accorded to aliens generally.’ Under this scenario, non-deportation should 
only be generally guaranteed in first country of refuge; or if the refugee is 
resettled to a third State, only in country of resettlement. Where such a 
refugee irregularly moves into a third safe State, they may be deported to 
their initial State of first refuge or resettlement as the case may be. In any 
event, non-refoulement to the State of origin, whilst the threat causing flight 
still subsists, should be adhered to by any host State at all times. The Charter 
should also have a properly developed system of burden-sharing, including 
demographic burden-sharing as discussed earlier in the Chapter.  
 
5.4 Reshaping the legislative framework from a control to a 
rights-based approach: proposal for a model legislation 
 
The survey of the various legislative regimes on the treatment of refugees in 
Chapter IV has revealed that most of the refugee regimes in SADC are in the 
category of ‘control’ rather than ‘protection’ frameworks.655 The relevant 
pieces of refugee legislation in those countries focus of the various measures 
to be adopted in controlling the movement and economic activities of 
refugees, rather than addressing the various rights, particularly 
socioeconomic rights, that they ought to be entitled to in order to live lives of 
                                                 
655
  See Rutinwa (note 571 above) 
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dignity. In several cases, such as Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland and 
Zambia, the titles of the pieces of legislation themselves make it clear that 
they were designed for purposes of recognition and control. Yet others, even 
though their titles made no reference to the issue of control, were essentially 
control centred in their conceptualisation. A good example is the Malawian 
Refugee Act of 1989.656  
 
Some of these control oriented pieces of legislation had, and still have, 
draconian provisions such as those authorizing confiscation of refugee 
property such as livestock, and vehicles without compensation and without 
due process.657They also permit the restriction of movement of refugees in 
the host country.658In addition, they do not address the issue of durable 
solutions for the refugee problem.659 The refugee control approach is 
obviously not a human rights-oriented protection approach. Instead of being 
premised on the idea of substitute protection for the refugee, meant to restore 
the refugee’s right to have rights (in the case of political refugees); it proceeds 
from the premise of ‘otherness’ and primarily seeks to ensure that the lives of 
refugees, irrespective of the cause or circumstances of flight, are restricted 
                                                 
656
  Rutinwa, (note 571 above). It is significant to note however, that a Draft Refugees 
Amendment Bill (2011) as well as a Draft Refugee Policy (2011) has been prepared 
by the Minister Responsible for Refugees in Malawi. Both, if passed, will represent a 
significant paradigm shift from the essentially refugee control approach to a refugee 
protection approach. In summary, they propose an incorporation of the refugee rights 
provided for under ‘Refugee Conventions’ (principally, the 1951 Convention).   
657
  Mwalimu (note 645 above) 464. See also Rutinwa (note 608 above) The provisions 
are s 8 of the Tanzanian Refugee Control Act of 1966 and the identical s 9 in the 
Swazi and Zambian Acts. 
658
  Rutinwa (note 610 above); also see Ss 9 of the Botswana Act and the identical s 12 
in the Swazi, Tanzanian and Zambian Acts. In Malawi, whilst the Refugee Act is 
silent on the issue of freedom of movement for refugees; as pointed out in Chapter 
III, the country entered a reservation upon ratification of the 1951 Convention where 
it stated that ‘‘In respect of article 26, the Government of the Republic of Malawi 
reserves its right to designate the place or places of residence of the refugees and to 
restrict their movements whenever considerations of national security or public order 
so require.’ Whilst this formulation does not appear to have been a complete 
abrogation of the right; and left open the possibility of a more generous interpretation 
in view of section 39 of the 1994 Constitution that guarantees freedom of movement 
for every person, the High Court in the Nsabimana case, as Chapter IV shows, 
essentially affirmed the generalised restriction of refugee movements and the 
encampment policy. – Nsabimana Case (note 583 above) 
659
  Rutinwa (note 571 above) 
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within narrowly circumscribed parameters, particularly in the area of economic 
rights.  
 
The legal frameworks of other southern African States however, have 
assumed a more protection oriented approach. These include Lesotho, 
Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. In the case of South Africa, 
socioeconomic rights of refugees are comprehensively guaranteed under the 
Refugees Act as read with the bill of rights in the Constitution. The guarantee 
of such rights is premised on domestic law. In the other cases, the refugee 
legislation basically incorporates the protection guarantees under the 1951 
Convention. As Chapter IV demonstrates, on the whole, the South African 
legal framework seems to provide the best guarantees in the region, 
notwithstanding some not so encouraging judicial pronouncements from 
superior courts. 
 
In view of the foregoing discussion, it is submitted that in addition to the 
proposed Charter on the Movement and Treatment of Refugees in the SADC 
Region, to ensure a harmonised protection system, it would also be 
appropriate for SADC to adopt ‘Model Legislation on Refugees’ in order to 
provide a standard legal framework to be used as a benchmark for the review 
and reform of national legislation relating to refugees in the region, in 
conformity with international human rights standards.660 The model legislation 
should be strongly refugee protection oriented, in view of the vulnerability of 
refugees; whilst at the same time addressing essential national interest 
matters such as national security and public order. Such model legislation 
should address important matters of principle highlighted above in respect of 
the proposed Charter. Among other things, the Model legislation should draw 
a clear distinction between political refugees and humanitarian refugees, with 
                                                 
660
  This Model legislation would follow the ‘Model Law on HIV in Southern Africa’ that 
was adopted by the SADC Parliamentary Forum in November 2008. See S Ebobrah 
& A Tanoh (eds.) Compendium of African Sub-regional Human Rights Documents 
(2010) 465.  
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the appropriate standards of treatment for these two categories appropriately 
split, as discussed in Chapter II. 
 
The model legislation should also ensure that local integration through the 
naturalisation of refugees is not made practically impossible as is the case 
with several countries in the region at present. As shown in Chapter I, this 
causes enormous hardships to refugees who have stayed in the host country 
for long periods, and sometimes it negatively affects generations of refugees. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
There is little, if any debate at all, on the general justifiability, and indeed 
necessity, of protecting refugees – people in flight from danger or harm in 
their home countries – by offering them safe refuge. However, that seems, 
unfortunately, to be where this global consensus stops. Further issues need 
to be explored and addressed if effective refugee protection is to be a reality 
in the contemporary world. Some of the critical issues are (a) the standard of 
protection (in terms of legal guarantees) that refugees should receive and the 
basis for such standard;  (b) Whose obligation it is to provide international 
refugee protection;  (c) Whether refugee protection should be approached 
individually by each State, or whether it calls for a more concerted and 
collaborative approach among States; and (d) If a concerted and collaborative 
approach is to be adopted as a requirement of international law; what  the 
appropriate scheme of burden-sharing should be. 
 
 It has been demonstrated in this work that these are complex matters and 
there are no easy ways of dealing with them. As Goodwin-Gill observes in 
this regard, ‘[n]o one doubts that the protection of refugees must take place in 
a political world, and no one should underestimate the pressures – moral, 
financial [and] circumstantial’ that the refugee problem imposes.661 He states 
that ‘[d]ecisions on matters of principle are never easy, but at least one can 
expect that those principles should be known, and that rational justification be 
given.’662 This thesis has confronted these questions, proposing a principled 
but pragmatic way of ensuring the effective guarantee of socioeconomic 
rights for refugees in Southern Africa. 
                                                 
661
  GS Goodwin-Gill, ‘Challenges to Protection’  (2001) Vol. 35, No. 1, International 
Migration Review, 130-142, 135. 
662
  Ibid, 136. 
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Conceptually, prior to engaging any of the above questions, one needs to 
define the contours of refugeehood by adopting a proper definition. In this 
regard, this study has shown that the meaning of a refugee, as provided for 
under the 1969 OAU Convention, is sufficiently pragmatic and progressive to 
provide a good definitional benchmark for purposes of harmonization in the 
SADC region. The definition under the 1969 Convention encompasses the 
other definitions adopted under other regimes, such as the 1951 
Convention.663 The thesis has advocated for a bifurcated definition of 
refugeehood that distinguishes political refugees from humanitarian refugees, 
and this distinction is encapsulated under the 1969 OAU Convention 
definition. Further, the thesis demonstrates, that not only does the 1969 OAU 
Convention create space for the group (prima facie) determination of refugee 
status; but also that through a purposive interpretation, it would suffice to 
grant refugee status to people who are faced with grave deprivations of 
socioeconomic rights in their home countries.664In the premises, this definition 
is an appropriate benchmark that should be adopted both in the Charter on 
the Movement and Treatment of Refugees in the SADC Region and the 
Model Law on Refugees in SADC that this study recommends. 
 
A more complex issue however, relates to whether there is a rational basis for 
treating refugees preferentially over other foreign nationals in host States 
when it comes to the enjoyment of socioeconomic rights. The question is 
rather complex because State sovereignty is a central principle in 
contemporary international law,665 and this principle, among other things, 
entails that States have the sovereign prerogative to determine who enters 
their territories and when they enter, the extent to which they are to be 
guaranteed the enjoyment of certain rights.666 These arguments are in turn 
                                                 
663
  Art I(1) 
664
  Chapter I, page 80. 
665
  As Goodwin-Gill observes, in refugee discourse, ‘“Sovereign States” are still key 
actors in flight and solution.’ –  GS Goodwin-Gill, ‘Challenges to Protection’  (2001) 
Vol. 35, No. 1, International Migration Review, 130-142; 133 
666
  Benhabib (note 213 above) 6; Dauvergne (note 224 above) 595.  
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premised on communitarian, pragmatic and social justice considerations. In a 
real world with practical borders between States; they are arguments that 
cannot just be wished away.  
 
From such analysis, an argument has been constructed in this study that 
differential treatment between citizens and foreign nationals generally is 
justified.667 This is based on communitarian considerations; and also what I 
call, ‘principled pragmatism’ as informed by Max Weber’s ethics of principled 
conviction and responsibility.668 The study argues however that such 
differential treatment must be tempered by universal notions of human rights 
that are premised on the recognition that humans have human rights that are 
universal, based on their inherent dignity; and that wherever they may be, it 
behoves the authorities in control of such territories to ensure that every 
human being is guaranteed minimum core socioeconomic entitlements, as of 
right, in order for them to lead a minimally decent and dignified lives.669  
 
Whilst such an approach is perhaps sufficient in respect of the treatment of 
foreign nationals generally; it might leave refugees in an adverse situation if 
they were to be treated on the basis of parity with all other foreign nationals 
generally. At the same time, the study recognises that there are many causes 
of forced migration that ground refugeehood. These include instances where 
refugees flee due to political reasons – classically instances where the State 
persecutes or acquiesces in their persecution, thereby repudiating its duty of 
protection towards them; and also where such persecution is non-existent but 
there are pressing humanitarian factors that lead to flight. In the premises, a 
distinction is again drawn between political and humanitarian refugees. 
 
                                                 
667
  See Chapter II, pages 48-69. 
668
  Weber (note 234 above) 359-369. 
669
  Nussbaum (note 216 above) 274. 
243 
 
In the case of political refugees, refugees are denied what Hannah Arendt 
refers to as the right to have rights.670 Based on the value of human dignity; 
and in order to restore their right to have rights; refugees are entitled to 
surrogate international protection.671 Surrogate protection entails ‘substitute’ 
protection,672 and it must therefore seek to bring the refugees as closely as 
possible to national treatment; and the study argues that the appropriate 
general standard for political refugees is the most favourable treatment 
accorded to a foreign national generally in the host country.673 Whilst some 
rights can be guaranteed exclusively to citizens, such as political participation 
rights such as the right to vote, on the grounds enumerated in Chapter II 
above; this standard generally entitles refugees, on the basis of the principle 
of surrogacy, to socioeconomic rights on a footing that is as close as possible 
to that of nationals in order for them to lead a fulsome and dignified life in the 
host State.674 
 
In respect of humanitarian refugees, the study argues that since membership 
to the political community of their State of origin is not repudiated; a number 
of protective options are available to the international community. These 
include in-country measures where possible; and if this is not practicable; 
they can be offered temporary protection in another safe State. A political 
decision according such refugees immediate political membership to the host 
State is therefore not apposite. The appropriate standard is to accord them 
treatment that is as favourable as possible, but in any event not lesser than 
treatment that is accorded to other foreign nationals in the country generally. 
 
An analysis of the legal frameworks in various Southern African countries 
demonstrates that most States have adopted either the 1951 protection 
framework; which entails the fourfold test described above; or they have 
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  Arendt (note 278 above) 
671
  Ibid. 
672
  A v Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 142 ALR 331  
673
  Türk (note 17 above) at n.41. 
674
  Okoth-Obbo (note 308 above) 47. 
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adopted the standard of the same treatment as accords to other foreign 
nationals generally. In the case of political refugees, it is submitted that both 
of these approaches are unduly restrictive in the light of the principle of 
surrogacy as the conceptual basis for refugehood. It is submitted, for 
instance, that instead of adopting the standard that accords refugees the 
same treatment as any other foreign nationals generally,675an approach more 
consistent with the theoretical basis for political refugeehood would guarantee 
them the most favourable treatment accorded to foreign nationals in the host 
State as the general (default) standard of treatment.  
 
Further, most of the States in Southern Africa have expressly adopted a 
control approach in the protection of refugees which focuses on controlling 
the movement and stay of refugees, rather than a protection approach that 
focuses on restoring the dignity of refugees and enabling them to lead a 
fulsome life. It is submitted that the control approach is unsatisfactory. This 
thesis recommends that the legal regimes for refugee protection in Southern 
Africa must be reformed so that they assume a rights-based protection 
approach instead. In this respect, they should adopt the most favourable 
treatment accorded to other foreign nationals as the general standard of 
treatment.  
 
However, simply guaranteeing refugees the most favourable treatment 
accorded to other foreign nationals in respect of their socioeconomic rights 
would be an exercise in futility in the absence of effective guarantees of 
socioeconomic rights in the respective States. In this regard, it has been 
observed that with the exception of South Africa, and to a slightly lesser 
extent Malawi and Namibia; socioeconomic rights generally are not effectively 
guaranteed in the sub-region. In most cases, they are provided as non-
binding directive principles of State policy, and in a few cases, the 
constitutions are effectively silent on the guarantee of these rights. Thus it is 
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submitted that constitutional frameworks in the region ought to be reformed in 
order to guarantee comprehensive catalogues of these rights.  
 
Further however, mindful of the fact that such reforms might only effectuate in 
the medium to long term; there is need for more robust, vigilant and bold 
judiciaries that are prepared to innovatively interpret other rights, such as the 
rights to life and human dignity that are guaranteed in all the constitutions 
explored; and imply in these rights the full range of socioeconomic rights as 
Indian courts have done. Whilst it is regrettable that in Lesotho the High Court 
lost an opportunity by refusing to adopt the Indian innovative approach, it is 
submitted that even in that country there is still hope for a different conclusion 
because the matter has not yet been considered by Lesotho’s highest court. 
In addition to advocating for more progressive development of socioeconomic 
rights jurisprudence by judicaries; the Charter on the Movement and 
Treatment of Refugees in the SADC Region and the Model Law on Refugees 
in SADC proposed in this thesis should also provide for a comprehensive set 
of substantive socioeconomic rights guarantees for refugees in Southern 
Africa. 
 
Whilst all States have obligations to ensure the protection of refugees; it is 
also a fact that States have a number of constraints when it comes to 
guaranteeing socioeconomic rights. These include spatial as well as 
economic constraints.  Large numbers of refugees might strain the available 
resources in a particular State, to the extent that the hosting of refugees, 
especially good quality hosting which entails providing refugees with 
comprehensive soscioeconomic rights entitlements, might breed resentment 
and xenophobia from the host communities.676 This study has demonstrated 
that the refugee problem is an international problem that is, and should be, 
the responsibility of the international community as a whole.  
 
                                                 
676
  Türk & Nicholson (note 17 above)  
246 
 
Notwithstanding this, a lacuna in the international refugee instruments is the 
lack of an unequivocal provision that addresses the issue of international 
burden-sharing.677 The present framework of international refugee law, as 
Hathaway and Neve succinctly point out, is such that:  
 
neither the actual duty to admit refugees nor the real costs associated 
with their [refugees] arrival are fairly apportioned among governments. 
There is a keen awareness that the States in which refugees arrive 
presently bear sole legal responsibility for what often amounts to 
indefinite protection.
678
 
 
On this basis, it is submitted that a legal scheme of refugee burden-sharing 
needs to be developed in Southern Africa, under the aegis of SADC. Such a 
scheme needs to address both instances where States are confronted with a 
mass influx of refugees on the one hand; and where they are faced with 
lesser refugee movements. The need for burden-sharing is heightened in the 
case of refugee mass influx, and the proposed regime should address such 
an issue. Chapter V has made prescriptive recommendations in terms of the 
precise contours that such a scheme should provide.  A shared scheme for 
the protection of refugees would ease the asymmetrical socioeconomic 
burden of the refugee problem on some States in comparison with others. 
This is because such a scheme would include the pooling together of 
resources as well as, in appropriate cases, refugee resettlement within the 
region. This would in turn, it is hoped, also help in stemming the tide of anti-
refugee sentiment that gets generally hyped up by perceptions that large 
numbers of refugees cause a heavy strain on host State’s limited resources; 
to the disadvantage of citizens; and that this becomes unfair when the 
refugee population gets concentrated in one host State without the support of 
others. 
                                                 
677
  Barkley (note 17 above) 328. 
678
  JC Hathaway & RA Neve, ‘Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A 
Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection’, (1997) 10 Harvard 
Human Rights Law Journal 115. 
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The study acknowledges that the burden sharing scheme would involve 
complex and polycentric considerations including the sizes of the various 
economies, the GDP levels and GDP per capita in such States, the 
population sizes of the host States as well as the spatial capacities of host 
States, among other things. A comprehensive and scientific analysis of the 
how SADC will synthesise these factors together in order to carve out a fair 
burden sharing scheme is beyond the scope of this thesis, and it is strongly 
recommended that this be explored by other scholars in the social sciences.  
 
The study further proposes that it is imperative to design a harmonised 
regime in order to eliminate differences that provide room for different 
standards of protection in different Southern African countries. Areas of 
critical importance that require harmonisation include the definition of a 
refugee; status determination; the substantive socioeconomic rights 
guaranteed and their scope; and the standard of treatment of refugees. It is 
further proposed that a salient avenue for achieving such harmonisation at 
the level of domestic legislation is to adopt a Model Law on Refugees in 
SADC, akin to the Model Legislation on HIV/AIDS Law previously adopted by 
SADC, along which SADC legislatures would pattern their country-specific 
pieces of legislation on the subject.  
 
The study recognises that the various other recommendations made in the 
study for regional (SADC) law to address issues of refugee burden-sharing, 
and harmonisation of legal protection schemes aimed to achieve greater 
congruence in the treatment of refugees in terms of their socioeconomic 
rights guarantees in the region; are significantly far-reaching. For this reason, 
they might take longer and might meet more political obstacles to their 
implementation than the adoption of the Model legislation, which already has 
a precedent within SADC. Thus the adoption of this model legislation ought to 
be the first practical step adopted by SADC along the path of eventually 
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constructing an ideal regionally harmonised and effective refugee protection 
scheme as proposed by this thesis. It is submitted that this is a realistic 
pathway towards achieving a more effective and harmonized scheme for the 
guarantee of socioeconomic rights for refugees in the region. 
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ANNEXURE I 
 
CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, 
189 U.N.T.S. 150, ENTERED INTO FORCE APRIL 22, 1954 
 
PREAMBLE 
The High Contracting Parties, 
Considering that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights approved on 10 December 1948 by the General 
Assembly have affirmed the principle that human beings shall enjoy 
fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination, 
Considering that the United Nations has, on various occasions, manifested its 
profound concern for refugees and endeavoured to assure refugees the 
widest possible exercise of these fundamental rights and freedoms, 
Considering that it is desirable to revise and consolidate previous 
international agreements relating to the status of refugees and to extend the 
scope of and the protection accorded by such instruments by means of a new 
agreement, 
Considering that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on 
certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the 
United Nations has recognized the international- scope and nature cannot 
therefore be achieved without international co-operation, 
Expressing the wish that all States, recognizing the social and humanitarian 
nature of the problem of refugees, will do everything within their power to 
prevent this problem from becoming a cause of tension between States, 
Noting that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is charged 
with the task of supervising international conventions providing for the 
protection of refugees, and recognizing that the effective co-ordination of 
measures taken to deal with this problem will depend upon the co-operation 
of States with the High Commissioner, 
Have agreed as follows: 
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CHAPTER I 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Article 1. - Definition of the term "refugee" 
A. For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "refugee,, shall apply 
to any person who: 
(1) Has been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12 May 1926 
and 30 June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 
February 1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939 or the Constitution of the 
International Refugee Organization; 
Decisions of non-eligibility taken by the International Refugee Organization 
during the period of its activities shall not prevent the status of refugee being 
accorded to persons who fulfil the conditions of paragraph 2 of this section; 
(2) As a result of events occurring before I January 1951 and owing to well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality 
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of 
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 
In the case of a person who has more than one nationality, the term "the 
country of his nationality" shall mean each of the countries of which he is a 
national, and a person shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the 
country of his nationality if, without any valid reason based on well-founded 
fear, he has not availed himself of the protection of one of the countries of 
which he is a national. 
B. (1) For the purposes of this Convention, the words "events occurring 
before I January 1951" in article 1, section A, shall be understood to mean 
either (a) "events occurring in Europe before I January 1951"; or (b) "events 
occurring in Europe or elsewhere before I January 1951"; and each 
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Contracting State shall make a declaration at the time of signature, ratification 
or accession, specifying which of these meanings it applies for the purpose of 
its obligations under this Convention. 
(2) Any Contracting State which has adopted alternative (a) may at any time 
extend its obligations by adopting alternative (b) by means of a notification 
addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
C. This Convention shall cease to apply to any person falling under the terms 
of section A if: 
(1) He has voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country of his 
nationality; or 
(2) Having lost his nationality, he has voluntarily reacquired it; or 
(3) He has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the 
country of his new nationality; or 
(4) He has voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or 
outside which he remained owing to fear of persecution; or 
(5) He can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he 
has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to 
avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality; 
Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under section 
A (I) of this article who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of 
previous persecution for refusing to avail himself of the protection of the 
country of nationality; 
(6) Being a person who has no nationality he is, because the circumstances 
in connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased 
to exist, able to return to the country of his former habitual residence; 
Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under section 
A (I) of this article who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of 
previous persecution for refusing to return to the country of his former 
habitual residence. 
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D. This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving 
from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance. 
When such protection or assistance has ceased for any reason, without the 
position of such persons being definitively settled in accordance with the 
relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, 
these persons shall ipso facto be entitled to the benefits of this Convention. 
E. This Convention shall not apply to a person who is recognized by the 
competent authorities of the country in which he has taken residence as 
having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of the 
nationality of that country. 
F. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with 
respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that: 
(a) He has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against 
humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make 
provision in respect of such crimes; 
(b) He has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of 
refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee; 
(c) He has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations. 
Article 2. - General obligations 
Every refugee has duties to the country in which he finds himself, which 
require in particular that he conform to its laws and regulations as well as to 
measures taken for the maintenance of public order. 
Article 3. - Non-discrimination 
The Contracting States shall apply the provisions of this Convention to 
refugees without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin. 
Article 4. - Religion 
The Contracting States shall accord to refugees within their territories 
treatment at least as favourable as that accorded to their nationals with 
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respect to freedom to practise their religion and freedom as regards the 
religious education of their children. 
Article 5. - Rights granted apart from this Convention 
Nothing in this Convention shall be deemed to impair any rights and benefits 
granted by a Contracting State to refugees apart from this Convention. 
Article 6. - The term "in the same circumstances" 
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "in the same circumstances" 
implies that any requirements (including requirements as to length and 
conditions of sojourn or residence) which the particular individual would have 
to fulfil for the enjoyment of the right in question, if he were not a refugee, 
must be fulfilled by him, with the exception of requirements which by their 
nature a refugee is incapable of fulfilling. 
Article 7. - Exemption from reciprocity 
1. Except where this Convention contains more favourable provisions, a 
Contracting State shall accord to refugees the same treatment as is accorded 
to aliens generally. 
2. After a period of three years' residence, all refugees shall enjoy exemption 
from legislative reciprocity in the territory of the Contracting States. 
3. Each Contracting State shall continue to accord to refugees the rights and 
benefits to which they were already entitled, in the absence of reciprocity, at 
the date of entry into force of this Convention for that State. 
4. The Contracting States shall consider favourably the possibility of 
according to refugees, in the absence of reciprocity, rights and benefits 
beyond those to which they are entitled according to paragraphs 2 and 3, and 
to extending exemption from reciprocity to refugees who do not fulfil the 
conditions provided for in paragraphs 2 and 3. 
5. The provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 apply both to the rights and benefits 
referred to in articles 13, 18, 19, 21 and 22 of this Convention and to rights 
and benefits for which this Convention does not provide. 
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Article 8. - Exemption from exceptional measures 
With regard to exceptional measures which may be taken against the person, 
property or interests of nationals of a foreign State, the Contracting States 
shall not apply such measures to a refugee who is formally a national of the 
said State solely on account of such nationality. Contracting States which, 
under their legislation, are prevented from applying the general principle 
expressed in this article, shall, in appropriate cases, grant exemptions in 
favour of such refugees. 
Article 9. - Provisional measures 
Nothing in this Convention shall prevent a Contracting State, in time of war or 
other grave and exceptional circumstances, from taking provisionally 
measures which it considers to be essential to the national security in the 
case of a particular person, pending a determination by the Contracting State 
that that person is in fact a refugee and that the continuance of such 
measures is necessary in his case in the interests of national security. 
Article 10. - Continuity of residence 
1. Where a refugee has been forcibly displaced during the Second World War 
and removed to the territory of a Contracting State, and is resident there, the 
period of such enforced sojourn shall be considered to have been lawful 
residence within that territory. 
2. Where a refugee has been forcibly displaced during the Second World War 
from the territory of a Contracting State and has, prior to the date of entry into 
force of this Convention, returned there for the purpose of taking up 
residence, the period of residence before and after such enforced 
displacement shall be regarded as one uninterrupted period for any purposes 
for which uninterrupted residence is required. 
Article 11. - Refugee seamen 
In the case of refugees regularly serving as crew members on board a ship 
flying the flag of a Contracting State, that State shall give sympathetic 
consideration to their establishment on its territory and the issue of travel 
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documents to them or their temporary admission to its territory particularly 
with a view to facilitating their establishment in another country. 
CHAPTER II 
JURIDICAL STATUS 
Article 12. - Personal status 
1. The personal status of a refugee shall be governed by the law of the 
country of his domicile or, if he has no domicile, by the law of the country of 
his residence. 
2. Rights previously acquired by a refugee and dependent on personal status, 
more particularly rights attaching to marriage, shall be respected by a 
Contracting State, subject to compliance, if this be necessary, with the 
formalities required by the law of that State, provided that the right in question 
is one which would have been recognized by the law of that State had he not 
become a refugee. 
Article 13. - Movable and immovable property 
The Contracting States shall accord to a refugee treatment as favourable as 
possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens 
generally in the same circumstances, as regards the acquisition of movable 
and immovable property and other rights pertaining thereto, and to leases 
and other contracts relating to movable and immovable property. 
Article 14. - Artistic rights and industrial property 
In respect of the protection of industrial property, such as inventions, designs 
or models, trade marks, trade names, and of rights in literary, artistic and 
scientific works, a refugee shall be accorded in the country in which he has 
his habitual residence the same protection as is accorded to nationals of that 
country. In the territory of any other Contracting States, he shall be accorded 
the same protection as is accorded in that territory to nationals of the country 
in which he has his habitual residence. 
Article 15. - Right of association 
As regards non-political and non-profit-making associations and trade unions 
the Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their 
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territory the most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign 
country, in the same circumstances. 
Article 16. - Access to courts 
1. A refugee shall have free access to the courts of law on the territory of all 
Contracting States. 
2. A refugee shall enjoy in the Contracting State in which he has his habitual 
residence the same treatment as a national in matters pertaining to access to 
the courts, including legal assistance and exemption from cautio judicatum 
solvi. 
3. A refugee shall be accorded in the matters referred to in paragraph 2 in 
countries other than that in which he has his habitual residence the treatment 
granted to a national of the country of his habitual residence. 
CHAPTER III 
GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT 
Article 17. - Wage-earning employment 
1. The Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their 
territory the most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign 
country in the same circumstances, as regards the right to engage in wage-
earning employment. 
2. In any case, restrictive measures imposed on aliens or the employment of 
aliens for the protection of the national labour market shall not be applied to a 
refugee who was already exempt from them at the date of entry into force of 
this Convention for the Contracting State concerned, or who fulfils one of the 
following conditions: 
(a) He has completed three years' residence in the country; 
(b) He has a spouse possessing the nationality of the country of residence. A 
refugee may not invoke the benefit of this provision if he has abandoned his 
spouse; 
(c) He has one or more children possessing the nationality of the country of 
residence. 
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3. The Contracting States shall give sympathetic consideration to assimilating 
the rights of all refugees with regard to wage-earning employment to those of 
nationals, and in particular of those refugees who have entered their territory 
pursuant to programmes of labour recruitment or under immigration schemes. 
Article 18. - Self-employment 
The Contracting States shall accord to a refugee lawfully in their territory 
treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable 
than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances, as regards 
the right to engage on his own account in agriculture, industry, handicrafts 
and commerce and to establish commercial and industrial companies. 
Article 19. - Liberal professions 
1. Each Contracting State shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their 
territory who hold diplomas recognized by the competent authorities of that 
State, and who are desirous of practising a liberal profession, treatment as 
favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that 
accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances. 
2. The Contracting States shall use their best endeavours consistently with 
their laws and constitutions to secure the settlement of such refugees in the 
territories, other than the metropolitan territory, for whose international 
relations they are responsible. 
CHAPTER IV 
WELFARE 
Article 20. - Rationing 
Where a rationing system exists, which applies to the population at large and 
regulates the general distribution of products in short supply, refugees shall 
be accorded the same treatment as nationals. 
Article 21. - Housing 
As regards housing, the Contracting States, in so far as the matter is 
regulated by laws or regulations or is subject to the control of public 
authorities, shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory treatment 
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as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that 
accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances. 
Article 22. - Public education 
1. The Contracting States shall accord to refugees the same treatment as is 
accorded to nationals with respect to elementary education. 
2. The Contracting States shall accord to refugees treatment as favourable as 
possible, and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens 
generally in the same circumstances, with respect to education other than 
elementary education and, in particular, as regards access to studies, the 
recognition of foreign school certificates, diplomas and degrees, the 
remission of fees and charges and the award of scholarships. 
Article 23. - Public relief 
The Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their 
territory the same treatment with respect to public relief and assistance as is 
accorded to their nationals. 
Article 24. - Labour legislation and social security 
1. The Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their 
territory the same treatment as is accorded to nationals in respect of the 
following matters; 
(a) In so far as such matters are governed by laws or regulations or are 
subject to the control of administrative authorities: remuneration, including 
family allowances where these form part of remuneration, hours of work, 
overtime arrangements, holidays with pay, restrictions on home work, 
minimum age of employment, apprenticeship and training, women's work and 
the work of young persons, and the enjoyment of the benefits of collective 
bargaining; 
(b) Social security (legal provisions in respect of employment injury, 
occupational diseases, maternity, sickness, disability, old age, death, 
unemployment, family responsibilities and any other contingency which, 
according to national laws or regulations, is covered by a social security 
scheme), subject to the following limitations: 
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(i) There may be appropriate arrangements for the maintenance of acquired 
rights and rights in course of acquisition; 
(ii) National laws or regulations of the country of residence may prescribe 
special arrangements concerning benefits or portions of benefits which are 
payable wholly out of public funds, and concerning allowances paid to 
persons who do not fulfil the contribution conditions prescribed for the award 
of a normal pension. 
2. The right to compensation for the death of a refugee resulting from 
employment injury or from occupational disease shall not be affected by the 
fact that the residence of the beneficiary is outside the territory of the 
Contracting State. 
3. The Contracting States shall extend to refugees the benefits of agreements 
concluded between them, or which may be concluded between them in the 
future, concerning the maintenance of acquired rights and rights in the 
process of acquisition in regard to social security, subject only to the 
conditions which apply to nationals of the States signatory to the agreements 
in question. 
4. The Contracting States will give sympathetic consideration to extending to 
refugees so far as possible the benefits of similar agreements which may at 
any time be in force between such Contracting States and non- contracting 
States. 
CHAPTER V 
ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES 
Article 25. -Administrative assistance 
1. When the exercise of a right by a refugee would normally require the 
assistance of authorities of a foreign country to whom he cannot have 
recourse, the Contracting States in whose territory he is residing shall 
arrange that such assistance be afforded to him by their own authorities or by 
an international authority. 
2. The authority or authorities mentioned in paragraph 1 shall deliver or cause 
to be delivered under their supervision to refugees such documents or 
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certifications as would normally be delivered to aliens by or through their 
national authorities. 
3. Documents or certifications so delivered shall stand in the stead of the 
official instruments delivered to aliens by or through their national authorities, 
and shall be given credence in the absence of proof to the contrary. 
4. Subject to such exceptional treatment as may be granted to indigent 
persons, fees may be charged for the services mentioned herein, but such 
fees shall be moderate and commensurate with those charged to nationals 
for similar services. 
5. The provisions of this article shall be without prejudice to articles 27 and 
28. 
Article 26. - Freedom of movement 
Each Contracting State shall accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the 
right to choose their place of residence and to move freely within its territory 
subject to any regulations applicable to aliens generally in the same 
circumstances. 
Article 27. - Identity papers 
The Contracting States shall issue identity papers to any refugee in their 
territory who does not possess a valid travel document. 
Article 28. - Travel documents 
1 . The Contracting States shall issue to refugees lawfully staying in their 
territory travel documents for the purpose of travel outside their territory, 
unless compelling reasons of national security or public order otherwise 
require, and the provisions of the Schedule to this Convention shall apply with 
respect to such documents. The Contracting States may issue such a travel 
document to any other refugee in their territory; they shall in particular give 
sympathetic consideration to the issue of such a travel document to refugees 
in their territory who are unable to obtain a travel document from the country 
of their lawful residence. 
2. Travel documents issued to refugees under previous international 
agreements by Parties thereto shall be recognized and treated by the 
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Contracting States in the same way as if they had been issued pursuant to 
this article. 
Article 29. - Fiscal charges 
1. The Contracting States shall not impose upon refugees duties, charges or 
taxes, of any description whatsoever, other or higher than those which are or 
may be levied on their nationals in similar situations. 
2. Nothing in the above paragraph shall prevent the application to refugees of 
the laws and regulations concerning charges in respect of the issue to aliens 
of administrative documents including identity papers. 
Article 30. - Transfer of assets 
1. A Contracting State shall, in conformity with its laws and regulations, permit 
refugees to transfer assets which they have brought into its territory, to 
another country where they have been admitted for the purposes of 
resettlement. 
2. A Contracting State shall give sympathetic consideration to the application 
of refugees for permission to transfer assets wherever they may be and which 
are necessary for their resettlement in another country to which they have 
been admitted. 
Article 31. - Refugees unlawfully in the country of refuge 
1. The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their 
illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory 
where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or 
are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present 
themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their 
illegal entry or presence. 
2. The Contracting States shall not apply to the movements of such refugees 
restrictions other than those which are necessary and such restrictions shall 
only be applied until their status in the country is regularized or they obtain 
admission into another country. The Contracting States shall allow such 
refugees a reasonable period and all the necessary facilities to obtain 
admission into another country. 
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Article 32. - Expulsion 
1. The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory 
save on grounds of national security or public order. 
2. The expulsion of such a refugee shall be only in pursuance of a decision 
reached in accordance with due process of law. Except where compelling 
reasons of national security otherwise require, the refugee shall be allowed to 
submit evidence to clear himself, and to appeal to and be represented for the 
purpose before competent authority or a person or persons specially 
designated by the competent authority. 
3. The Contracting States shall allow such a refugee a reasonable period 
within which to seek legal admission into another country. The Contracting 
States reserve the right to apply during that period such internal measures as 
they may deem necessary. 
Article 33. - Prohibition of expulsion or return ("refoulement") 
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any 
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom 
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group or political opinion. 
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a 
refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the 
security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final 
judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the 
community of that country. 
Article 34. - Naturalization 
The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and 
naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to 
expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the 
charges and costs of such proceedings. 
CHAPTER VI 
EXECUTORY AND TRANSITORY PROVISIONS 
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Article 35. - Co-operation of the national authorities with the United 
Nations 
1. The Contracting States undertake to co-operate with the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or any other agency of the 
United Nations which may succeed it, in the exercise of its functions, and 
shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the 
provisions of this Convention. 
2. In order to enable the Office of the High Commissioner or any other agency 
of the United Nations which may succeed it, to make reports to the competent 
organs of the United Nations, the Contracting States undertake to provide 
them in the appropriate form with information and statistical data requested 
concerning: 
(a) The condition of refugees, 
(b) The implementation of this Convention, and 
(c) Laws, regulations and decrees which are, or may hereafter be, in force 
relating to refugees. 
Article 36. - Information on national legislation 
The Contracting States shall communicate to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations the laws and regulations which they may adopt to ensure the 
application of this Convention. 
Article 37. - Relation to previous conventions 
Without prejudice to article 28, paragraph 2, of this Convention, this 
Convention replaces, as between Parties to it, the Arrangements of 5 July 
1922, 31 May 1924, 12 May 1926, 30 June 1928 and 30 July 1935, the 
Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 1938, the Protocol of 14 
September 1939 and the Agreement of 15 October 1946. 
CHAPTER VII 
FINAL CLAUSES 
Article 38. - Settlement of disputes 
Any dispute between Parties to this Convention relating to its interpretation or 
application, which cannot be settled by other means, shall be referred to the 
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International Court of Justice at the request of any one of the parties to the 
dispute. 
Article 39. - Signature, ratification and accession 
1. This Convention shall be opened for signature at Geneva on 28 July 1951 
and shall thereafter be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations. It shall be open for signature at the European Office of the United 
Nations from 28 July to 31 August 1951 and shall be re-opened for signature 
at the Headquarters of the United Nations from 17 September 1951 to 31 
December 1952. 
2. This Convention shall be open for signature on behalf of all States 
Members of the United Nations, and also on behalf of any other State invited 
to attend the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons or to which an invitation to sign will have been addressed 
by the General Assembly. It shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification 
shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
3. This Convention shall be open from 28 July 1951 for accession by the 
States referred to in paragraph 2 of this article. Accession shall be effected by 
the deposit of an instrument of accession with the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations. 
Article 40. - Territorial application clause 
1. Any State may, at the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare 
that this Convention shall extend to all or any of the territories for the 
international relations of which it is responsible. Such a declaration shall take 
effect when the Convention enters into force for the State concerned. 
2. At any time thereafter any such extension shall be made by notification 
addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and shall take 
effect as from the ninetieth day after the day of receipt by the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations of this notification, or as from the date of entry 
into force of the Convention for the State concerned, whichever is the later. 
3. With respect to those territories to which this Convention is not extended at 
the time of signature, ratification or accession, each State concerned shall 
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consider the possibility of taking the necessary steps in order to extend the 
application of this Convention to such territories, subject, where necessary for 
constitutional reasons, to the consent of the Governments of such territories. 
Article 41. - Federal clause 
In the case of a Federal or non-unitary State, the following provisions shall 
apply: 
(a) With respect to those articles of this Convention that come within the 
legislative jurisdiction of the federal legislative authority, the obligations of the 
Federal Government shall to this extent be the same as those of parties 
which are not Federal States; 
(b) With respect to those articles of this Convention that come within the 
legislative jurisdiction of constituent States, provinces or cantons which are 
not, under the constitutional system of the Federation, bound to take 
legislative action, the Federal Government shall bring such articles with a 
favourable recommendation to the notice of the appropriate authorities of 
States, provinces or cantons at the earliest possible moment; 
(c) A Federal State Party to this Convention shall, at the request of any other 
Contracting State transmitted through the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, supply a statement of the law and practice of the Federation and its 
constituent units in regard to any particular provision of the Convention 
showing the extent to which effect has been given to that provision by 
legislative or other action. 
Article 42. - Reservations 
1. At the time of signature, ratification or accession, any State may make 
reservations to articles of the Convention other than to articles 1, 3, 4, 16 (1), 
33, 36-46 inclusive. 
2. Any State making a reservation in accordance with paragraph I of this 
article may at any time withdraw the reservation by a communication to that 
effect addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
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Article 43. - Entry into force 
1. This Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the 
day of deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification or accession. 
2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of 
the sixth instrument of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter 
into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit by such State of 
its instrument of ratification or accession. 
Article 44. - Denunciation 
1. Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention at any time by a 
notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
2. Such denunciation shall take effect for the Contracting State concerned 
one year from the date upon which it is received by the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations. 
3. Any State which has made a declaration or notification under article 40 
may, at any time thereafter, by a notification to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, declare that the Convention shall cease to extend to such 
territory one year after the date of receipt of the notification by the Secretary-
General. Article 45. - Revision 
1. Any Contracting State may request revision of this Convention at any time 
by a notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
2. The General Assembly of the United Nations shall recommend the steps, if 
any, to be taken in respect of such request. 
Article 46. -Notifications by the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all Members of the 
United Nations and non-member States referred to in article 39: 
(a) Of declarations and notifications in accordance with section B of article 1; 
(b) Of signatures, ratifications and accessions in accordance with article 39; 
(c) Of declarations and notifications in accordance with article 40; 
(d) Of reservations and withdrawals in accordance with article 42; 
(e) Of the date on which this Convention will come into force in accordance 
with article 43; 
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(f) Of denunciations and notifications in accordance with article 44; 
(g) Of requests for revision in accordance with article 45. 
IN FAITH WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this 
Convention on behalf of their respective Governments. 
DONE at Geneva, this twenty-eighth day of July, one thousand nine hundred 
and fifty-one, in a single copy, of which the English and French texts are 
equally authentic and which shall remain deposited in the archives of the 
United Nations, and certified true copies of which shall be delivered to all 
Members of the United Nations and to the non-member States referred to in 
article 39. 
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ANNEXURE II 
 
PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, 606 
U.N.T.S. 267, ENTERED INTO FORCE OCT. 4, 1967 
 
  
The Protocol was taken note of with approval by the Economic and Social 
Council in resolution 1186 (XLI) of 18 November 1966 and was taken note of 
by the General Assembly in resolution 2198 (XXI) of 16 December 1966. In 
the same resolution the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General 
to transmit the text of the Protocol to the Stares mentioned in article 5 thereof, 
with a view to enabling them to accede to the Protocol 
ENTRY INTO FORCE: 4 October 1967, in accordance with article 8 
The States Parties to the present Protocol, 
Considering that the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at 
Geneva on 28 July 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Convention) covers 
only those persons who have become refugees as a result of events 
occurring before I January 1951, 
Considering that new refugee situations have arisen since the Convention 
was adopted and that the refugees concerned may therefore not fall within 
the scope of the Convention, 
Considering that it is desirable that equal status should be enjoyed by all 
refugees covered by the definition in the Convention irrespective of the 
dateline I January 1951, 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article 1. - General provision 
1. The States Parties to the present Protocol undertake to apply articles 2 to 
34 inclusive of the Convention to refugees as hereinafter defined. 
2. For the purpose of the present Protocol, the term "refugee" shall, except as 
regards the application of paragraph 3 of this article, mean any person within 
the definition of article I of the Convention as if the words "As a result of 
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events occurring before 1 January 1951 and..." and the words "...as a result 
of such events", in article 1 A (2) were omitted. 
3. The present Protocol shall be applied by the States Parties hereto without 
any geographic limitation, save that existing declarations made by States 
already Parties to the Convention in accordance with article I B (I) (a) of the 
Convention, shall, unless extended under article I B (2) thereof, apply also 
under the present Protocol. 
Article 2. - Co-operation of the national authorities with the United 
Nations 
1. The States Parties to the present Protocol undertake to co-operate with the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or any other 
agency of the United Nations which may succeed it, in the exercise of its 
functions, and shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising the 
application of the provisions of the present Protocol. 
2. In order to enable the Office of the High Commissioner or any other agency 
of the United Nations which may succeed it, to make reports to the competent 
organs of the United Nations, the States Parties to the present Protocol 
undertake to provide them with the information and statistical data requested, 
in the appropriate form, concerning: 
(a) The condition of refugees; 
(b) The implementation of the present Protocol; 
(c) Laws, regulations and decrees which are, or may hereafter be, in force 
relating to refugees. 
Article 3. - Information on national legislation 
The States Parties to the present Protocol shall communicate to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations the laws and regulations which they 
may adopt to ensure the application of the present Protocol. 
Article 4 - Settlement of disputes 
Any dispute between States Parties to the present Protocol which relates to 
its interpretation or application and which cannot be settled by other means 
304 
 
shall be referred to the International Court of Justice at the request of any one 
of the parties to the dispute. 
Article 5. - Accession 
The present Protocol shall be open for accession on behalf of all States 
Parties to the Convention and of any other State Member of the United 
Nations or member of any of the specialized agencies or to which an 
invitation to accede may have been addressed by the General Assembly of 
the United Nations. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an 
instrument of accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
Article 6. - Federal clause 
In the case of a Federal or non-unitary State, the following provisions shall 
apply: 
(a) With respect to those articles of the Convention to be applied in 
accordance with article I, paragraph 1, of the present Protocol that come 
within the legislative jurisdiction of the federal legislative authority, the 
obligations of the Federal Government shall to this extent be the same as 
those of States Parties which are not Federal States; 
(b) With respect to those articles of the Convention to be applied in 
accordance with article I, paragraph 1, of the present Protocol that come 
within the legislative jurisdiction of constituent States, provinces or cantons 
which are not, under the constitutional system of the Federation, bound to 
take legislative action, the Federal Government shall bring such articles with 
a favourable recommendation to the notice of the appropriate authorities of 
States, provinces or cantons at the earliest possible moment; 
(c) A Federal State Party to the present Protocol shall, at the request of any 
other State Party hereto transmitted through the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, supply a statement of the law and practice of the Federation 
and its constituent units in regard to any particular provision of the 
Convention to be applied in accordance with article I, paragraph 1, of the 
present Protocol, showing the extent to which effect has been given to that 
provision by legislative or other action. 
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Article VII. - Reservations and declarations 
1. At the time of accession, any State may make reservations in respect of 
article IV of the present Protocol and in respect of the application in 
accordance with article I of the present Protocol of any provisions of the 
Convention other than those contained in articles 1, 3, 4, 16(1) and 33 
thereof, provided that in the case of a State Party to the Convention 
reservations made under this article shall not extend to refugees in respect of 
whom the Convention applies. 
2. Reservations made by States Parties to the Convention in accordance with 
article 42 thereof shall, unless withdrawn, be applicable in relation to their 
obligations under the present Protocol. 
3. Any State making a reservation in accordance with paragraph I of this 
article may at any time withdraw such reservation by a communication to that 
effect addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
4. Declarations made under article 40, paragraphs I and 2, of the Convention 
by a State Party thereto which accedes to the present Protocol shall be 
deemed to apply in respect of the present Protocol, unless upon accession a 
notification to the contrary is addressed by the State Party concerned to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations. The provisions of article 40, 
paragraphs 2 and 3, and of article 44, paragraph 3, of the Convention shall be 
deemed to apply muratis mutandis to the present Protocol. 
Article 8.- Entry into Protocol 
1. The present Protocol shall come into force on the day of deposit of the 
sixth instrument of accession. 
2. For each State acceding to the Protocol after the deposit of the sixth 
instrument of accession, the Protocol shall come into force on the date of 
deposit by such State of its instrument of accession. 
Article 9.- Denunciation 
1. Any State Party hereto may denounce this Protocol at any time by a 
notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
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2. Such denunciation shall take effect for the State Party concerned one year 
from the date on which it is received by the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations. 
Article 10.- Notifications by the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform the States referred 
to in article V above of the date of entry into force, accessions, reservations 
and withdrawals of reservations to and denunciations of the present Protocol, 
and of declarations and notifications relating hereto . 
Article 11. - Deposit in the archives of the Secretariat of the United 
Nations 
A copy of the present Protocol, of which the Chinese, English, French, 
Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, signed by the President of 
the General Assembly and by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
shall be deposited in the archives of the Secretariat of the United Nations. 
The Secretary-General will transmit certified copies thereof to all States 
Members of the United Nations and to the other States referred to in article 5 
above. 
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ANNEXURE III 
 
CONVENTION GOVERNING THE SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF 
REFUGEE PROBLEMS IN AFRICA, 1001 U.N.T.S. 
45, ENTERED INTO FORCE JUNE 20, 1974 
 
  
PREAMBLE 
We, the Heads of State and Government assembled in the city of Addis 
Ababa, from 6-10 September 1969, 
1. Noting with concern the constantly increasing numbers of refugees in 
Africa and desirous of finding ways and means of alleviating their misery and 
suffering as well as providing them with a better life and future, 
2. Recognizing the need for and essentially humanitarian approach towards 
solving the problems of refugees, 
3. Aware, however, that refugee problems are a source of friction among 
many Member States, and desirous of eliminating the source of such discord, 
4. Anxious to make a distinction between a refugee who seeks a peaceful 
and normal life and a person fleeing his country for the sole purpose of 
fomenting subversion from outside, 
5. Determined that the activities of such subversive elements should be 
discouraged, in accordance with the Declaration on the Problem of 
Subversion and Resolution on the Problem of Refugees adopted at Accra in 
1965, 
6. Bearing in mind that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights have affirmed the principle that human beings 
shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination, 
7. Recalling Resolution 2312 (XXII) of 14 December 1967 of the United 
Nations General Assembly, relating to the Declaration on Territorial Asylum, 
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8. Convinced that all the problems of our continent must be solved in the spirit 
of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and in the African context, 
9. Recognizing that the United Nations Convention of 28 July 1951, as 
modified by the Protocol of 31 January 1967, constitutes the basic and 
universal instrument relating to the status of refugees and reflects the deep 
concern of States for refugees and their desire to establish common 
standards for their treatment, 
10. Recalling Resolutions 26 and 104 of the OAU Assemblies of Heads of 
State and Government, calling upon Member States of the Organization who 
had not already done so to accede to the United Nations Convention of 1951 
and to the Protocol of 1967 relating to the Status of Refugees, and meanwhile 
to apply their provisions to refugees in Africa, 
11. Convinced that the efficiency of the measures recommended by the 
present Convention to solve the problem of refugees in Africa necessitates 
close and continuous collaboration between the Organization of African Unity 
and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article 1 
Definition of the term "Refugee" 
1. For the purposes of this Convention, the term "refugee" shall mean every 
person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or who, 
not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual 
residence as a result of such events is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to return to it. 
2. The term "refugee" shall also apply to every person who, owing to external 
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing 
public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is 
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compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in 
another place outside his country of origin or nationality. 
3. In the case of a person who has several nationalities, the term "a country of 
which he is a national" shall mean each of the countries of which he is a 
national, and a person shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the 
country of which he is a national if, without any valid reason based on well-
founded fear, he has not availed himself of the protection of one of the 
countries of which he is a national. 
4. This Convention shall cease to apply to any refugee if: (a) he has 
voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country of his nationality, 
or, 
(b) having lost his nationality, he has voluntarily reacquired it, or, (c) he has 
acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of his new 
nationality, or, (d) he has voluntarily re-established himself in the country 
which he left or outside which he remained owing to fear of persecution, or, 
(e) he can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he 
was recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail 
himself of the protection of the country of his nationality, or, (f) he has 
committed a serious non-political crime outside his country of refuge after his 
admission to that country as a refugee, or, (g) he has seriously infringed the 
purposes and objectives of this Convention. 
5. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with 
respect to whom the country of asylum has serious reasons for considering 
that: (a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime 
against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to 
make provision in respect of such crimes; (b) he committed a serious non-
political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that 
country as a refugee; (c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes 
and principles of the Organization of African Unity; (d) he has been guilty of 
acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 
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6. For the purposes of this Convention, the Contracting State of Asylum shall 
determine whether an applicant is a refugee. 
Article 2 
Asylum 
1. Member States of the OAU shall use their best endeavours consistent with 
their respective legislations to receive refugees and to secure the settlement 
of those refugees who, for well-founded reasons, are unable or unwilling to 
return to their country of origin or nationality. 
2. The grant of asylum to refugees is a peaceful and humanitarian act and 
shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act by any Member State. 
3. No person shall be subjected by a Member State to measures such as 
rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion, which would compel him to return 
to or remain in a territory where his life, physical integrity or 
liberty would be threatened for the reasons set out in Article I, paragraphs 1 
and 2. 
4. Where a Member State finds difficulty in continuing to grant asylum to 
refugees, such Member State may appeal directly to other Member States 
and through the OAU, and such other Member States shall in the spirit of 
African solidarity and international co-operation take appropriate measures to 
lighten the burden of the Member State granting asylum. 
5. Where a refugee has not received the right to reside in any country of 
asylum, he may be granted temporary residence in any country of asylum in 
which he first presented himself as a refugee pending arrangement for his 
resettlement in accordance with the preceding paragraph. 
6. For reasons of security, countries of asylum shall, as far as possible, settle 
refugees at a reasonable distance from the frontier of their country of origin. 
Article 3 
Prohibition of Subversive Activities 
1. Every refugee has duties to the country in which he finds himself, which 
require in particular that he conforms with its laws and regulations as well as 
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with measures taken for the maintenance of public order. He shall also 
abstain from any subersive activities against any Member State of the OAU. 
2. Signatory States undertake to prohibit refugees residing in their respective 
territories from attacking any State Member of the OAU, by any activity likely 
to cause tension between Member States, and in particular by use of arms, 
through the press, or by radio. 
Article 4 
Non-Discrimination 
Member States undertake to apply the provisions of this Convention to all 
refugees without discrimination as to race, religion, nationality, membership of 
a particular social group or political opinions. 
Article 5 
Voluntary Repatriation 
1. The essentially voluntary character of repatriation shall be respected in all 
cases and no refugee shall be repatriated against his will. 
2. The country of asylum, in collaboration with the country of origin, shall 
make adequate arrangements for the safe return of refugees who request 
repatriation. 
3. The country of origin, on receiving back refugees, shall facilitate their 
resettlement and grant them the full rights and privileges of nationals of the 
country, and subject them to the same obligations. 
4. Refugees who voluntarily return to their country shall in no way be 
penalized for having left it for any of the reasons giving rise to refugee 
situations. Whenever necessary, an appeal shall be made through national 
information media and through the Administrative Secretary-General of the 
OAU, inviting refugees to return home and giving assurance that the new 
circumstances prevailing in their country of origin will enable them to return 
without risk and to take up a normal and peaceful life without fear of being 
disturbed or punished, and that the text of such appeal should be given to 
refugees and clearly explained to them by their country of asylum. 
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5. Refugees who freely decide to return to their homeland, as a result of such 
assurances or on their own initiative, shall be given every possible assistance 
by the country of asylum, the country of origin, voluntary agencies and 
international and intergovernmental organizations, to facilitate their return. 
Article 6 
Travel Documents 
1. Subject to Article III, Member States shall issue to refugees lawfully staying 
in their territories travel documents in accordance with the United Nations 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the Schedule and Annex 
thereto, for the purpose of travel outside their territory, unless compelling 
reasons of national security or public order otherwise require. Member States 
may issue such a travel document to any other refugee in their territory. 
2. Where an African country of second asylum accepts a refugee from a 
country of first asylum, the country of first asylum may be dispensed from 
issuing a document with a return clause. 
3. Travel documents issued to refugees under previous international 
agreements by States Parties thereto shall be recognized and treated by 
Member States in the same way as if they had been issued to refugees 
pursuant to this Article. 
Article 7 
Co-operation of the National Authorities with the Organization of African Unity 
In order to enable the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of 
African Unity to make reports to the competent organs of the Organization of 
African Unity, Member States undertake to provide the Secretariat in the 
appropriate form with information and statistical data requested concerning: 
(a) the condition of refugees; (b) the implementation of this Convention, and 
(c) laws, regulations and decrees which are, or may hereafter be, in force 
relating to refugees. 
Article 8 
Cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees 
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1. Member States shall co-operate with the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees. 
2. The present Convention shall be the effective regional complement in 
Africa of the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees. 
Article 9 
Settlement of Disputes 
Any dispute between States signatories to this Convention relating to its 
interpretation or application, which cannot be settled by other means, shall be 
referred to the Commission for Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration of the 
Organization of African Unity, at the request of any one of the Parties to the 
dispute. 
Article 10 
Signature and Ratification 
1. This Convention is open for signature and accession by all Member States 
of the Organization of African Unity and shall be ratified by signatory States in 
accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of 
ratification shall be deposited with the Administrative Secretary-General of the 
Organization of African Unity. 
2. The original instrument, done if possible in African languages, and in 
English and French, all texts being equally authentic, shall be deposited with 
the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity. 
3. Any independent African State, Member of the Organization of African 
Unity, may at any time notify the Administrative Secretary-General of the 
Organization of African Unity of its accession to this Convention. 
Article 11 
Entry into force 
This Convention shall come into force upon deposit of instruments of 
ratification by one-third of the Member States of the Organization of African 
Unity. 
Article 12 
Amendment 
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This Convention may be amended or revised if any member State makes a 
written request to the Administrative Secretary-General to that effect, 
provided however that the proposed amendment shall not be submitted to the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government for consideration until all 
Member States have been duly notified of it and a period of one year has 
elapsed. Such an amendment shall not be effective unless approved by at 
least two-thirds of the Member States Parties to the present Convention. 
Article 13 
Denunciation 
1. Any Member State Party to this Convention may denounce its provisions 
by a written notification to the Administrative Secretary-General. 
2. At the end of one year from the date of such notification, if not withdrawn, 
the Convention shall cease to apply with respect to the denouncing State. 
Article 14 
Upon entry into force of this Convention, the Administrative Secretary-
General of the OAU shall register it with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Article 15 
Notifications by the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of 
African Unity 
The Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity 
shall inform all Members of the Organization: (a) of signatures, ratifications 
and accessions in accordance with Article X; (b) of entry into force, in 
accordance with Article XI; (c) of requests for amendments submitted under 
the terms of Article XII; (d) of denunciations, in acccordance with Article XIII. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF WE, the Heads of African State and Government, 
have signed this Convention. 
DONE in the City of Addis Ababa this 10th day of September 1969. As of 06 
January 1995 
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